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Directed by: Professor Robert Griffith
This dissertation examines the political economy of
the United States in the second quarter of the twentieth
century, focusing on the public career of David E.
Lilienthal. This is not a biography, but rather, uses
Lilienthal's career as a lens for viewing the American
At-
economy at a time when the relationship between the state
and private economic enterprise underwent a profound
transformation.
A student of Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School,
Lilienthal went to work as a labor lawyer with Donald
Richberg in the aftermath of the 1922 railroad shopcraft
strike and helped craft the legislation that culminated in
the Railway Labor Act of 1926. During 1931-1933, Lilienthal
reorganized the Wisconsin Public Service Commission under
Governor Philip La Follette, establishing a reputation as a
regulatory activist that resulted in his appointment to the
board of the newly-chartered Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) . After a protracted struggle with TVA chairman
vi
Arthur E. Morgan, Lilienthal gained control of the agency,
where he remained until the end of World War II.
During the interwar period, Lilienthal was a
participant in the formation of what has come to be known
as a "Keynesian" political-economic perspective. Working
with colleagues such as Frankfurter and social reformer
Morris L. Cooke, as well as elements from both corporate
capital and organized labor, Lilienthal designed an agenda
for aggressive federal intervention in the marketplace with
a macroeconomic approach for coordinating the relationship
between mass production and mass consumption. Through the
Electric Home and Farm Authority's low-cost appliance
program, through high-wage, pro-union labor policies at the
agency, and most importantly through the TVA's promotion of
cheap and plentiful electricity, Lilienthal was
experimenting with the growth-oriented policies that came
to characterize Keynesianism. This position became
prominent in the New Deal during the mid-1930s, creating
salients within the federal government of a social
democratic state. By the end of the decade, however,
political opposition and the conservative implications of
this growth perspective moderated the Keynesian agenda for
the TVA and the New Deal.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS iv
ABSTRACT vi
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION. DAVID E. LILIENTHAL AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES 1
2. REGULATION IN THE AGE OF "NORMALCY:"
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT OF 192 6 18
3. SHAPING THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION:
RATES AND REGULATORY TECHNIQUE DURING
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 73
4. THE AUTHORITY AS INSTRUMENT:
STATE-BUILDING AS A TECHNOLOGICAL
ENTERPRISE AT THE TVA IN THE 1930S 128
5. SELLING STATE POWER: LEGITIMATING THE
TVA AND THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION 168
6. FORGING "A POTENTIAL MASS MARKET:"
THE ELECTRIC HOME AND FARM AUTHORITY,
1932-1935 210
7. THE "FEUD" REVISITED: ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY
AND THE LILIENTHAL-MORGAN CONTROVERSY ... 249
8. CONCLUSION. THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION
AND THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: THE
NEW DEAL ORDER IN THE POSTWAR ERA 298
BIBLIOGRAPHY '^^^
viii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION.
DAVID E. LILIENTHAL AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES
One of the central issues of the twentieth century has
been the relationship of the state to private economic
enterprise. The rise of corporate capitalism rendered
obsolete much of the political system of nineteenth century
America. Both the scope and the nature of state
intervention underwent extensive transformations, as the
struggles among shifting political coalitions altered the
country's political economy— with the rules of the
marketplace redefined and the economy's institutional
terrain reshaped. Out of this, the federal government
emerged with greatly expanded influence in American
society. The origins of this transformation in the American
political system rest in the quarter century from the mid-
1890s to 1920. Issues such as the merger movement, labor
relations, and industrialism's impact on the social fabric
dominated the ideological landscape at the turn of the
century. By 1917-1919 the administrative arrangements of
the wartime state signaled the culmination of certain of
these political tendencies, while prefiguring a new
framework.
The principal outlines of this nascent political
economy took form during the second quarter of the
twentieth century. At the beginning of the decade, the
192 0s seemed to mark the beginning of an era of prosperity
2and stability. This, of course, did not happen. The
prosperity of the 1920s was built upon a system that could
not sustain long-term growth. Three successive Republican
administrations cannibalized the state machinery that had
coordinated the economy during the first World War, and
turned over the levers of control to private sector trade
associations. Federal policies underwrote burgeoning profit
margins and hefty stock dividends, but undermined the
stability of financial markets and the monetary system.
Corporate capital had engineered a vaunted mass production
economy, but had neglected to forge a corresponding system
of mass consumption which would secure both economic growth
and their own political hegemony. Unemployment remained
persistently high and real wages of workers (and thus
consumers) fell as increases in industrial productivity and
profits outpaced pay hikes. By the end of the decade, the
economy approached total collapse, and the Republicans were
in political retreat and ideological disarray.
What followed the chimerical "New Era" of the 1920s
were two decades of renewed conflict over the proper limits
of state power. Slowly, the results of this process became
clear. In order to maintain social stability, the
government would regulate but not control such key sectors
of the economy as investment markets. The state also sought
to mediate class conflict by attempting to forge a
consensus between management and organized labor based upon
3a mutual interest in a dynamic economy that would yield
material gains, however unequally distributed, for both.
What emerged was a kind of state-brokered capitalism.
It is the purpose of this study to explore the forging
of this modern American political economy by focusing on
the career of one man, David E. Lilienthal. A brief
overview of his activities suggests that Lilienthal is
particularly well-situated for such an enterprise. From his
practice of labor and public utility law in Chicago and
Wisconsin during the 1920s and early 1930s, through his
tenure as a director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and
finally with his work as the first chair of the Atomic
Energy Commission, Lilienthal was intimately involved in
the processes out of which the new system would emerge.
Lilienthal 's career provides valuable insight into the
changing role of the state, as all of his efforts dealt
directly with issues involving the legitimacy and the
nature of government intervention in the private sector.
His work spanned the ideological course of the period. As a
labor lawyer in the 1920s, Lilienthal worked with the
railway unions in their unsuccessful struggles to secure
federal legislation that sanctioned collective bargaining.
With those unions he suffered through the political defeats
that undermined their goals and paved the way for a more
limited state role as provided for in the Railway Labor Act
of 1926. As a director of the TVA, Lilienthal participated
4in the New Deal's brief period of social democratic
experimentation in the mid-1930s. While gradually asserting
control over the Authority, he recast its role as part of a
broader transformation of those social democratic impulses
into the more cautious, growth-oriented system that
characterized postwar America. By revealing the contours of
the postwar system, Lilienthal's work details the limits to
that order, and thus also suggests the fault lines upon
which it would ultimately split apart less than half a
century later.
Lilienthal's career also highlights the increasing
importance of the state as an independent agent of power.
Beginning with his tenure as Public Service Commissioner in
Wisconsin in 1931-1933, Lilienthal assumed the role of a
bureaucratic entrepreneur. His agencies served as more than
neutral instruments for policy implementation. At both the
Wisconsin post and then the TVA, David Lilienthal used his
administrative apparatus as a means for defining policies
and influencing public sentiment, thereby serving express
ideological goals while also enhancing each agency's
autonomy and power.
This dissertation is not a biography, although
biographical elements will almost certainly loom large, for
I use Lilienthal as a window opening onto the complex
transformation of America's political economy. Clearly,
such a vantage point cannot sustain a sufficiently broad
5perspective from which to view the entire process out of
which the postwar system emerged. Instead, I focus the
study on three themes, illuminated in the career of
Lilienthal, that set in bold relief a broader constellation
of issues. First, I consider the ideological composition
and political ascendancy of what is often described as
conservative keynesianism, which by the 1940s sustained
state-sponsored, demand-driven economic growth while
blunting reformist tendencies that had threatened to limit
private profit or managerial prerogative. I argue that the
interplay between Lilienthal 's ideological commitment to
reform politics and his institutional agenda at the PSC and
the TVA converge in his embrace of a mass consumption
strategy. While initially informed by a social democratic
vocabulary that spoke of income redistribution and a new
balance of political forces, Lilienthal 's strategy also
carried with it a set of contradictory, and profoundly
conservative, implications. As the New Deal suffered a
series of setbacks in the late 1930s, Lilienthal 's programs
shed their redistributive intentions, and focused instead
on using economic growth and mass consumption as means for
sustaining the prevailing arrangement of power.''
Second, I examine Lilienthal 's conception of
autonomous regulatory agencies and how he executed that
^There is no comprehensive biography of Lilienthal, although
political scientist Steven M. Neuse is currently at work on just
such a study.
6idea as he remade the Wisconsin Railroad Commission into
the Public Service Commission and then molded a new agency
at the TVA. A political strategy that embraced aggressive
public oversight of the economy with frequent interventions
in the marketplace required a bold commitment to a larger
and more functionally agile public bureaucracy. In short,
Lilienthal was a state-builder. The expansion of state
prerogatives has been one of the telling features of the
last fifty years, and a carefully detailed study of
Lilienthal 's efforts in this matter reveal much concerning
the creation of a state apparatus. As with his economic
policies, Lilienthal 's administrative agenda was driven by
a deeply contradictory set of implications that played out
dialectically and ultimately resulted in agencies far
different from his original conception. Rather than
becoming the forceful arm of the people, Lilienthal 's
design of autonomous public agencies such as the TVA
yielded bureaus that pursued policies shaped by an internal
administrative logic and lacked any well-defined mechanisms
for accountability through the political process.
Finally, I use the ideological struggle within the TVA
to highlight the convergence within the New Deal of the
mass consumption strategy and the expansion of state power.
Lilienthal 's pursuit of keynesian objectives ran counter to
the regional decentralism of his antagonist, TVA chair
Arthur E. Morgan. The differences between the two present a
7vivid contrast; their personal styles and political
sensibilities were as distinct as their ideologies. A
reexamination of their power struggle highlights the
mult i faceted nature of the New Deal. Lilienthal's triumph
signals the triumph of the centralizing, consumptionist
tendencies within the Roosevelt administration, yet the
transformations that occurred within the keynesian strategy
as exemplified by Lilienthal's activities at the TVA
suggest how limited this vision truly was.
My treatment of these themes locates this study within
several crosscurrents in the historiography of modern
America. A number of scholars have begun to revive
political history by moving beyond the "Presidential
Synthesis" which exercised an intellectual hegemony within
the field for years. As with the more traditional history,
these new studies portray the New Deal and its aftermath as
an epochal transition in American life, but they range far
beyond the linear narratives of electoral battles and
legislative maneuvering and examine instead a more complex
matrix of linking policies, ideologies, and economic and
social developments. Most of the scholars engaged in this
enterprise point to a set of institutional and cultural
relations variously called a "New Deal" or "Postwar Order."
Their works do not constitute a uniform historical
"school," as the analyses differ over the primary causes,
the precise timing, and the relative durability of this
8order. Still, while not monolithic, this eclectic mix of
historians and social scientists offers vital and
compelling insight regarding the emergence of a new system
of political economy in the United States by the
midtwentieth century.^
In my descriptions of this new political economy, I
frequently use the terms "keynesianism" and "conservative
(or commercial) keynesianism." These terms have applied to
a wide variety of scholarly formulations, but as I use
them, they describe an ideological constellation that
coalesced around the use of fiscal policy and regulatory
mechanisms to foster consumption-driven economic growth.
Keynesian policies embraced a broad range of the political
spectrum— from the social democratic alternatives that
sought to turn the expansion of state power toward the
redistribution of income and the legitimation of organized
^For overviews of this periodization , see Steve Fraser and
Gary Gerstle, eds
.
, The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order.
1930-1980 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989) ; David M.
Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work.
Divided Workers; The Historical Transformation of Labor in the
United States (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982) ; and
Robert Griffith, "The Forging of America's Postwar Order:
Domestic Politics and Political Economy in the Age of Truman," in
Michael J. Lacey, ed. , The Truman Presidency (Washington, D. C.
,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge
University Press, 1989), pp. 57-88.
A few examples of monographs that raise related issues are
Michael Bernstein, The Great Depression. Delayed Recovery and
Economic Change in America. 1929-1939 (New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1987) ; Lizabeth Cohen, Making A New Deal.
Industrial Workers in Chicago. 1919-1939 (New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1990) ; and Christopher L. Tomlins, The State
and the Unions (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985).
9labor, to the conservative variants that circumscribe the
role of the state and limit this ideology's reformist
tendencies
.
For these constructs, I rely heavily upon the work of
Peter Friedlander, Steven Eraser, and Carlos Pabon, which
describes the development among advocates of a mass
consumption strategy in the 1920s and early 1930s of what
came to be called a keynesian perspective. During the
twenties, planners such as Morris Cooke, union officials
such as Sidney Hillman, and business leaders such as Edward
Filene recognized the need for a synthesis of mass
consumption and mass production. By late in the decade,
these authors argue, this cadre began to recognize the
limitations of the Hooverian faith in voluntarism and
associational activity as means for rationalizing
production and ensuring long-term economic stability. These
mass consumptionists became proto-keynesians , or simply
keynesians before Keynes, when they began to see the state
as the necessary arbiter for a successful linkage of
production and consumption.^
^For a succinct critique of the "Presidential Synthesis,"
see Alan Brinkley, "Writing the History of Contemporary America:
Dilemmas and Challenges," Daedalus 113 (1984): 121-141.
See Fraser, Labor Will Rule. Sidney Hillman and the Rise of
American Labor (New York, Free Press, 1991) and "The ^ Labor
Question'" in, Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds. , The Rise and Fall
of the New Deal Order. 1930-1980 (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1989), pp. 55-84; Friedlander, "The Origins of the Welfare
State: The Keynesian Elite and the Second New Deal, 1910-1936,"
(Unpublished Manuscript, 1987); and, Pabon, "Regulating
Capitalism," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (University of
10
In 1931-1935, during his tenure in Wisconsin and his
first years at the TVA, Lilienthal adopted a keynesian
perspective. After Felix Frankfurter, his teacher at
Harvard and his mentor for many more years, Morris Cooke
was Lilienthal 's staunchest supporter and most consistent
confidante. Cooke provided counsel during Lilienthal 's
greatest political struggles, and shared as well the
intellectual context of his economic philosophy. But
Lilienthal drew on Cooke's advice and ideas not simply as
some sort of intellectual endeavor, but rather because the
Massachusetts Amherst, 1992) . For more on these issues, see
below, esp. chapters 4 and 5.
On commercial keynesianism, see Robert M. Collins, The
Business Response to Keynes^ 1929-1964 (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1981) . On social keynesianism, see Margaret
Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities
for ^Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden,
Britain, and the United States," in Peter B. Evans, et al
,
eds..
Bringing the State Back In (New York, Cambridge University Press,
1985), pp. 108-163. As will be noted below, I disagree with
Skocpol and her colleagues on the "state capacity" issue, but the
range of their work on the history of the American state rests on
much broader (and firmer) ground than the particulars of that one
issue
.
I will at times also employ the terms "fordism" or
"productivism. " As with keynesianism, I do not use fordism in any
strictly doctrinal sense, which in this case would denote a
specific production regime as most commonly exemplified by
automobile assembly plants. For the most part, I use one of these
terms when I am most concerned with issues of industrial
production typified by high output and low per-unit profit
margins, and the linkage of mass production to consumption.
Keynesianism will remain the term I use most freguently when
referring to issues surrounding the broader questions of
political economy. The reader should note that I do not
capitalize either "keynesianism" or "fordism" precisely because I
am using these terms to describe ideological responses to the
political and economic environment particular to mass
industrialism. In this study, the terms do not denote a school of
thought that owes a direct lineage to the writings of J.M.
Keynes, or to the specific manufacturing practices of Henry Ford.
consumptionist agenda fit his institutional interests.
Lilienthal understood that the success of the mass
consumption strategy would enhance his agencies and promote
the regulatory politics on which he had staked his career.
Lilienthal 's efforts to strengthen the Wisconsin PSC
and the TVA raise a related set of issues regarding his
role as a "state-builder." The work of Stephen Skowronek
and Theda Skocpol in particular has turned scholars'
attention to the importance of government's ability to
intervene, or "state capacity," as a crucial determinant in
the development of modern political economies. Especially
in the United States, they argue, the historical absence of
a centralized state bureaucracy served to limit the
possibilities for state intervention, confined the scope of
regulation, and fostered closer ties between the state and
large-scale business firms, which had already developed
efficient, national corporate infrastructures capable of
self-regulating the complex matrices of private enterprise.
Examples that are often cited include the various business
executives who lent administrative expertise to the
government during World War I, and the control that
corporate capital exercised over the National Recovery
Administration. Influenced as well by the powerful
organizational paradigm shaped by Louis Galambos and Alfred
Chandler, this work has situated the growth of bureaucratic
12
systems as one of the central experiences of modern
America .
^
But much of the work on statebuilding has portrayed
state capacity as simply a neutral tool, with little
politics or formal ideology embedded within the
bureaucratic structure itself. The policy-makers and their
policies reflect certain ideological positions, but the
bureaucratic forms they employ do not. The limits to state
intervention in the first half of the twentieth century
become, then, primarily a question of technological
immaturity— the machinery of state was insufficiently
developed, and the country lacked a political culture that
could build better tools.
^
'^Theda Skocpol, "Political Responses to Capitalist Crisis:
Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,"
Politics and Society 10 (1980): 155-201; Skocpol and Kenneth
Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early
New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (1978): 255-278; and
Stephen Skowronek, Building A New American State. The Expansion
of National Administrative Capacities. 1877-1920 (New York,
Cambridge University Press, 1982)
.
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters
in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1962), and Chandler, The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1977); Louis Galambos, "The Emerging
Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," Business
History Review 44 (1970): 471-493, and Galambos, "Technology,
Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the
Organizational Synthesis," Business History Review 57 (1983):
471-493. A valuable review (and gentle critique) of the
organizational paradigm, from the pen of a former Galambos
student, is Brian Balogh, "Reorganizing the Organizational
Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in Modern America,"
Studies in American Political Development 5 (1991): 119-172.
^See, for example, "When the Depression hit, therefore, the
U.S. had (for a major industrial nation) a bureaucratically weak
I argue that Lilienthal's experience in rebuilding the
PSC in Madison and then creating a new agency in the
Tennessee Valley suggests that the speed with which an
aggressive public agency could be built and put into action
was dependent more upon administrative and statutory
intent. Detailed studies of numerous other agencies are
needed before definitive conclusion can be drawn, but it
seems clear that at the TVA, Lilienthal was unhindered by
the lack of any long-standing "state capacity." It may be
the case, for instance, that the NRA ' s commitment to
cartel ization and its origins as an agency designed to
address the Depression as a problem of overproduction
(rather than underconsumption) had as much to do with the
agency's domination by large-scale industrial firms.
^
Skocpol and her colleagues make other contributions
that I believe speak directly and accurately to my analysis
of Lilienthal's career. During his years at the PSC and
TVA, Lilienthal came to identify himself with his agencies.
He developed what was for all practical purposes a
proprietary attitude about the agencies, and this
bureaucratic allegiance had a profound influence upon his
policies and politics. He became what Margaret Weir and
national government, and one in which existing administrative
capacities were poorly coordinated," in Skocpol, "Political
Response," p. 175.
^On the NRA, see Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Probl em
of Monopoly. A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1966)
.
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Theda Skocpol have called a "state manager," who made these
public bureaucracies into relatively autonomous agents in
the reshaping of America's political economy. Ultimately,
the inherently conservative nature of Lilienthal's interest
in bureaucratic self-preservation accelerates the
articulation of the equally conservative tendencies within
the keynesian program.
As a state manager, Lilienthal was constantly trying
to balance two conflicting strains in his ideology. On the
one hand, he believed that technical experts— lawyers,
economists, and engineers, could only be effective as
regulators if their agencies were relatively autonomous and
free from the partisan sway of politics. On the other hand,
Lilienthal understood that the administrative reformers who
staffed the New Deal's proliferating bureaucracy were
pursuing controversial and often expressly political aims
and they needed popular support to achieve these goals. The
administrators, essentially technocrats, lacked the natural
constituencies of union leaders or machine politicians, and
were also without the financial resources that accorded
corporate capital political power. To strengthen their
agencies and promote their programs, Lilienthal knew that
he had to win over the American people. In effect,
bureaucratic reformers had to sell themselves, and
Lilienthal the salesman spared no effort in this regard.
The tension between popular support and administrative
autonomy forced Lilienthal and others like him to chart a
careful course. The task for Lilienthal and others in this
administrative class was to elicit support without
relinquishing control.
As much as this study is both more and less than a
biography of David Lilienthal, it is equally both more and
less than a history of the TVA. Readers should register
that caveat carefully, for anyone seeking a linear,
descriptive account of the Authority's first years will be
disappointed. Nonetheless, readers will, I believe, find
within my thematic approach, a considered contribution to
the literature on the TVA.
Most accounts of the TVA conflate the rough mix of
ideas held by the first three directors into a single
vision. According to this standard interpretation,
decentralization was the unifying force within the new
agency. In a recent example, historian Bruce Schulman
describes the TVA's decentralist vision as an attempt to,
restore a potentially sound agricultural economy
without undesirable heavy manufacturing, unsightly
urban growth, or fundamental change on the farms. The
TVA officials interpreted the Depression as a warning
against industrialization.... Decentralization implied
small-scale industries spread among rural
areas. .. .These beliefs became early TVA policy.
Schulman then notes that this strategy "precluded the
arrival of large firms that would bring to the Southeast
unions, high wages, and demand for labor." This is a highly
accurate portrayal of certain tendencies within the agency.
16
It represents the philosophy of TVA chair Arthur E. Morgan,
whose social planning was complemented by a strong
attachment to the regionalist and decentralist tendencies
closely associated with the resettlement programs in the
Roosevelt administration.''
In the agency's first five years, however, I argue
that the TVA was for all practical purposes three separate
agencies, each with its own ideological agenda and its own
set of policies. Until 1938, when Arthur Morgan was forced
out, the TVA had no unified vision. It is a mistake to
describe the early TVA as "decentralist." There were many
TVAs, joined at the hip, to be sure, but with separate
identities. Harcourt Morgan's TVA formulated agricultural
policies in close cooperation with the Valley's
agricultural elite— much to the detriment of small
farmers, tenants, and particularly farm laborers. Arthur
Morgan's TVA favored small-scale regional development and
practiced socio-cultural planning similar to the work of
''Bruce J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt. Federal
Policy. Economic Development, and the Transformation of the
South. 1938-1980 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.
35-36. In another example, Howard Segal states, "TVA was always
more avowedly regional [than other decentralist projects]." In
Segal, "The Science of Decentralized Technology in Twentieth-
Century America," 1984 ASEE Annual Proceedings, Session 2262.
Also see Nancy L. Grant, TVA and Black Americans . Planning for
the Status Quo (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990) ; and
Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis. A Century of Invention and
Technological Enthusiasm (New York, Viking, 1989)
.
For more on the decentralist elements in the New Deal, see
chapter 6. A useful introduction can be found in Paul K. Conkin's
Tomorrow A New World; The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1959)
.
the New Deal's rural resettlement programs. Lilienthal's
TVA pursued precisely what many scholars have neglected in
their portrayals of the Authority's decentralism
—
intensive industrial development and a mass consumption
strategy that located the TVA within the context of a
broader national recovery.
As David Lilienthal consolidated his control over the
TVA, his vision became the TVA's vision. Lilienthal's rise
to power was paced nationally by the rise of the keynesian
perspective. That shared trajectory is the course that I
chart in this study.
CHAPTER 2
REGULATION IN THE AGE OF "NORMALCY:"
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT OF 192 6
Late in the summer of 1923 when David Lilienthal
joined Donald Richberg's law firm, the nation's railway
labor unions were engaged in a rearguard struggle to defend
the gains they had won during World War I. Like much of
the rest of organized labor, during the war the rail
workers had enjoyed a brief period of wage hikes,
membership gains, and limited but significant state support
for collective bargaining; by 1923, all of this was gone.
Antagonistic court decisions, hostile legislation, and an
unsuccessful strike left the railroad unions struggling to
stop the hemorrhaging within their ranks, as wages and
membership went into a sharp declined
Entering into labor law with Richberg, the Chicago
reformer who had succeeded the late Glenn Plumb as the
chief counsel for the railroad brotherhoods and shopcrafts,
the twenty-four year-old Lilienthal understood that his
work would be difficult and not especially remunerative. He
had done everything but break down the door to Richberg's
office in order to get the position as junior associate
with the man who would become one of Lilienthal 's many
^ For overviews of labor's problems during the early 1920s,
see, Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years. A History of the American
Worker. 1920-1933 (Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966), esp. Part I,
pp. 45-243; also see, David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of
Labor. The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activ ism,
1865-1925 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 370-
464
.
mentors. Having recently parted ways with his father's old
partner, Harold Ickes, Richberg had little in the way of a
client base beyond the modest retainer from the beleaguered
railway unions, and no plans to take on any staff.
Lilienthal's salary, therefore, would fall far below that
of his fellow graduates from Harvard Law School. Yet this
was just the kind of struggle that seemed somehow
appropriate for a young man who had at DePauw competed as a
light heavyweight boxer while also serving as class
president and gaining Phi Beta Kappa membership. "The need
in the labor movement of trained men to aid in what at
times seems a pretty hopeless struggle," he wrote in his
introductory letter to Felix Frankfurter in May, 1921,
"adds fuel to my enthusiasm for the task which I hope
awaits me."^ The task now lay before him.
At a time when the American Federation of Labor
(AFofL) endorsed minimal state intervention in the
marketplace, when many manufacturers adopted the anti-
union, open shop "American Plan," and when Business
Republicans embraced a new decade as a return to
"Normalcy," the rail unions, Richberg, and Lilienthal moved
in another direction. Working to expand the state's
^On Richberg 's hiring of Lilienthal, see Thomas E. Vadney,
Wayward Liberal. A Political Biography of Donald Richberg
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1970) ; Lilienthal to
Felix Frankfurter, May 1, 1921, Box 47, Papers of David E.
Lilienthal, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University;
hereafter cited as DEL Papers.
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regulatory presence and strengthen the role of collective
bargaining in industry, Lilienthal joined with forces that
were building a new order based not on some mythic pre-war
normalcy but instead on models of state activism and
industrial relations that had flourished briefly under the
auspices of wartime necessity. But these efforts
constituted more than an attempt to stem the reversals
suffered since the end of World War I. Trying to recoup
gains only recently lost and to reshape industrial
relations, Lilienthal became engaged in a broader struggle
to reconstruct the country's political economy so that it
provided more permanent federal support for the rights of
organized labor and a greater union role in improving the
productive efficiency of American industry. It was his
task to help recast the roles of the state, the railways,
and the unions.
To revive the railway unions' sagging fortunes,
Richberg and Lilienthal moved forward on several different
fronts. Believing that favorable legislation might limit
the role of a staunchly antilabor judiciary and create a
more favorable regulatory environment, they sought to alter
what had become an increasingly hostile political and
legislative landscape. To do this, the labor counsels
needed coordinated action from the various railway unions,
a difficult matter given the organizations' troubled
history of disunity marked by jurisdictional disputes and
ideological differences. They also urged continued labor
support for a set of union-management cooperation
initiatives designed in concert with shopcraft officials in
order to strengthen the right to collective bargaining by
giving unions a greater role in implementing efficiency
measures and increasing production
.
The course charted by the unions and their lawyers was
deeply influenced the traditions of government regulation
of railroads. Many trade unionists, for whom the idea of
an activist state evoked memories of union-busting , court
injunctions, and strikebreaking troops, embraced a
voluntarist, anti-statist philosophy. Yet most railway
unions had a more positive, if still cautious,
understanding of state intervention , rooted in a very
different historical experience. Beginning with the
passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1888 , the federal
government began moving slowly toward guaranteeing the
rights of railroad labor to organize and bargain
collectively. Congress continued to strengthen federal
regulation of the carriers' industrial relations with the
Erdman Act of 1898 and later the Newlands Act of 1913. For
railway labor leaders, these acts were modest first steps
toward a sympathetic state, with even greater advances made
during World War I."^
^ A very useful overview of federal railway labor
legislation up to 1926 is available in, A.R. Ellingwood, "The
Railway Labor Act of 1926," Journal o f Political Economy
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On December 26, 1917, with the nation facing a grave
transportation crisis, the government took control of the
railroads. President Wilson appointed his son-in-law and
erstwhile political ally, Secretary of the Treasury William
G. McAdoo, Director-General of the Railroad Administration
(RA) and named railroad brotherhood president W.S. Carter
head of the RA's Division of Labor. For the railway unions,
federal administration was a model of a successful state
enterprise. McAdoo issued directives that granted
significant wage hikes and extended the eight-hour day to
all railway employees. To promote industrial peace and
enforce discipline on the shopfloor, he facilitated union
organizing and collective bargaining. To mediate labor
disputes, he approved the formation of adjustment boards
with equipartisan representation from labor and
management.^ There was still dissent among some workers,
but most of organized labor carried with it distinctly
positive memories of the Railroad Administration. All of
the rail unions, David Montgomery notes, had "waxed fat"
during the war. An editorial in the Railway Carmen's
Journal put the case quite clearly: "If this is what
36(1928): 53-82; for labor's attitudes toward the state, see,
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor ; Bruce Laurie,
Artisans into Workers. Labor in Nineteenth-Century America (New
York, Hill & Wang, 1989), especially the epilogue, pp. 211-220;
and Victoria Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power. The Origins
of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1993)
.
^ Ellingwood, p. 58; Davis, "Bitter Storm," p. 85.
government control means, lets have more and plenty of
it. "5
Memories of wartime gains outlasted the gains
themselves. Defeats suffered during the period of postwar
reaction seemed all the more harsh in comparison with the
recent past. Committed to a quixotic hope that some accord
could be fashioned to keep the roads in the hands of the
state, the rail unions rallied around the Plumb Plan for
permanent government ownership. Named for its architect,
Glenn Plumb, the plan attracted the attention of the press
as well as support from certain members of Congress and
sectors of organized labor. In spite of Samuel Gompers '
s
long standing opposition to state enterprise, the AFofL at
its 1920 convention overwhelmingly endorsed the plan, but
the dominant conservative voices within Congress drowned
out labor's small bloc; neither house gave the plan serious
consideration. The Transportation Act of 1920, or Esch-
Cummins, passed easily, and private management regained
control of the roads on March 1, 1920.*^
Railway labor's situation worsened as the Railroad
Labor Board, created under Title III of Esch-Cummins and
^ Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor , p. 400; editorial
in Railway Carmen's Journal 23(1918): p. 148, as quoted in Davis,
"Bitter Storm," p. 96.
^ Vadney, Wayward Liberal , pp. 41-4 6; Montgomery, Fall of
the House of Labor , pp. 399-401, 430; on Jewell and Stone's role,
see, Glenn Plumb to Morris Llewellyn Cooke, July 19, 1919, Papers
of Morris L. Cooke, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library,
Box 14 (hereafter cited as Cooke Papers)
.
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dominated by conservative Republican appointees, authorized
sharp wage cuts in the face of a deepening postwar
recession. The board then refused to hear union charges
that open shop systems such as the Pennsylvania were
deliberately undercutting the shopcrafts' wartime
membership gains by contracting out much of their
maintenance work to non-union shops that were not covered
by federal railway labor legislation. Unable to get
satisfactory redress from a Labor Board now composed of
Republican appointees, the unions prepared to strike. They
set a strike date for October 1921, but then backed off and
postponed the walkout. In the midst of a fairly severe
postwar recession, the brotherhoods were reluctant to
support a strike focused primarily upon shopcraft issues,
particularly as management was more conciliatory toward the
traditionally stronger operators. The shopcrafts continued
to bear the brunt of management's anti-union offensive, and
with their backs to the wall, trade unions representing
400,000 railroad workers reversed themselves and went on
strike on July 1, 1922.''
Characterized by David Montgomery as "grimly
determined defensive warfare," the strike was seriously
handicapped from the outset. The operating brotherhoods
For a detailed discussion of the strike, see Davis,
"Bitter Storm." For other analyses of the strike, see,
Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor , pp. 399-403, 422-423;
and, Bernstein, The Lean Years , pp. 211-212.
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remained at work, and management quickly filled many of the
vacated jobs from the long lines of unemployed workers.
While these obstacles severely weakened the shopmen, the
Harding administration's actions ensured their defeat.
Tennessee Republican Ben W. Hooper, the new chairman of the
RLB, charged the workers with fomenting Bolshevism,
declared the strike illegal, and approved the certification
of new company unions. Then, on September 1, Attorney
General Harry Daugherty sought and received a sweeping
anti-strike injunction from U.S. District Court Judge James
H. Wilkerson.^
Weakened by these reversals and without the resources
needed to sustain a prolonged campaign, the unions relented
and the strike withered. The shopcrafts' hopes of
maintaining national standards crumbled. The unions were
able to reach an accord with some lines, but most carriers
fell in line with the vaunted Pennsylvania and broke the
shopcrafts. The industry's leading trade journal. Railway
Age, smugly stated that by walking out, "Mr. Jewell" and
other union leaders "have become our leading open shop
promoters." The strike deeply scarred the unions.
Membership continued its precipitous decline; the
Machinists and other major shopcraft organizations lost
between 70 and 90 percent of their rail members over the
first half of the 1920s. The enmity and intransigence of
® Montgomery, p. 4 07.
26
the open shop employers had been expected, but the federal
government's hostility left labor embittered. James
Wikline, General President of the International Brotherhood
of Blacksmiths, voiced this anger in the AFofL organ, the
American Federationist
. "The strongly organized forces of
an army of employers made the most vicious and most wicked
attack on organized labor in the history of this splendid
movement," Wikline charged. Labor had to defend itself not
only against capital's assaults, but "also against a
political administration that permitted the use of its
officers to aid in this attack."'
With its experiences of good and bad times from World
War I through the 1922 strike, railroad labor understood
that either the government would recognize and protect the
rights of organized labor, or it would assist in the
trampling of those rights. In the fall of 1923 union
officials sat down to make their plans with Richberg and
Lilienthal. Among the key figures for the unions were Bert
' Unsigned editorial, Railway Age 73(1922), p. 545; James
Wikline, American Federationist . 30(1923), p. 746.
Membership Losses 1920-1924:
Blacksmiths .... 90 percent
Boilermakers .... 75 percent
Machinists .... 70 percent
The Railway Carmen were the only shopcraft to lose less than
one-half of its members over this period^- still losing 20
percent, roughly 40,000 members.
Statistics from, U.S. Senate, 68th Congress, 1st Session,
Hearings Before A Special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce , Bill No. S. 2646, A Bill to
Amend the Transportation Act of 1920, March-April 1924, p. 28
(hereafter cited as Hearings on S. 2646 )
.
M. Jewell, from the Railway Employees' Department (RED) of
the American Federation of Labor, William H. Johnston,
president of the Machinists union, and David B. (D.B.)
Robertson, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen. Jewell and the RED represented the
various shopworkers, including the Machinists, who built
and maintained the roads' rolling stock. For its part, the
RED functioned as a caucus within the AFofL for the men
from the numerous shopcrafts. The brotherhoods, which
represented the engineers, enginemen, brakemen, and others
who operated the trains, were both more powerful and more
conservative than most of the shopcraft and yard service
unions
.
Following Richberg's counsel, union leaders developed
strategies designed to recreate a more sympathetic state.
For Richberg, the necessary remedies had to be electoral
and legislative; court action offered little hope. "The
courts," Richberg advised B.M. Jewell,
For information outlining the various railway unions,
see, Colin J. Davis, "Bitter Storm: The 1922 National Railroad
Shopmen's Strike," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, State
University of New York at Binghamton, 1988, esp. pp. 16-76.
The papers of the Railway Employes' (sic) Department of the
American Federation of Labor at the Martin P. Catherwcpod Library,
Cornell University, are a valuable source of information
regarding the shopcrafts' strategies during this period. See
Field, "Designing the Capital-Labor Accord: Railway Labor, the
State, and the Beyer Plan for Union-Management Cooperation,"
Unpublished paper presented at the 1992 meeting of the
Organization of American Historians.
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are the branch of Government most partisan in
opposition to the claims of organized labor. The
precedents upon which they rely have been
developed largely for the protection of private
property rights Through political action in
getting new laws made by the legislatures and
obtaining executive support of such laws, there
is a possibility of change. ''^
The plans were direct; change the laws and the people who
made those laws, and the courts will follow.
While drafting broader electoral and economic
strategies in the months following the strike, labor took
immediate and direct aim at Title III of the Transportation
Act and the Railroad Labor Board. The union executives
gave Richberg responsibility for drafting legislation that
would replace the RLE. Throughout 1923 Richberg conferred
with the labor leaders, as well as defending several
officials against charges of violating Judge Wilkerson's
injunction. Richberg assigned his new assistant the task
of crafting a more detailed proposal that they could then
bring back to the unions. The purpose of the proposed
legislation was two-fold. First, it would strengthen
federal support for labor's rights to organize and bargain
Richberg to Jewell, December 9, 1923; enclosure to Jewell
to D.B. Robertson, December 11, 192 3, DRR-CHS, Box 2.
Richberg and Lilienthal's commitment to electoral and
legislative efforts challenges a view of late Progressivism that
depicts a retreat from politics. See, for example, Barry Karl,
The Uneasy State. The United States from 1915 to 1945
(University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 60-61. Karl claims that
during the 1920s groups of young lawyers who called themselves
Progressives, and were followers of Louis Brandeis and Woodrow
Wilson, "turned to the courts and litigation as their answer to
the problem of combatting their old enemies Politics was not
the perceived route to take."
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collectively. Then, it would substitute more equitable
mediation machinery for Hooper's anti-union Labor Board.
Lilienthal began his work by searching for legislative and
legal precedents upon which to model the bill.^^
The first and most obvious set of precedents was past
legislation such as the Erdman and Newlands Acts,
superseded by Esch-Cummins , and the regulatory bodies and
principles established during the war under the Railroad
Administration and the National War Labor Board. Despite
the inadequacies of the earlier laws, the unions preferred
machinery designed only to mediate between capital and
labor, rather than agencies with the power to arbitrate
disputes and deliver decisions by administrative fiat.
Lilienthal also recognized that labor needed explicit
recognition of collective bargaining.
Lilienthal then wrote to E.E. Witte at the Wisconsin
Legislative Reference Library, a clearinghouse designed to
provide legislators and others the technical advice and
information for which Wisconsin progressivism was widely
recognized. Witte offered little hope that a law
protecting individual workers from discrimination for union
activities would stand up in court. Citing both the Adair
and Coppage decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and "an
unbroken line of state supreme court decisions," Witte
^^Richberg Memorandum, December 11, 1922, DRR-CHS, Box 2;
Lilienthal, Unbound Manuscript Journal, Entry of January 1, 1924,
DEL Papers, Box 193, p. 157.
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advised Lilienthal that a bill containing any provisions
outlawing anti-union strategies such as blacklisting and
yellow-dog contracts most probably would be struck down--
observing, "there seems to be no hope whatsoever that the
courts will reverse themselves." Witte did add that John
R. Commons, the noted labor economist from the University
of Wisconsin, suggested that the courts might uphold anti-
discrimination provisions "if the public purpose of trade
unions were set forth in the statute itself," if in other
words, the unions were construed as some form of public
utility. However, the cost would likely be high, as both
the federal and state governments would then attempt to
exercise considerable control over union rules and by-
laws.
Witte was more hopeful about legal protection for
collective bargaining, observing that "there is a distinct
tendency toward the recognition of trade agreements [i.e.
collective labor contracts] as legal enforceable
contracts." He also provided Lilienthal with a specific
model for mediation machinery, citing an article on
"Industrial Councils in the Electrical Construction
Industry" from the Monthlv Labor Review . These industrial
councils were composed of an equal number of
representatives from labor and management. The article
E.E. Witte to Lilienthal, September 25, 1923, DRR-CHS,
Box 2 .
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observed that such equipartisan boards seemed to function >
more effectively than did tripartite boards, in which labor
and management's negotiators were matched by an equal
number of "neutral" members representing the public
interest
Lilienthal also sought the advice of the Canadian
Prime Minister, MacKenzie King. King was the author of
that nation's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907
(IDI)
,
which had received a great deal of attention in the
United States. Samuel Gompers and the AFofL had vehemently
opposed the act because of a clause that banned strikes
while an IDI review board investigated labor disputes. The
law did, however, institutionalize labor's right to
collective bargaining. Amidst the open shop drive of the
1920s, Lilienthal and the railway labor leaders knew that
they would have to incorporate some degree of public
involvement into labor relations if they were to gain
greater federal support for their unions, although they had
no intention of compromising labor's right to strike.
Former Deputy Minister of Labour F.A. Acland,
answering Lilienthal 's inquiry on behalf of King, noted the
Witte to Lilienthal, September 25, 1923; "Industrial
Council in the Electrical Construction Industry," Monthly Labor
Review (August, 1923): 26-43.
F.A. Acland for MacKenzie King to Donald Richberg and
David Lilienthal, September 19, 192 3, DRR-CHS, Box 2; for an
analysis of the IDI, see, Bruno Ramirez, When Workers Fight. The
Politics of Industrial Relations in the Progressive Era, 189 8-
1916 (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 163-169.
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success of the IDI and other Canadian labor laws. Acland
made specific reference to the 1922 shopcrafts' strike,
observing that while "disputes on the two sides of the
border were practically identical...,"
the work of the different Conciliation Boards and
the close attention given by the Minister of
Labour, and other members and officers of the
Government, resulted in an avoidance of any
cessation of work [in Canada]. ""^
However, while Acland was most concerned with avoiding any
"cessation of work," Lilienthal and Richberg had to shape
legislation that balanced the state's interest in
uninterrupted rail service with labor's interest in durable
negotiating machinery that could yield fair wages, steady
work, and decent working conditions.
Through the fall of 1923 the labor counsels continued
their work. Richberg succeeded in mending the split
between the operating brotherhoods and the shopcrafts that
had developed during the 1922 strike. Despite their
reluctance to strike, the brotherhoods recognized the Labor
Board's deficiencies and feared that Chairman Hooper's
anti-union bias would endanger them all. Railway labor was
thus united in its determination to abolish the RLB; and
unity was essential, for any open divisions in labor's
ranks would have guaranteed a debacle similar to that of
1922. Lilienthal and Richberg completed the draft bill by
Acland to Richberg and Lilienthal, September 19, 192 3.
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December and brought it to the union officials for their
approval
.
The proposal had three central components. It replaced
the RLB with a five-member National Board of Mediation. As
with the RLB, the Mediation Board's members would be
Presidential appointees, but as its title indicates, the
board would only mediate labor disputes when bilateral
contract negotiations between management and labor had
reached an impasse. The board would have no decision-
making authority, thereby limiting the power of hostile
political appointees. The proposal created four
equipartisan National Boards of Adjustment, one each for
the operating brotherhoods, the machinists and other
shopcrafts, the clerks and freight handlers, and the inland
waterway workers. These boards would have the power to
decide disputes regarding work rules and grievances arising
within the context of an existing contract. Labor believed
that national boards would establish nation-wide labor
standards and would strengthen the unions in regions of the
country where they were weak. Finally, the bill made the
sixteen standard railroad labor organizations the workers'
legitimate representatives regarding the composition of the
Boards of Adjustment. Naming the standard organizations
gave explicit state recognition to the unions, dealt a blow
to the legitimacy of company unions, and elevated the
status of the weakened shopcrafts by making them the equals
34
Of the operating brotherhoods. The unions endorsed the
proposal in late December and began mapping out a
legislative strategy. ""^
Before moving ahead with their plans, the union
leaders held several conferences with Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover. Having expressed disbelief and disgust at
the hard-line positions of Daugherty and Hooper, Hoover had
been trying to reduce conflict on the rail system. His
efforts to forge a consensus failed repeatedly, however.
Throughout 1923 various union officials offered to meet
with management to draft co-sponsored legislation, but
their offers were rebuffed by the Association of Railway
Executives (ARE) , which saw no reason to amend Esch-
Cummins. With their own proposal completed, on December 28
D.B. Robertson and several other labor leaders met again
with Hoover. The meeting was amicable, but the Commerce
Secretary expressed reservations with labor's plan.
Outlining what became several of management's strongest
objections. Hoover recommended the formation of either
regional or system-level Boards of Adjustment, and a
provision giving the President the power to declare a
national emergency, initiate an investigation, and prohibit
strikes during a "cool ing-of f " period, similar to Canada's
^'^ Vadney, Wayward Liberal , p. 54; David Lilienthal, "A
Practical Plan for Railroad Peace," unpublished manuscript, no
date, circa March 1924, DRR-CHS, Box 3; D.B. Robertson to Donald
Richberg, December 29, 1923, DRR-CHS, Box 2.
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IDI. The union leaders left the meeting with Hoover's
commitment to further talks, but without an endorsement of
their billJ^
As they prepared their legislation for Congress, the
railway unions moved ahead with the Beyer Plan, the
cooperative productivity venture initiated on the B&O
Railroad after the shopcraft strike. Named for Otto Beyer,
a member of the Taylor Society and advocate of scientific
management who developed and oversaw the program, the Beyer
Plan was an integral part of the union's efforts to
institutionalize collective bargaining. The plan would
bring local and district union representatives into the
planning, introduction, and implementation of shopfloor
efficiency measures. In exchange for labor's support,
management would abandon open shop and company union
policies, recognize the standard craft unions as the
legitimate representatives of labor, and promise to limit
seasonal layoffs and contracting out. The plan also
explicitly linked wage hikes to increased productivity.
Labor leaders hoped that the plan would serve as a model
^® Robertson to Richberg, December 29, 192 3; The Memoirs of
Herbert Hoover. The Cabinet and the Presidency. 1920-1933 (New
York, MacMillan Company, 1952), pp. 105-108.
In his Memoirs . Hoover claims credit for devising the
Mediation Board as established in the final version of the bill,
which became law in 1926. This account completely ignores the
provisions of the original 1924 version drafted by Lilienthal and
Richberg. Indeed, Hoover's involvement in 1925-1926 seems to be
centered around bringing labor and management together around a
compromise bill rather than drafting any part of the legislation.
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for responsible unionism as they pressed for greater
public support for collective bargaining. "•^
David Montgomery calls the Beyer Plan the "most famous
offspring" of the "paradoxical marriage of progressive
unionism and scientific management." Beyer was one of a
cadre within the Taylor Society whose experiences during
World War I transformed his understanding of labor
relations and consequently his strategies for improving
^
productivity. Beyer had worked with the Ordnance
Department during the war, initiating a prototype of the |
plan at the government's Rock Island arsenal. At the I
arsenal, he saw that the goal of increased efficiency could
not be imposed upon an unwilling workforce, but could only
^
be achieved through an arrangement agreed upon by ^
management and labor as equal and organized agents. With
union-management cooperation, Beyer believed that industry
could achieve what he viewed as the socially desirable goal
of orderly economic growth through increased productivity.
I
The Beyer Plan is also known as the B&O Plan, and the
Glenwood Plan, for the Glenwood shop on the B&O line in which the
plan was first implemented.
The literature on the Beyer Plan is voluminous. For useful
analyses, see, Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor , pp. 422-
424; Milton J. Nadworny, Scientific Management and the Unions.
1900-1932. A Historical Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1955)
,
pp. 116-131 ; Ronald Radosh, "Labor and the
American Economy: The 1922 Railroad Shop Crafts Strike and the
^B&O Plan,'" in Jerry Israel, ed. Building the Organizational
Society (New York, Free Press, 1972), pp. 73-87; Sumner H.
Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management (New York,
Greenwood Press, 1968, orig. ed. : Brookings Institution, 1941),
pp. 437-503.
I
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Along with Morris Cooke and other members of what
constituted a laborist caucus within the scientific
management movement, Beyer's ties to organized labor grew
after the war. After the collapse of the Plumb Plan, Beyer
began working with Machinists President William Johnston to
implement the Rock Island formula in the rail shops during
1921-1922 .2°
The Baltimore & Ohio was the logical choice for the
trial of an experimental union-management endeavor. B&O
President Daniel Willard had spent the 1910s trying to
rebuild the troubled road, and important strategic
considerations influenced his support for the Beyer Plan.
Prior to Willard 's arrival, the road had endured a period
of willful neglect under the administrative control of its
major competitor, the vaunted Pennsylvania Railroad.
Willard had to improve the B&O's competitive efficiency in
order to gain an edge on the rival that had run the road
into fiscal ruin. But there was a personal dimension
behind Willard 's embrace of the plan as well. The son of a
Yankee farmer, he began working as a laborer on a section
gang with the Vermont Central Railroad at the age of 18 in
^° Montgomery Fall of the House of Labor , pp. 422, 399;
Nadworny, Scientific Management , pp. 116-117; For studies of the
laborist wing of the Taylor Society, see the excellent work of
Carlos Pabon. See "Mapping A New Political Economy: The Taylor
Society, Keynesianism, and Mass Consumption Capitalism,"
presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Organization of
American Historians; and his unpublished dissertation (University
of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1992) . I gratefully acknowledge my
debt to Pabon 's work on this subject.
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1879. He had been a member of the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, and after moving into management, he
retained some sense of respect for the railway unions. in
a New York Times report in 1925, Willard observed that he
was not receptive to Beyer's initial overtures; the plan
sounded too much like an industrial soviet. He was won
over when the unions assured him that they "did not want to
infringe on the limits of control of management." In
addition, he was impressed by the plan's trial run at the
Glenwood shops, where, he recalled, "in the old days they
[the workers] didn't care how long it took to turn out the
necessary work." Although Willard 's acceptance of the
Beyer Plan and his disdain for the "Pennsy's" harsh labor
policies reflect the lingering memories of his wage working
past, his ultimate loyalties rested with the security of
the B&O's profit margin and the protection of managerial
prerogative.^^
Although union support for the Beyer Plan came at a
time of great labor weakness, its support was not simply a
defensive response to organizational debility, as David
Montgomery has argued. Beyerism involved a reformulation
of the wage relation, as the unions began to break with
restrictions of production, or "soldiering," and with the
^^David M. Vrooman, Daniel Willard and Progressive
Management on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (Columbus, Ohio
State University Press, 1992); New York Times , January 4, 1925,
VIII, 4:1.
concept of a "living wage" which pegged wage levels to
notions of family subsistence and comfort. Bert Jewell
claimed that soldiering had been a response to contracting
out or irrational planning by management that resulted in
intermittent layoffs. "So-called restrictions of output by
workers," Jewell noted,
have been in practice only in industries which
afford its employes irregular or seasonal
employment. There are today on the railroads no
policies or rules restricting or limiting
production, but if the railroads are going to
restrict, limit and reduce below the actual
requirements of the industry itself the working
time of its employes, then ... the employes [sic]
will have to take some action to safeguard their
interests
.
In an address to rail executives delivered in the pages of
their journal, Railway Age
. Beyer declared that because
there was no consensual definition of a fair wage,
negotiations had to be "shifted from the dubious cost-of-
living basis to the basis of service and productivity," but
this could not be accomplished without "an equal balance of
bargaining powers." Forging an alliance with the Taylor
Society's laborists, the railway unions were offering
management what they viewed as a fair exchange
—
productivity guarantees and labor peace for union
recognition, regular work, and wage hikes.
Montgomery, Fall of the House of labor , p. 4 09; Bert
Jewell to Leonard Singer, December 4, 1922, enclosure in Jewell
to Richberg, December 8, 1922, Box 2, DRR-CHS ; Otto S. Beyer Jr.
"The Employee Morale of Our Railroads," Railway Acre 75(1923), pp
656-657.
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Labor recognized the limits of the Beyer Plan. The
open shop roads showed absolutely no interest. Elisha Lee,
a Vice President of the Pennsylvania Railroad and a member
of the more conservative faction of the scientific
management movement, charged that the independent trade
unions were replacing collective bargaining with
"collective coercion" and thus deliberately maintaining
artificially high labor costs. Management's only proper
response, Lee claimed, was support for employee
representation plans, commonly known as company unions.
The unions charged that even in the B&O's shops, the road's
management acted in bad faith by failing to deliver wage
hikes as both productivity and the company's profit level
improved, by hiring temporary workers not covered by the
union agreement, and by continuing to lay off permanent
employees. Had the plan been the unions' only strategy,
it could not possibly have succeeded. However, viewed
within the context of other political and legislative
efforts, the Beyer Plan was part of a broader offensive
strategy designed to reinvigorate the labor movement and
secure for labor a more permanent role in America's
political economy.
Elisha Lee, "Labor Problems from an Engineer's Point of
View," Railway Age 73(1922), p. 1193; Slichter, Union Policies,
pp. 480-493, 496-497; Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, p.
423 .
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Throughout the winter of 1923-1924 the labor leaders
and their lawyers continued to prepare their bill for
Congress. Facing a legislative leadership dominated by
standpat Republican regulars, and a presidential
administration that was perhaps less corrupt but no less
conservative than its predecessor, Lilienthal and Richberg
anticipated a difficult struggle. Organized labor did have
allies in Congress, however, and it was these loosely
organized blocs of progressive insurgents to whom the
bill's authors turned for support. Hoping to forge a
bipartisan coalition that would draw together enough
Democrats and progressive Republicans, the labor counsels
asked Democratic Representative Alben Barkley and
Republican Senator R.B. Howell to jointly sponsor the bill.
A Kentucky Democrat who would later become Senate Majority
leader and then Harry Truman's Vice President, Alben
Barkley was familiar with the legislative maneuvering it
would take to bring this bill to a vote if the House
leadership opposed it. Preparing for an upcoming
senatorial campaign, Barkley was eager to stand against the
regular Republicans who controlled the House. In the
Senate, Howell was a first term Republican from Nebraska
and a close associate of his senior colleague, George W.
Norris, but he had arrived in Washington in 1923 with well-
established progressive credentials of his own. A Naval
Academy graduate and civil engineer, he had served for ten
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years as General Manager of Omaha's municipally-owned
water, gas, and ice utility. Howell also had relied
heavily on organized labor's support in his successful
Senate campaign. The rail unions distributed free copies
of their weekly, Labor , containing a strong endorsement of
Howell's candidacy. 2^ On February 28, 1924, Howell and
Barkley introduced their bill into both houses of Congress.
Barkley spent much of the spring trying to wrench the
bill out of the grasp of the Chairman of the House
Committee on Interstate Commerce, Massachusetts Republican
Samuel Winslow, but the bill quickly went to hearings in
the Senate. For several days during March and April,
numerous representatives for labor and the carriers stated
their views to the Senators, issuing charges and
countercharges regarding the motives for each side's
position on Howell-Barkley . While they expected opposition
from the Congressional leaders and from the business
community, the labor leaders still had reason for cautious
optimism. Hoping to consolidate the labor bloc that lay
cautiously within the embrace of the Democratic party, many
regular Democrats were joining with the Republican
insurgents in backing Howell-Barkley. In his detailed
On Howell's Senate campaign, see, Gutzom Borglum to
Robert Smith, Howell Campaign Manager, July 12, 1922, Borglum
Papers, Library of Congress, Container 83. Best known as the
architect of the Mount Rushmore monument, Borglum was a supporter
of various progressive causes.
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Study of the bill, Robert Zieger observes that "chances of
passage seemed excellent.
.
.
,
"
with the brotherhoods' political militance
increasing, the measure had the support of a
majority in the House and perhaps in the Senate
as well."
As the hearings opened, railway labor hoped to translate
those excellent chances into a victory that would reverse
four years of bitter defeat.
Richberg and Robertson delivered most of labor's
testimony, with the lawyer explaining the bill's features
and the union president presenting the organizations'
official position. As the leader of an operating
brotherhood, Robertson's statements could have more impact
than the AFofL's Jewell or the Machinists' Johnston, still
reeling from membership losses and the negative attention
attendant upon the 1922 strike. Robertson spoke first,
telling the Senators that the law, Title III of Esch-
Cummins, and the administration of that law by the RLB were
gravely flawed. The 1920 Act failed to provide suitable
protection for labor, he stated. The law provided for the
establishment of Boards of Adjustment, but left the
specific arrangements up to management and labor; the roads
resisted and the boards were not created, Robertson
charged. While the law was tentative in the formation of
adjustment boards, it was expansive and ambitious in
Robert H. Zieger, Republicans and Labor. 1919-1929
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 198.
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granting to the Labor Board "judicial" decision-making
powers over contractual matters that should have been left
to the negotiating parties. Robertson asserted that the
RLB, dominated by an anti-union majority, was able to move
against labor when it never should have been empowered to
do so. 2^
Robertson went on to explain that the judicial power
of the Labor Board was distinctly one-sided. While
management swiftly enacted the wage cuts authorized by
Board rulings, on the occasions when a decision went
against the roads, corporate lawyers hamstrung the RLB with
court actions challenging the constitutionality of its
powers. "Robby," as the labor leader was known to his
associates, claimed that these views were not his alone,
nor were they held exclusively by disgruntled laborists.
He quoted a statement from George W. Anderson, a former
member of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Massachusetts Public Service Commission. The effect of the
law, Anderson believed,
was to leave the labor forces at the mercy of the
exploiting forces that dominate the railroads....
The general result is that the mass of railroad
employees were, in my opinion, never so
embittered and so distrustful of railroad
management as now. . . . The labor provisions of the
transportation act are effectually discredited.
So is the Labor Board.
Hearings on S. 2646, pp. 2-15.
Hearings on S. 2646, p. 8.
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Irreparably flawed, Esch-Cummins and the RLB effectively
undermined peaceful labor relations on the nation's
railroads, Robertson claimed.
Richberg spoke next. Anticipating that the carriers
planned to smear Howell-Barkley as "class legislation,"
tainting it with the deep red hue of Bolshevism, Richberg
deftly tried to portray the bill as a moderate measure,
resting largely on successful precedents drawn from
previous legislative and administrative experience. "Its
provisions and language are largely transcriptions or
revisions in minor details of present or past acts," he
assured his audience. "It is not a radical or even a novel
piece of legislation." Richberg went on to dress the bill
in the language of voluntarist associationalism that was so
actively promoted by Hoover from the Commerce Secretariat,
insisting that the state must serve as a generally silent
referee. "Any compulsion exerted by Government in a
democracy must be based on contract," he noted. To make
and maintain those contracts, there must be "conference
between representatives designated and authorized so to
confer, respectively by the carriers and by the
employees . "^^
But there were important distinctions between the
provisions and intent of Howell-Barkley and Hooverian
Hearings on S. 2646, pp. 17-18.
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ideology. Section 3 of labor's bill stated that the
representatives should be designated by both parties,
in such manner as may be provided in their
corporate organization or unincorporated
association, or otherwise, without interference,
influence or coercion exercised bv either party
over the self-organization or designation of
representatives by the other (emphasis added)
.
The bill went on to list the standard railway unions as the
legitimate organizations from which labor could choose its
representatives. 29 The inclusion of this language within
the bill struck direct blows against both the open shop and
voluntarism. The Pennsylvania and other carriers played
very active roles in the formation and continued operation
of company unions, and such activities would be invalidated
if Howell-Barkley became law. Further, Section 3 expanded
the role of the state beyond that of a silent referee,
providing legal recognition for the independent AFofL
unions and the operating brotherhoods as collective
bargaining agents. While the replacement of the RLB by a
National Board of Mediation with no decision-making
authority would reduce the powers of one state agency,
Section 3 made Howell-Barkley novel and precedent-setting,
not moderate or voluntarist— despite Richberg's carefully-
crafted assurances.
After Richberg finished his testimony, the roads'
executives took the floor to defend Esch-Cummins and the
Hearings on S.2646, p. 18
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RLB and to attack Howell-Barkley
. Hale Holden, Chairman of
the Executive Committee of the ARE, challenged the bill's
legitimacy and raised the specter of uncontrolled wage
hikes if it became law. Holden 's first steps were exactly
what Richberg had anticipated. Howell-Barkley was written
by and for labor, without recourse to industrial
conferences or any public discussion, the ARE chairman
charged. "It is, therefore, obviously a partisan measure,"
he observed. Holden then went on to point out that Esch-
Cummins and the RLB had begun to restore order to labor
relations on the roads by imposing some much-needed wage
restraint. The Adamson Act and McAdoo's Railroad
Administration during the war had awarded pay increases to
workers that weighed heavily on the roads, necessitating
rate hikes that in turn harmed industrial shippers,
farmers, and ultimately, the consuming public. Holden
argued that labor would never voluntarily negotiate wage
cuts, and since the proposed Mediation Board could not
compel reductions as the RLB could and did, "it is a fair
inquiry to know how and in what manner [such reductions]
may be accomplished when the time arrives for an inquiry
into that subject. "^°
Holden also questioned the wisdom of national Boards
of Adjustment. National Boards, Holden claimed, would lack
contact with local conditions, and "would undertake to
Hearings on S. 2646, pp. 31, 45.
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promote unnecessary standardization of conditions without
due regard to local differences." Such federal
intervention may have been necessary during the wartime
emergency, "but they are an unwise institution in time of
peace." It was not simply the formation of national boards
that troubled Holden, however, but also the bill's
provisions for appointments to the boards. "Nominations to
these boards are provided by this law in a manner which
will effectively establish the closed shop on the American
railroads," the ARE spokesman stated. Company unions
would be closed out. Holden opposed Howell-Barkley in
order to protect company unionism and deflationary wage
policies
.
Daniel Willard followed Holden, registering his
general support for Holden 's claims. The co-architect of
the Beyer Plan on the B&O, Willard was no open shop
ideologue. It was the RLB's ability to dictate wage
restraint that was the paramount issue for Willard. Not
only did Willard reaffirm the necessity for administrative
wage controls, but he lauded Hooper's Labor Board for the
reductions it had previously mandated. Downplaying the
sporadic violence accompanying the 1922 strike by 400,000
men, Willard claimed that the board had achieved the cuts
"without violent protests, and it seems to me that this one
accomplishment of itself fully justifies the existing labor
Hearings on S. 2646, p. 39.
49
provisions of the Transportation Act."" Even for Willard,
the bonds of union-management cooperation stretched thin
when corporate profitability was endangered.
Through the late spring, the bill's chances for
passage still seemed good. It cleared the Senate Commerce
Committee by a 13-3 vote, and Alben Barkley was making some
gains in his ongoing battle with the House leadership.
Winslow placed several minor pieces of legislation ahead of
Howell-Barkley on the committee's schedule. Frustrated by
the introduction of what he described as "chicken feed
legislation" ahead of his bill, Barkley secured the
necessary number of signatures on a petition requiring a
floor vote on whether or not to release the bill from
committee. Amidst debate that the New York Times described
as "exceedingly bitter," and "marked by scenes of disorder
and confusion that recalled the revolt against Speaker
Cannon in 1910," Barkley swung forty Republicans and lost
only 28 Democrats, winning the bill's release 194-181.^^
If he could get the bill on the schedule before the summer
recess, and hold those votes, Barkley had his victory.
As Congress debated, the roads mobilized a broad
business coalition against Howell-Barkley. A Public
Relations Committee of Eastern Railroads provided
32 Hearings on S. 2646, p. 54
" Zieger, Republicans and Labor , pp. 200-201; New YpfK
Times
.
May 6, 1924, 2:2.
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literature to other business groups and the media. The
United States Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers both issued resolutions
against any changes in the present law, with statements
that closely followed the reasoning and wording of the
Holden and Walber testimony at the Senate hearings.'^ The
New York Times devoted considerable editorial space to
denunciations of the bill. From March through July, the
Times delivered four editorials, one per month with the
exception of June, all of them unalterably opposed to
Howell-Barkley .^^
The unions attempted to respond in kind, but their
resources were limited. Richberg went on the stump, with
Lilienthal often serving as his speechwriter . Always the
crusader, Lilienthal was prone to florid prose, as when he
attacked the "autocratic and high-handed methods of the
Pennsylvania management." Newton "Fred" Arvin,
Lilienthal 's closest childhood friend (later a professor at
Smith College and a respected Nathaniel Hawthorne scholar)
,
critiqued the speeches. Offering praise and youthful
barbs, Arvin wrote,
I get an enormous kick out of watching your
vigorous, masculine pamphleteering style develop:
already almost completely purged of those
New York Times , April 5, 1924, 22:3 ; Railway Age
76 (1924) : 1205-1206.
^5 New York Times . March 31, 16:4; April 23, 20:3; May 7,
20:3; July 21, 10:2.
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tendencies toward Crolyese which I used to
reproach you for.
The railway unions had their own newspaper, Labor , strike a
steady drumbeat for the bill. Politically progressive
papers supported Howell-Barkley
,
including the Cleveland
Press, which had roundly denounced Ben Hooper in 1923 as
"the traveling propagandist of conservatism."^^ Ralph
Easley, long-time Chairman of the National Civic Federation
and a well-known advocate of union-management cooperation
,
wrote on labor's behalf, informing Richberg that he did so
"on account of so much unfair paid propaganda that is being
put out at this time by those opposing the bill,"^^ In
spite of these voices of support labor would have been
hard-pressed to match capital ' s publ ic relations prowess
•
Neither side of this mobilization got to see how
effective its legislative efforts were, as the leadership
of both houses in Congress successfully shelved Howell-
Barkley before it came to a roll call. Robert La Follette,
aging leader of the Congressional insurgents, attempted to
force the Senate back from its summer recess in early June
to vote on Howell-Barkley and a farm relief bill, but his
efforts fell short. The propaganda campaign continued,
however, for while the bill was legislatively comatose,
Newton Arvin to Lilienthal, May 2, 1924, DEL Papers, Box
47; Cleveland Press . May 24, 1923.
Ralph M. Easley to Richberg, August 8, 1924, DRR-CHS, Box
3.
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railway labor legislation was not a dead issue. After all,
1924 was an election year.
Labor's campaign on behalf of the new legislation was
part of what at the time appeared to be a growing
progressive sentiment throughout the country. Since the
swift legislative enactment of Esch-Cummins and the death
of the Plumb Plan in 1920, the railway unions had realized
that they could not restrict themselves to economic and
legislative strategies; they had to broaden their electoral
presence. In 1922 the railroad unions led the call for a
conference that would unite various progressive political
forces , while also targeting specific races in the off-year
elections . Both efforts proved fruitful . Maj or opponents
of the Plumb Plan went down in defeat, including former
allies such as Atlee Pomerene (R-Ohio) , a product of Tom
Johnson's municipal reform movement in Cleveland and a
supporter of the Wilson administration's "New Freedom"
legislation, who broke with other progressives after the
war over the nineteenth amendment and the Plumb Plan. La
Follette led a smashing sweep of the Wisconsin
Congressional delegation and R.B. Howell won his first term
in the Senate. The conference called by the unions drew
broad support and led to the formation of the Conference
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for Progressive Political Action (CPPA) the following
year .^^
While the union leaders refused to consider creation
of the third party urged by the Socialist bloc in the CPPA,
they were clearly buoyed by their success, as well as by
international events such as the Labour party's victory in
Britain. The CPPA gained momentum through 1923, and as the
presidential election year opened, further political gains
seemed likely. By June, as Congressional leaders submerged
Howell-Barkley
, the CPPA was gearing up to support a
presidential challenge by the venerable political warhorse,
Robert M. La Follette Sr. With a convention set for the
Fourth of July in Cleveland, large blocs of Progressives
prepared to rally behind the Senator from Wisconsin. At La
Follette 's request, Richberg prepared a draft platform.
Progressive hopes ran high, as LaFollette stated in a late
June letter to Richberg, "historic work may be done in the
next ten days."^'
^® On Pomerene, see Otis Graham, An Encore for Reform. The
Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. 60-61.
Although its analysis is clearly shaped by the emerging Cold
War liberalism of its period, the best narrative account of the
CPPA and the 1924 campaign remains, Kenneth Campbell MacKay, The
Progressive Movement of 1924 (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1949)
.
MacKay, The Progressive Movement , pp. 55-74; Robert M.
LaFollette to Richberg, June 20, 1924, Richberg Papers, Library
of Congress, Container 1.
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The CPPA was a loosely-knit coalition, however, and
its internal divisions surfaced as the convention date drew
near. Many of the railway labor leaders supported William
McAdoo's campaign for the Democratic nomination, and feared
that support for LaFollette's nomination, coming before the
Democratic convention, would harm his chances. After a
protracted struggle McAdoo lost his bid; the railway
unions, and eventually the AF of L, endorsed LaFollette as
an independent candidate, but continued to oppose any
attempt to translate his campaign into a third party. Such
lukewarm support from a crucial segment of his electoral
base hindered La Follette's efforts and foreshadowed a
perilous journey to November. ^°
La Follette made railroad regulation and Howell-
Barkley a major theme in his campaign. The platform
endorsed eventual public ownership of the railroads, and
the Progressive Campaign Handbook declared that Esch-
Cummins was "a legislative crime," and "the railroads'
postwar charter of privilege."''^ The roads did not fail to
take note of these charges. Railway Age wasted no time
attacking his candidacy and pointing out labor's ties to
the CPPA. "For more than 25 years Senator La Follette has
been the most inveterate, reckless, and unfair assailant of
^° New York Times , June 24, 1924, 1:7, and June 29, 9:3;
American Federationist , 31(1924), pp. 563-565, 705.
New York Times . September 23 , 1924 , 37 : 4 .
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private management of the railways in the United States,"
the journal charged, also observing that "his candidacy is
intended primarily to promote the Howell-Barkley bill."
The New York Times called Howell-Barkley "one of La
Follette's pet measures." Atterbury's Pennsylvania
Railroad campaigned vigorously for the Republican Coolidge,
printing an antiLa Follette editorial by conservative
publisher Cyrus Curtis on the backs of dining car menus
that reached an estimated 30,000 patrons daily.
The Republicans attempted to undercut La Follette's
farm and consumer support by reiterating the charges made
during the Senate hearings that Howell-Barkley meant higher
shipping rates and higher food prices. The Progressives
countered with a complex argument regarding railroad
valuation. Richberg had served as the General Counsel for
the National Conference on Valuation of American Railroads
in 1923, and worked closely with La Follette on this issue
throughout the election campaign. Progressives argued that
the roads' fixed costs were enormously overvalued, because
that value was based upon the reproduction costs— the
amount of money that would be reguired to purchase all of
the equipment at contemporary prices. If the ICC endorsed
an "original cost" methodology, as the Progressives
suggested, then the roads' valuation would drop sharply,
Railway Age 77 (1924), pp. 45, 92; New York Times, June 1,
1924, 1:5; MacKay, The Progressive Movement , p. 165.
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and rates could be reduced even if accompanied by any wage
hikes that the carriers claimed would follow the passage of
Howell-Barkley. The difficulties inherent in making an
issue as complex as valuation a central campaign theme
illustrate the obstacles faced by the Progressives/^
The roads did have reason to be concerned about the La
Follette campaign's arguments linking Howell-Barkley and
original cost valuation. The Cleveland convention's
endorsement of eventual public ownership of the railroads
once again raised the specter of the Plumb Plan, which the
carriers thought they had conveniently buried in 1920. The
Plan had called for the sale of government bonds to raise
the funds for the purchase of the roads. If the state
based the purchase price upon original cost valuation, the
bond issue would be significantly smaller and thus more
palatable to the public, and the roads' stock and
bondholders would receive correspondingly less compensation
in the event of a forced buyout. Electoral success for the
CPPA and the subsequent passage of Howell-Barkley could set
in motion other legislation and regulatory decisions
favorable to labor. The carriers understood this threat
when one of their spokesmen charged at the Senate hearings
just months earlier that "this proposed bill is the heart
of the Plumb Plan in disguise." With the CPPA's treasury
nearly empty. La Follette had to curtail his whistle stop
Vadney, Wavward Liberal , pp. 67-71.
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tour, and most of the mainstream press either ignored or
condemned his campaign. What most people heard about
Howell-Barkley was the vitriol heaped on it by its
opposition/^ Hobbled by its funding shortfall and worn
down by internal faction fights, the La Follette movement
stumbled badly. Lilienthal's own lack of enthusiasm
reflected a malaise that pervaded much of the campaign. "I
can't write you at length about the campaign," he confided
to Fred Arvin, "because there isn't much length about
it.... I've lost the fine enthusiasm that we had." The
labor leaders were having second thoughts as well.
Throughout the fall of 1924, the rail union officials began
backing away from the fiery oppositional politics that they
had helped set in motion. With Ralph Easley and Herbert
Hoover serving as intermediaries, the Coolidge
administration informally initiated talks between the roads
and unions to ease tensions and encourage compromise
legislation even before the November election.
Given the impoverished state of his campaign, La
Follette fared relatively well on election day, finishing
second to Coolidge throughout most of the west and carrying
Wisconsin. While many of his supporters had not expected
victory, they had hoped that his campaign would generate
Statement of C.E. Anderson, Hearings on S. 2646, p. 276.
^5 Lilienthal to Newton Arvin, August 1, 1924, DEL Papers,
Box 47; Zieger, Republicans and Labor , pp. 203-204.
(votes for progressive Congressional candidates. Railway
labor had hopes that gains for the Democrats, Republican
insurgents, and independents who backed Howeli-liarkley
would match the impressive gains of 1922. They would need
no compromise if they could pass the bill intact. Results
failed to match expectations, however, and the net loss for
this "labor bloc" was three Senators and twenty-two
Representatives.^*^ Labor did not "capture" tho state;
indeed, the November defeats curtailed their inMuencc.
Over the next year, the CPPA collapsed, and the Republican
caucus stripped La Follette of his committee seniority.
The fiery Senator died the following year. With
progressive forces in disarray, Howell-Barkley ' s fate was
sealed
.
Strengthened by its decisive victory, the Coolidge
administration took a more forceful hand in guiding the
roads' management and labor toward compromise. Recognizing
that they would be bargaining from strength, but also
cognizant of how close to passage Howe! 1 -narkley had been
the previous summer, the ARE voted to negotiate. Labor
came to the bargaining tabic weakened, but stiil committed
to amending Esch-Cummins and abolishing the RLB. Wary ol
each other, yet equally weary of industrial strife, the two
sides met repeatedly during 1925. As late as August, they
remained far apart on several key issues, including labor's
MacKay, The Progressive Movement , p. 228.
(
stand against presidential intervention, the formation of
emergency boards of inquiry, and a "cooling-of f period.
Given the distance between conferees, Jewell noted that
Robertson "does not feel that there is a great deal of hope
of securing an agreement . "^^ Negotiations continued
through the fall, however, and by January 1926, the
reluctant partners had hammered out an accord.
The new bill bore only a superficial resemblance to
its predecessor. The most significant remnant from Howell-
Barkley was that the new bill replaced the RLB with a Board
of Mediation; backing away from their position of the
previous August, labor made this their sine qua non for any
compromise. The similarities stopped there. The new bill
deleted any reference to the sixteen standard railway
unions. It abandoned national adjustment boards in favor
of local autonomy, much like Esch-Cummins . Howell-Barkley
had specifically mandated the formation of national boards
but the conferee's proposal stated only that boards could
be established with the mutual consent of management and
labor. The bill authorized the President to create an
Emergency Board and declare a "cooling-of f" period— the
provision much like Canada's IDI that Jewell and Robertson
had so firmly opposed just months earlier. While this
provision did not explicitly prohibit individual employees
from striking, its wording was sufficiently cautious to
^'^ B.M. Jewell, Memorandum, August 19, 1925, DRR-CHS, Box 4.
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allow for the proscription of organized work stoppages
during a presidential inquiry. While appearing to be
patterned after Howell-Barkley, the revisions embodied in
the restructured bill completely demolished the attempt by
railway labor to resurrect the more sympathetic federal
apparatus of the wartime government/^
The most visible symbol of the two bill's differences
came with the Congressional sponsors who introduced the
compromise bill in early January. Unlike the insurgents
who fought for Howell-Barkley, co-sponsors James Watson of
Indiana and James Parker of New York were both conservative
Republicans, and the new chairmen of the two Commerce
committees in Congress. In an ironic twist of fate, Watson
replaced La Follette as the ranking Republican in the
Senate committee after the party stripped La Follette of
his privileges. With the backing of the Congressional
leadership, the Watson-Parker bill would not have to clear
the procedural obstacles faced by its predecessor.
Vadney, Wayward Liberal , pp. 53-65; A copy of Watson-
Parker can be found in. Hearings of the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on S. 2306, 69th
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1-8. Regarding the no-strike issue,
the bill stated,
nor shall anything in this act be construed to make the
quitting of his labor or service by an employee an illegal
act.... Nor shall any court of the United States, or of any
state, issue any process to compel the performance by an
employee of such labor or service without his consent.
This wording prohibits injunctions against individuals, but does
not protect their organizations against court action for
initiating and coordinating a work stoppage.
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The Senate hearings and Congressional debate on
Watson-Parker reveal a bill characterized by guarded
compromise, and reflect the mutual resignation exhibited by
both management and labor. Testifying on the bill's
particulars, D.B. Robertson told the Senate committee that
the carriers had agreed in principle to the formation of
adjustment boards, and that this was "one of the most
important results of the protracted negotiations which have
preceded the introduction of this bill." Recognizing that
the bill did not compel the formation of any adjustment
boards, the labor chieftain observed that "the provision
. .
.
might have little force were it not for the fact that
the agreement has been made that these boards will be
established." He also spoke "with some hesitation"
regarding the cooling-off provision, noting that labor
continued to oppose the principle behind such a grant of
executive authority, but had reluctantly agreed to its
inclusion at the ARE * s insistence
.
Declaring that "I have got to know a fact when I meet
it on the road," A. P. Thorn explained why the carriers
agreed to the 1925 conferences. The 68th Congress had very
nearly passed Howell-Barkley despite the roads' strenuous
opposition, the ARE counsel observed, leaving management
determined to play a role in what they believed would be
the inevitable repeal of Esch-Cummins. Management
Hearings on S. 2306, pp. 40-41.
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supported the proposed legislation because it had
successfully eliminated the most pernicious aspects of
Howell-Barkley during the negotiations. In particular,
Thom pointed to the new method for creating Boards of
Adjustment, and the deletion of any explicit mention of the
standard railway unions. Thom also told the Senators that
Watson-Parker's protection of company unions was crucial.
"A very important provision of this bill is found in one of
its paragraphs," he testified,
which provides that nothing in the act shall be
construed to prohibit an individual carrier and
its employees from agreeing upon settlements of
disputes through such machinery ... as they may
mutually establish. That means that
notwithstanding the provisions of this bill, any
carrier and its employees may agree among
themselves as to other machinery not provided in
the bill. 5°
If not wholly satisfactory, Watson-Parker was at least
acceptable, Thom concluded. Echoing Thom's sentiments,
W.W. Atterbury and Daniel Willard, both formidable
opponents of Howell-Barkley, spoke in support of the new
measure. They assured the legislators that the bill served
the public interest by promoting industrial peace on the
nation's railroads.
Despite support from this uneasy alliance of the ARE
and the labor leaders, Watson-Parker encountered stiff
resistance. A dissident faction within the ARE composed of
^° Hearings on S. 2306, 10, 20-22.
5^ Hearings on S. 2306, pp. 38-39, 145-163.
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open shop roads formerly aligned with the Pennsylvania
constituted a core of " irreconcilables , " in opposition to
the compromise legislation. After failing to block the
ARE's endorsement, where voting was apportioned according
to a road's mileage, the officers from several roads
including the Southern Pacific, the Atchison, Topeka
, and
Santa Fe, and the New York Central Railroads broke with
their organization. The dissidents found an ally and fell
in behind the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
,
which led the assault on Watson-Parker.
James Emery, General Counsel for the NAM, spoke for
the opposition and offered two key amendments to the bill.
Noting that the Board of Mediation established to replace
the RLB would not have the power to dictate wage restraint
by administrative edict, Emery proposed a provision
authorizing the ICC to suspend wage agreements that the
Commission bel ieved would necessitate excessive rate hikes
.
He also suggested that Congress should strengthen the
wording of the "cool ing-of f " clause, a clause that was
already barely acceptable to labor, in order to avoid "any
ambiguous, uncertain language which ... appeared to or was
intended to impair the judicial powers of the courts of the
United States." The NAM counsel feared that the bill might
possibly be interpreted as limiting the judiciary's right
to enjoin unions as well as individuals. He wanted no
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legislative precedents attacking the injunction powers of
the courts.
Both the ARE and labor rushed to denounce Emery's
proposals. W.W. Atterbury and Richberg joined in urging
the Senators not to tinker with the bill. The labor lawyer
first questioned the constitutionality of the ICC
provision, arguing that the RLB's power to invalidate wage
agreements had been declared void by recent Supreme Court
rulings. Merely transferring this power to another
administrative agency would not make it any more legal,
Richberg cautioned, as he went on to condemn the NAM
proposals to proscribe strikes and control wages as "a
return to some of the legislative theories of the Middle
Ages." Concluding his rebuttal, Richberg reemphasized the
fragility of the Watson-Parker coalition, warning the
Senators that any amendment "will be regarded as a
destruction of the agreement.""
The support of the Congressional leaders proved as
beneficial for Watson-Parker as their opposition had been
deadly to its predecessor. The bill cleared the House on
March 16 without a misstep and without amendment, passing
381 to 13. Both sides focused their efforts on the Senate,
which prepared to consider the bill late in its spring
session. Pressing for a vote before the Congressional
^2 Hearings on S. 2306, pp. 50-51, 64-69.
" Hearings on S. 2306, pp. 39, 78, 89.
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recess, the ARE lobbied individual Senators and on April 24
sent a delegation to meet with President Coolidge. By this
time, the labor unrest in Britain that would erupt into a
general strike on May 3 began to cast a long shadow over
the debate, as the carriers warned that strikes and chaos
were imminent without the bill's passage. On May 6 and 7
the Senate took up the bill. Making reference to the
turmoil in Britain, Hiram Johnson of California spoke in
favor, and La Toilette's 1924 running-mate, Burton Wheeler
of Montana, challenged the claim that the legislation would
harm an already weakened farm economy. The bill passed
the Senate on May 12. Although Coolidge expressed what for
him were strong reservations, fueled by the ardent
opposition of the NAM, he signed the bill on May 20 and the
Railway Labor Act became law.^^
Two days later, a New York Times editorial described
the charges made by the NAM as "phantom fears," heralding
the Railway Labor Act as
the all-important first step toward accomplishing
precisely that cooperation of labor and
5^ New York Times . April 24 and April 25, 1926, 31:1 and
7:1, respectively.
" New York Times , May 7 and 8, 1926, 18:8 and 16:8,
respectively; Curtis unsuccessfully attempted to have the bill
renamed "A bill to increase the farmers' working day from 14 to
16 hours, and to reduce the railroad man's working day from 8 to
7 hours," Zieger, Republicans and Labor , p. 209.
56 New York Times . May 13, 1926, 24:4; Zieger, Republicans
and Labor , p. 210.
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management which Mussolini intends, but on our
traditional basis of self-government.^''
For several years, public reports of the law's success
continued to highlight the emergence of this new Era of
Good Feelings, and many historians since have portrayed the
Railway Labor Act (RLA) as a prime example of the liberal
corporatism that they claim dominated the country's
ideological landscape before the Great Depression.^® Such
pronouncements are not without merit— the late 1920s was
indeed a period of relative calm on the nation's roads, and
examined in its final form, the RLA could be seen as an
embodiment of industrial self-government and labor-
management cooperation.
The surface calm of the late 1920s is misleading,
however. Once enacted, the RLA's administrative machinery
was largely dysfunctional, and the reports of its success
were, in Irving Bernstein's words, "as much shadow as
substance." As D.B. Robertson had testified during the
1926 hearings, the act did not specifically require the
formation of Adjustment Boards, it merely provided for
their establishment through joint negotiations and by
mutual agreement. In an effort to strengthen company
unionism, management insisted on system-level boards, while
New York Times , May 22, 1926, 16:1.
^® See, for example, Larry Gerber's claim that Hoover and
Richberg viewed the RLA as the "perfect embodiment of the
philosophy of voluntarism," in The Limits of Liberalism, p. 200;
also see Radosh, "Labor and the American Economy."
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the independent unions preferred national boards but were
willing to accept a regional framework. In most cases, the
boards simply were never formed. Led by Chairman Samuel
Winslow, Alben Barkley's antagonist during the struggle for
Howell-Barkley in the House of Representatives, the newly
created Board of Mediation refused on procedural grounds to
hear cases that had not first been reviewed by an
Adjustment Board— an impossible requirement for most
disputes. The unions contended that the roads almost
immediately began to subvert the law's intent by forcing
employees into company unions. The Southern Pacific, for
example, fired shopmen who refused membership in the road's
Shop Craft Protective League. Attempts to contest this
coercion under the provisions of the RLA proved futile, for
the Board of Adjustment on the Southern Pacific was a
system-level body with its labor representatives drawn from
the Protective League. Bert Jewell and Richberg sought to
bring this matter directly to the national Mediation Board,
but it flatly refused to hear the case. Dismayed at this
rapid collapse of any semblance of equity and cooperation,
John Marrinan, the Secretary for the Board of Mediation and
a former assistant to Hoover at the Commerce Department,
resigned his position, charging that "the inaction of the
Board has thereupon made it possible for some carriers to
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perpetuate a Company union by practicing brutally coercive
methods . "^^
As the backlog of grievances continued to build, and
the RLA's flaws became increasingly evident, many union
leaders became convinced that remedial legislation was
necessary. J.G. Luhrsen, President of the American Train
Dispatchers Association, wrote to Richberg in early 1928,
warning that,
the fear I so repeatedly expressed , with
reference to the idle promises made by management
conferees on this Bill, is becoming more
realistic daily and until something compulsory is
enacted, the present R.L.A. is one of the very
best mediums through which carriers can and will
destroy organizations
.
Layoffs totaling approximately 20 percent of the nation's
rail workforce added a sense of urgency to labor's calls
for new legislation. After conferring with several
officials
,
Richberg outlined a set of proposed amendments
to the RLA. As described in a letter to Bert Jewell, the
central revision would make it "unlawful for a carrier to
decline to deal with the accredited representatives of the
employes," with "a provision for prosecution and punishment
by the government." In order for the Mediation Board to
determine labor ' s legitimate representative , Richberg
suggested that
Vadney, Wayward Liberal , pp. 77-78; Zieger, Republicans
and Labor , p. 211; Richberg to Jewell, March 11, 1927, DRR-CHS,
Box 5; John Marrinan to L.R. Richey, December 22, 1928, copy in
DRR-CHS, Box 7.
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the Board of Mediation shall be authorized to
take a secret ballot of the employes involved, or
to utilize any other appropriate method of
ascertaining the names of their duly designated
and authorized representatives
Stymied by the ineffectual machinery wrought by the
compromise of 1926, the railway unions still hoped to
recreate a more positive model of federal regulation.
Beyond organized labor, few people possessed the sense
of urgency that had been so prevalent during the mid-1920s.
The shadows 1922 walkout and the 1926 British general
strike receded, and even labor did not bear the same
animosity toward the current board as it had toward the
widely discredited RLB and its rancorous chairman, Ben
Hooper. Labor's political influence had also waned since
the zenith of the CPPA, and even this limited power
dissipated as union officials split in their choice of
candidates in the 1928 presidential election, with both
Hoover and Al Smith burdened with liabilities that limited
labor's support. Despite the act's obvious inadequacies.
Richberg to Jewell, March 20, 1928, DRR-CHS, Box 6.
Richberg, Robertson, and William Green of the AFofL
worked for Hoover's nomination, in part due to genuine political
sympathy— but also motivated by the need to block the nomination
of Charles G. Dawes. By late August, Richberg and Robertson were
growing disenchanted by Hoover's overtures to
"ultraconservatives . " Urged by Frederic Howe to join
"Progressives for Smith," Richberg declined, however, noting that
Smith's pro-labor rhetoric was offset by his campaign associates.
"Should I be guided by the voice of Smith, or the hand of
Raskob," Richberg asked, questioning the influence of Smith's
campaign manager, the notoriously anti-union John J. Raskob.
Richberg to Frederic Howe, August 30, 1928; Richberg to
Robertson, August 28, 1928; Richberg to Martin F. Ryan, June 4,
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the unions were wearily stalemated. Weakened by declining
membership and sagging political might, railway labor
lacked sufficient leverage to press their demands, and
union leaders were unwilling to risk the results of open
confrontation. The Railway Labor Act remained unaltered.
For a brief period in the mid-1920s it seemed possible
that the unions could stem the reversals suffered since
1920, and regain the ground lost since Wilson's wartime
administration. If the legislative and electoral defeats
during 1924 crushed railway labor's boldest plans, the
uneasy compromise that yielded the RLA in 1926 had
sustained some hope for more modest gains. The swift
collapse of mutualism that followed the act's passage
destroyed even the pretense of progress for organized
labor. The unions would not recapture strategic momentum
until they had the harsh ally of economic depression, which
smashed the Business Republicans' hegemony and created a
more favorable political environment.
The Railway Labor Act was not the ideal embodiment of
industrial self-government and liberal corporatist
ideology. For organized labor, the law was a failure,
functioning only to undermine independent unionism; for
management, the law was a tool, designed to blunt support
for more radical measures and to serve their self-interest.
Still, the law set an important precedent, legitimating the
1928, all in DRR-CHS, Box 6.
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principle, if not the fact, of labor's right to collective
bargaining. As Richberg stated in an address to union
leaders in October 1926, the RLA "marks one of the great
advances in the labor movement of this country,"
because the right of organizing, the right of
representation by representatives of your own
choice, the right to negotiate and bargain
collectively, each one of these rights is set
forth as a duty and an obligation in law.
If the present statute lacked sanctions, acceptance of
these rights would evolve "by custom and by common
consent," eventually establishing the need for further
legislation if "it is necessary to swing the force of
government against them [the employers]." Labor's efforts
were statist and not voluntarist, embracing an expansion of
the federal government's regulatory authority
.
At the end of the decade, in the midst of a deepening
Depression, David Lilienthal moved to the rich political
soil of the state of Wisconsin. Although leaving labor law
for public utility regulation, the struggles surrounding
the passage of the Railway Labor Act shaped Lilienthal 's
new career. In Wisconsin, his efforts to cultivate public
" Richberg, Untitled Speech, October 5, 1926, DRR-CHS, Box
5; as David Montgomery stated in his study of the Murray Hill
agreement involving the Machinists, the National Metal Trades
Association, and the National Civic Federation, "it was through
the agency of the country's political machinery, rather than
through voluntary associations of businessmen, that 'corporate
liberalism' most effectively wooed union leaders...."
Montgomery, "Machinists, the Civic Federation, and the Socialist
Party," in, Workers' Control in America (New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1979), p. 83.
support for economic regulation, and to implement a
productivist program carry the clear imprint of the battles
of the 1920s.
CHAPTER 3
SHAPING THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION:
RATES AND REGULATORY TECHNIQUE DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Over the second-half of the 1920s, Lilienthal slowly
drifted away from a career in labor law and toward the
field of public utilities. Although he remained associated
with Richberg until 1928-1929, the daily demands of their
practice were not burdensome, and Lilienthal had enough
time to pursue other interests. Although these interests
covered a broad range of issues, and included assisting
Clarence Darrow in the Ossian Sweet murder/civil rights
case, Lilienthal 's commitment to public utility law grew
proportionally stronger as his involvement with Richberg
waned. Of course, the drift into public utility regulation
in the years immediately prior to the Great Depression
ultimately proved to be both fortuitous and enduring, for
it was in this field that Lilienthal made significant
contributions .
^
First as a lawyer in the late 1920s, and then as a
member of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission from
1931-1933, Lilienthal began a comprehensive reformulation
of the purpose and practice of public utility regulation.
^Vadney, Wayward Liberal , pp. 66-67, 76-82. Regarding
Lilienthal 's Chicago years, see also the work of political
scientist Steven M. Neuse, who is writing a formal biography of
Lilienthal, esp. "A Young Professional Makes His Mark," (draft
chapter, in this author's possession).
Lilienthal and Richberg severed their formal relationship i
1926, but they maintained close ties— with Lilienthal renting
office space from Richberg and working for him on an occasional
basis
.
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Relying on the experience he gained in crafting railway
labor legislation, and working closely with a number of
similarly reform-minded colleagues, Lilienthal also turned
his utility work toward a much more ambitious political
agenda. By the early 1930s Lilienthal envisioned government
regulation of the utilities as the fulcrum for both
economic and political reconstruction. With the country
facing a depression of ill-defined but obvious severity,
and with prospects for a quick recovery fading, Lilienthal
began calling for a sweeping expansion of regulatory
authority as a necessary response to the economy's sharp
decline. He linked recovery and continued prosperity to a
strong administrative state that would exercise a mix of
both oversight and control over virtually every economic
sector— regulation that would extend far beyond the scope
of traditional government intervention in the marketplace.
This work, which became in many ways a grand struggle,
began quite modestly. In early 1926 Irwin S. Rosenbaum, a
Cincinnati lawyer who knew of Lilienthal through mutual
friends from Harvard Law School, suggested that the two
collaborate on a series of articles on the regulation of
motor vehicles and the trucking industry. Lilienthal
understood the significance of trucking, one of the newest
forms of interstate commerce and an emerging competitor for
the railroads, and he eagerly accepted the offer. Their
first effort appeared in the July 1926 issue of the Journal
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of Land and Public Utility Economics
,
the organ of Richard
T. Ely's Institute for Economic Research at Northwestern
University. Soon after the publication of their article,
Lilienthal and Rosenbaum co-edited a serial publication on
public utilities published by Commerce Clearing House
(CCH) .2
Lilienthal 's new venture was similar to a tax service
also published by CCH, and consisted of statutes,
commission rulings and regulations, and court decisions at
the state and federal levels. He sought a wide audience,
and to enhance sales, Lilienthal defined a broad
jurisdiction for the service. The co-editors covered
regulated industries ranging from gas and electric
utilities to motor carriers. The publication's breadth
proved to be more than a valuable sales asset, however.
Through his editorial tasks Lilienthal gained an overview
of the current status of public utility regulation across
the United States. His familiarity with the perplexing
array of state and federal regulations and the various
legal precedents, as well as contacts with utility
commissioners, lawyers, and legislators, provided him with
^David E. Lilienthal, Bound Journal, Unpublished Manuscript,
January 1, 1927, pp. 174, 181-183, Lilienthal Papers, Box 193.
Lilienthal 's journals are available in a seven-volume
edition (New York, Harper and Row, 1964 et. seq.), but much of
the material from the years prior to his work at the Tennessee
Valley Authority is not included in the published edition.
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a firm foundation for his work well beyond the post with
Commerce Clearing House.
The editorial position was not an abrupt break with
Lilienthal's legal training, his work with Richberg, or his
political inclinations. The serial brought the young
lawyer back to his training in regulatory law under the
tutelage of Felix Frankfurter, and the common-carrier
statutes that he compiled were familiar from his efforts on
behalf of the Railway Labor Executives Association.
Similarly, the loose-leaf publication recalled his work
for the 1924 La Follette campaign, and the struggle to
define shipping rates, fair valuation, and rigorous
commission oversight as political issues. Yet this career
move was not motivated only, or perhaps even primarily, by
Lilienthal's political leanings or his legal background.
Lilienthal sensed that during the 1920s public utility law
had languished, despite significant transformations in the
economic landscape-- such as the rapidly increasing
consolidation of utility interests within holding
companies. The move into utility law represented a
promising career opportunity for an ambitious young lawyer.
Lilienthal was, in effect, looking to make his mark. As he
confided to his long-time friend Newton "Fred" Arvin, "the
^service' [the CCH serial] is partly fascinating because it
is scholarly and creative; but I don't know how far that
accounts for my zeal. Uncomplimentary as it may seem, the
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desire to ^put over' a ^Big Thing' seems to be the most
important factor." Money, too, seems to have entered
Lilienthal's equation. Despite his admiration for and
loyalty to Donald Richberg, the labor law firm could not
match the handsome salary and royalties offered by Commerce
Clearing House. As Felix Frankfurter gently reminded
Lilienthal, "the interests to which you are devoted are not
on the side of the biggest money bags."^
Indeed, Lilienthal's editorial work paid dividends
well beyond a more secure and substantial salary, as he
accrued professional status as well. He parlayed his
growing expertise into speaking engagements before various
community and civic groups around Chicago, and began
teaching a course on public utility law at Northwestern
University. He also published several articles on
contemporary regulatory trends in two prestigious legal
journals, the law reviews at Columbia and Harvard.
4
In his articles, Lilienthal focused on the challenges
facing regulatory bodies due to the technological and
institutional changes within the utility industries. He
noted that the emergence of the holding company as the
^Lilienthal to Newton Arvin, October 29, 1927, and.
Frankfurter to Lilienthal, October 28, 1929, Lilienthal Papers,
Boxes 48 and 49 respectively.
For surveys of regulatory issues during the early 1900s,
see, Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1984) and Martin J. Sklar, The
Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism. 1890-1916 (New
York, Cambridge University Press, 1988)
.
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dominant corporate form among utilities had transformed
these enterprises, integrating the local operating
companies into national systems. American Telephone and
Telegraph and electric power giants such as Commonwealth
and Southern and Electric Bond and Share had facilitated
the diffusion of technological developments including long-
distance telephone communications and regional electrical
grids, Lilienthal observed, but state regulatory
commissions were ill-equipped, intellectually and legally,
to confront these new realities. Few commissions had kept
pace with these changes. Lilienthal argued that these state
bodies could provide competent oversight of the utilities,
but only if they had larger, better-trained staffs; utility
commissions could not function if they served as the
warehouses for the detritus of political sinecures.^
Lilienthal 's attempts to formulate a methodology for
regulating holding companies were quite timely. By the
late 1920s many economist were observing that these firms
were largely immune to both federal and state oversight.
Indeed, Columbia economist James C. Bonbright, who co-
authored the landmark study The Holding Company. Its Public
Significance and Its Regulation , argued that while there
were many imperatives behind the formation of these firms,
"freedom from regulation is likely to be the determining
^David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility
Holding Companies," Columbia Law Review 29 (1929), pp. 404-406.
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factor." Lilienthal urged that the holding companies ought
to be more stringently controlled by the individual states,
not simply because they were the "real proprietors" of
their operating subsidiaries, but because, "more
important [ ly] , they are managers as well, making decisions,
sharing responsibility, and in constant touch with the
properties which serve the public." The states could
achieve this control by indirect means, regulating
financial transactions between the holding company and its
operating subsidiaries that were already clearly subject to
the jurisdiction of the state commissions. Implementing
such indirect regulation would be a difficult task, for
commissions would not only have to establish the legitimacy
of state, and not federal, authority, but many state
commissions lacked both the willingness and the capacity to
assume this aggressive posture. Inadeguate staffing
rendered many commissions unable to pursue the complex
accounting and technical reviews of the burgeoning utility
industries .
^
The relative weakness of most commissions also
grew out of confusion regarding the purpose of the state
bodies. " [CJommissions are confused as to their proper
function," Lilienthal wrote to Frankfurter in October 1929,
^James C. Bonbright and Gardiner C. Means, The Holding
Company. Its Public Significance and Its Regulation (New York,
McGraw Hill, 1932), pp. 51-52. Lilienthal, "Regulation of Public
Utility Holding Companies," p. 408.
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are they courts, to listen to the evidence, weight it
render carefully drawn findings... or are they
administrative tribunals, conducting investigations
and reaching conclusions upon the kind of evidence
[as] skilled investigators.
Lilienthal favored the latter agenda, as his subsequent
work in Wisconsin would clearly demonstrate, for he
believed that the consuming public lacked the resources
necessary for adequate representation before the
commissions. If the regulators acted as neutral arbiters,
they were not serving in the public interest.
Still, aggressive regulation could not be effective,
as long as agency appointments remained substandard.
Lilienthal told Frankfurter that the quality of commission
personnel was "on the decline." Elaborating on this theme
in the draft of a later speech, Lilienthal excoriated "the
appointment of pygmy politicians, usually feeble lawyers as
the result of 'deals,'" that has "done more to discredit
regulation" in his opinion than any other factor. The
states must show a renewed commitment to their regulatory
bodies
.
^
With this work, Lilienthal established a reputation as
one of the leading authorities in utility law, gaining a
national audience and attracting in particular the
attention of James Bonbright and his colleague at Columbia,
Adolf A. Berle Jr. In summer 1929 both Eerie and Bonbright
^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, October 1929, Lilienthal, "The
Future Development of Public Utility Regulation," 1 September
1930, Lilienthal Papers, Boxes 49 and 4 respectively.
81
were involved in a New York state investigation of public
utility holding companies touched off by a series of
maneuvers by the Morgan financial interests. That June, in
their first exchange of letters, Berle noted that he and
Bonbright had read with great interest Lilienthal's recent
article in the Columbia Law Review . "it is an excellent
and scholarly piece of work," Berle wrote, "and the subject
is peculiarly alive."'' Through the late 1920s, Lilienthal
was building a reputation as an expert in his field, and
forging the personal and professional bonds that left him
well-positioned, when an opportunity arose, to put over his
"Big Thing."
Lilienthal's reputation among other supporters of
regulatory activism was greatly enhanced when he became
involved in a protracted legal struggle over telephone
rates in Chicago. In 1922, the Illinois Commerce
Commission ordered the Illinois Bell Telephone Company to
reduce its rates within the city of Chicago. Claiming that
the reductions would lower their rates to unacceptable
levels, Illinois Bell challenged the order in court. A
number of legal precedents had established that public
utilities were entitled to "fair" minimum rates of return
on their investments, generally gauged at between six and
eight percent; lower rates would be confiscatory upon stock
''Berle to Lilienthal, 29 June 1929, Papers of A. A. Berle
!
Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Box 9 (hereafter
cited as Berle Papers)
.
and bondholders' property and therefore unconstitutional,
the courts had stated. In 1923 Illinois Bell gained a
temporary injunction against the rates. Several lengthy
delays followed, but by 1929, both sides were prepared to
go before the Federal District Court in Chicago.^
The city's lawyers, George I. Haight and Benjamin F.
Goldstein, asked Lilienthal to help them reconstruct the
case they would lay before the judicial tribunal.
Preparing their case over the spring and summer of 1929,
Haight, Goldstein, and Lilienthal turned away from what
constituted a fair rate of return for Illinois Bell; they
centered their case on the relationship of the Bell
subsidiary to its holding company, American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T). At their broadest, the counsels' claims
questioned the standing of the Bell company in the suit,
asserting that AT&T's ownership of 99 percent of the
operating company's stock reduced it to "a mere agency and
instrumentality" of the parent corporation. As examples,
the city's advocates cited AT&T's use of local Chicago
exchange equipment free-of-charge for its long-distance
^The history of the Illinois Bell case can be found in the
record of its hearing before the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as in newspaper accounts of the hearings in the
Supreme Court and Federal District Court. See, "Proceedings,"
Smith et. al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133,
microfiche record of court proceedings, Rutgers University Law
Library; "Smith et. al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. No. 90),
Supreme Court Recorder 51 (October term, 1930): 65-73; New York
Times, December 2, 1930, 11:1, and, February 1, 1930, 2:4;
Chicago Tribune . February 1, 1930, 1:1.
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operations, and questioned the fairness of prices charged
by Western Electric, the sole supplier of the local
company's equipment and the manufacturing subsidiary of
AT&T. The counsels asked if AT&T was filling its coffers
by mandating imprudent investment in new plant, supplied at
monopolistic prices by Western Electric. The only way their
charges could be answered satisfactorily was to make the
holding company the legitimate target of the investigation
and set rates based upon a fair return on investment for
AT&T, they argued. Lilienthal worked closely with Haight
and Goldstein in the drafting of their brief, which
stretched to a long-winded 600 pages.'
On 31 January 1930, the District Court in Chicago
ruled in favor of Illinois Bell, on the ground that the
local company retained a separate corporate identity. The
court made permanent the seven year-old temporary
injunction against the Commerce Commission's rate order.
The regulators appealed, and the Supreme Court heard the
case during its October term. In what Haight and Goldstein
declared a "partial victory," the court remanded the case
back to the District Court in Chicago. With a statement
'Lilienthal correspondence with Haight and Goldstein, April-
June, 1929, Box 49, Lilienthal Papers; "Brief for the Appellant,"
Smith et. al., 282 U.S. 133.
^°One of the three Federal judges in the case was James H.
Wilkerson, who had issued the sweeping injunction against the
strikers in the 1922 Railway Shopcrafts strike. For an account
of the decision, see, Chicago Tribune , 1 February 1930, 1:1.
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issued by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the court
upheld the legal standing and corporate identity of
Illinois Bell, but then proceeded to significantly
strengthen indirect state regulation of public utility
holding companies. Because the ultimate issue was whether
or not the rates are confiscatory upon the company's
property, Hughes declared, the legitimacy of its operating
costs must be more closely scrutinized. All transactions
between AT&T and Illinois Bell must be subject to
examination by the Commission, including the use of local
exchange equipment for long-distance operations and the
prices charged by Western Electric for materials supplied
to the Bell company.
Hughes concluded by addressing the broader issue of a
fair return on a utility's property. Affirming parameters
set by the court in previous decisions, Hughes wrote that a
utility is entitled to a return "equal to that generally
being made at the same time and in the same general part of
the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding risks and
uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right," the
chief justice continued, "to profits such as are realized
or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or
speculative ventures. "^^ Though Illinois Bell emerged as
^^New York Times , 2 December 1930, 11:1; "Smith et. al. v.
Illinois Bell," Supreme Court Recorder , p. 72.
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the ultimate victor in this rate case, the Supreme Court's
demand for more rigorous regulatory inquiries and its
reaffirmation of ratemaking guidelines transcended the
particulars of Smith et. al., influencing public regulation
well beyond the boundaries of the city of Chicago.
Lilienthal immediately recognized the potential impact
of the Smith case. In a follow-up to his 1929 article in
the Columbia Law Review , he outlined the opportunities for
greater regulatory activism implied by the Hughes decision.
Smith et. al. provided a sound legal justification for
oversight of the relationship between holding companies and
their operating subsidiaries, Lilienthal noted.
Transactions ranging from stock transfers and dividend
payments to the purchase of new equipment should be
reviewed by regulators. Determining costs to holding
companies of services provided to its subsidiaries was, he
wrote, "puzzling in the extreme," raising numerous complex
accounting and technical obstacles. Surmounting these
obstacles would require larger budgets for commissions and
a commitment to technical expertise in place of the
political cronyi'sm that helped cripple such agencies.
The main precedent cited by Hughes was Bluefield Company v.
Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, 692, 693, 43 Sup. Ct.
675, 679 (1923) .
^^Lilienthal , "Recent Developments in the Law of Public
Utility Holding Companies," Columbia Law Review 31 (1931), pp.
195-198
.
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The case also upheld the primacy of state rather than
federal regulation of utilities, and provided the
f theoretical rationale for a pragmatic wariness exhibited by
Lilienthal and other reformers toward Washington. It is
|l
I
r^ot surprising that many reformers were wary of Washington,
j
After two conservative Republican administrations, and
I
growing disillusionment with the progressive credentials of
the Hoover presidency, Lilienthal observed that the
Court's decision in favor of Illinois Bell allowed each
state to "regulate the transactions within its own domain
according to its own conception of public policy." The
decision, Lilienthal continued, "shows a clear inclination
on the part of the Court... to sustain state power over
what are in point of law and fact and tradition essentially
local problems
,
(emp. his) "^^
As the Smith case lay before the nine justices of the
Supreme Court, Philip Fox La Follette was surging to a
landslide victory in the November 1930 gubernatorial
|| election in Wisconsin. The second son of Progressivism '
s
late standard bearer, Philip La Follette campaigned in the
aggressive and contentious style of his father. Hair awry,
jacket off. La Follette had crossed the state that summer.
The large-scale holding companies that grew to dominate the
^^Lilienthal, "Recent Developments," pp. 206-207. That
[ Lilienthal 's positive appraisal of this aspect of the decision
\ was shaped by his consideration of the political terrain becomes
; increasingly clear during his tenure in Wisconsin. See below,
I PP-
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power industry in the 192 0s were the frequent target of La
Follette's attacks. Charging these corporate giants with
"sinister and subversive practices," he asserted that "this
Power Monopoly [,] bent on gaining absolute mastery of the
energy of the present and future, has stopped at nothing,"
The young La Follette pledged to sweep the corporations out
of the halls of government, replacing them with "the
Progressive philosophy... that the public interest should
be placed above special privilege . "^'^ This message was
well-received throughout the state. La Follette captured
the Republican primary by over 18 percentage points and, in
a state that was at that time dominated by the Republican
party, the electoral bulge widened in November when the
thirty-three year-old candidate gained over 69 percent of
the vote.^^
Following his inauguration in January 1931, La
Follette began to assemble his administration. He quickly
turned his attention to the Railroad Commission, which,
although an early model of aggressive state regulation, had
fallen prey to the budgetary neglect common to many state
regulatory agencies. The end of one commissioner's
appointment and the resignation of a second meant that the
^^"Power," La Follette campaign position paper, n.d. (ca.
July 1930); Campaign Textbook ; P.F. La Follette Papers, Series I,
Box 1, Archives and Manuscripts Division, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin (hereafter, SHSW)
.
^^Miller, La Follette (1982), pp. 11-12.
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new governor could name two-thirds of the Commission. The
new governor hoped to find a chairman for the Commission
with the necessary expertise and a well-established
national reputation. La Follette first sought Basil Manly,
a veteran of his father's ill-fated 1924 presidential
campaign (and later influential in garnering Progressive
Republican support for Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 campaign),
then discussed the position with James M. Landis, a rising
star on the faculty at Harvard Law School; both declined
the position, primarily because the $5,000 annual salary
was too low. Without a strong enough candidate from
outside the state to take the chairmanship, La Follette
turned to one of his family's long-time supporters,
Theodore Kronshage, a member of the Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin and counsel for the state's League
of Municipalities. With Kronshage and the previously-
appointed Andrew R. McDonald giving the governor a two-
thirds Wisconsin majority on the Commission, he had enough
political leeway to offer the remaining seat to an out-of-
stater with impressive credentials but perhaps somewhat
less status than either Manly or Landis. Based on the very
strong recommendation of Donald Richberg, La Follette
turned to Lilienthal to fill the third seat.''^
^^"History of the Railroad Commission," n.d. (post 1931),
Records of the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Central
Files, Progress File, Series 1825, Box 3, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin (hereafter cited as PSC Records) . Wisconsin
is regularly cited as a leader in regulatory innovation; see, for
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Lilienthal recognized the opportunity that lay before
him. The governor had outlined an ambitious regulatory
agenda, and further, the central actors in that political
drama were certain to receive the national exposure that
seemed to be habitually accorded Wisconsin Progressivism.
Eager to return to the public arena, in early February
Lilienthal accepted La Follette's offer. As neither
Kronshage's nor Lilienthal 's name had been running through
the state capitol's rumor mill, the nominations came as
something of a surprise, but on Wednesday 11 February 1931,
the state Senate unanimously confirmed both appointments.'"''
Wrapping up much of his Chicago practice in just over six
weeks, Lilienthal prepared for the move to Madison. On 20
March, the new commissioner's friends and associates
honored him with a farewell banquet. Among those unable to
attend was La Follette, whose telegram reflected the tone
for much of his new appointee's work in Wisconsin. "We are
hoping," La Follette wrote, "that your David is equipped
with the necessary Biblical weapons. The Public Utility
Goliath is waiting." Brandishing accounting and
example, McCraw, Prophets of Regulation , p. 24 3.
Basil Manly to P.F. La Follette, 12 January 1931; Felix
Frankfurter to P.F. La Follette, and Robert M. La Follette Jr. to
P.F. La Follette, 14 January 1931, P.F. La Follette Papers,
Series I, Box 41; Donald R. Richberg to P.F. La Follette, 23
January 1931.
^''Lilienthal to La Follette, 5 February 1931, P.F. La
Follette Papers, Series I, Box 4; Milwaukee Journal, 6 February
1931, 1:3 and 6:1, and 11 February 1931, 5:1.
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engineering reports, and invoking legislative statutes, La
Follette's David chose weapons considerably more modern
Still some three months short of his thirty-second
birthday, in late March 1931 Lilienthal arrived in Madison
as the youngest member of the Wisconsin Railroad
Commission. He came with an emerging national reputation
as an expert in the field of public utility law. As one of
the architects of a rejuvenated regulatory activism that
was then gaining momentum across the country, he would
cultivate the shift in popular sentiment against the
utility holding companies and other large-scale firms that
had reaped the windfall of the 1920s but whose pockets had
shortened in the depths of the Depression. His tenure in
Wisconsin would be a brief two years. However, by the time
Lilienthal left in June 1933 he had broadened the
Commission's scope of action, refined its regulatory
technique, and left in place a model that was the center of
much debate among interested observers. By 1933, Lilienthal
had forged his new politics of consumption.
Among his first tasks upon arriving in Madison was the
administrative reorganization of the Commission. The
cornerstone of this restructuring was a statute enacted
during the spring session of the state legislature. The
Duncan Act invested the Railroad Commission with broad new
^^P.F. La Follette to Lilienthal, 20 March 1931, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 52.
91
powers and renamed it the Public Service Commission (PSC)
to signal the extent of the changes. The law strengthened
the PSC's ability to indirectly regulate holding companies,
with more control over the issue of utility securities. By
authorizing the agency to order a halt to dividend payments
if the commissioners believed that such payments would
endanger the utility's viability, the statute prevented
holding companies weakened by the Depression from forcing
otherwise stable operating subsidiaries into insolvency
simply to ease a capital crisis within the parent firm.
Finally, the law had an "assessment of costs" clause, that
required utilities to pay the cost of the Commission's
investigations and rate hearings. Along with a number of
statutes and resolutions designed to promote public
ownership, the law reorganizing the PSC was described in
the New York Times as one of the "far-reaching and radical
measures," that made Wisconsin "a leader in matters of
public utility regulation and control."^''
The next step for the commissioners was assembling a
staff that could implement the new agenda. Several
previous administrations, progressive as well as
conservative, had neglected the agency's personnel and
budgetary needs. With a severely circumscribed state
^'Miller, Governor Philip F. La Follette , pp. 17-21;
Lilienthal, "The Work of the Public Service Commission During
Governor La Follette's Administration," n.d. (ca. spring 1932);
New York Times . 5 July 1931, II, 2:6.
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administrative capacity, the commissioners needed to build
a bureaucratic infrastructure from the ground up. As the
year-end report to the governor noted, "on April l [1931]
we found that the Commission was wholly without an
accounting department; in fact," the report continued,
"there was not a single individual on the staff who could
be properly described as an accountant." Recognizing that
regulation "must lean heavily upon accounting control," the
PSC moved quickly to hire nineteen accountants, and
established an Accounting Department "of very high
caliber." The new regime also created a Rates and Research
Department to coordinate rate and valuation investigations,
and to study "the economic problems involved in public
ownership enterprises," hiring the managing editor of the
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics . Edward W.
Morehouse, as its chief. The Commission also bolstered the
Engineering Department in order to bring it "in line with
the needs of the State and of the Commission," recruiting
from the California utility board a highly respected
engineer, A.V. Guillou. Department heads filled out their
staffs with university-trained economists, engineers, and
statisticians. Rather than limiting the commission's
administrative reach, the relative neglect of previous
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administrations afforded La Follette's appointees a
relatively free hand in molding the revitalized agency. 2°
With the organization restructured, the agency sought
to redefine its mission by adopting a more active, and at
times perhaps belligerent, regulatory posture. At this
point, Lilienthal emerged as dominant member of the
Commission. In language closely paralleling Lilienthal 's
October 1929 memo to Frankfurter, the PSC's 1931 report to
La Follette informed the governor that the bureau's
reorganization had "practically revolutionized our work,"
changing the Commission
from a body conducting hearings in proceedings where
the preparation and presentation of the facts was
[sic] left to the parties directly interested to a
body initiating and conducting investigations in the
interest of the public and instituting proceedings on
its own motion in which the facts pertinent to the
public interest are assembled and presented by the
Commission's staff.
Despite being the youngest member of the commission, with
no political connections within the state, Lilienthal was
recasting the PSC according to his own vision.
Given La Follette's legislative program and
Lilienthal 's blueprint for regulatory activism, it was
virtually inevitable that the PSC's relationship with the
I
privately-held utilities would be tense. Lilienthal 's
^°Theodore Kronshage to Philip F. La Follette, 17 December
M 1931, Lilienthal Papers, Box 52; Lilienthal, "Work of the PSC."
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, October 1929, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 49; Lilienthal, "The Work of the PSC," p. 2;
Kronshage to La Follette, 17 December 1931.
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tendentious personality made this a certainty. Always
looking for the good fight, Lilienthal set his sights on an
industry that was reeling from both public ridicule and
financial instability. An opportunity to deliver a quick
blow came soon after his arrival in Madison. The governor
referred to his new commissioner a letter regarding utility
investments. The editor of Public Utility Fortnightly
,
a
journal owned by electrical manufacturing and power
magnates including Martin J. Insull and Owen D. Young,
wrote La Follette to inquire about the soundness of
investments in utilities operating in Wisconsin, given the
state's ambitious plans for public ownership and aggressive
regulation. The editor, Francis X. Welch, had avoided
noting his affiliation in the query. Responding to the
governor's referral, Lilienthal pointed out Welch's ties,
and suggested he was fishing for a statement to be used
"for publicity purposes." The new commissioner did not
want to disappoint Welch. He urged the governor to make
full use of the opportunity, and answer by asserting that
"any investor who is looking for speculative and fanciful
profits I should advise to keep his money out of Wisconsin
utilities." Lilienthal went on, asking La Follette to
proclaim that, "until the electrical industry cleans
house ,
"
and recognizes the truth of the humble laws of
arithmetic (i.e. avoids unsound financial activities),
no investment in a privately owned electric public
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Utility enterprise is safe, whether in Wisconsin or in
any other state."
With Lilienthal charting its course, there would be little
confusion concerning the Wisconsin commission's direction.
Putting the new staff to work, Lilienthal began the
PSC's first major rate investigation initiated on its own
motion. The target was not a power company; it was the
Wisconsin Telephone Company and its parent firm, American
Telephone and Telegraph. In August 1930 Wisconsin
Telephone went before the Railroad Commission to request
rate hikes ranging from 20 to 33.3 percent for its Madison
exchange. No decision had been rendered before the 1931
reorganization, when the new Commissioners took over and
widened the scope of the case. Citing a range of concerns,
on 29 July the PSC issued an order for a full-scale review
of the Wisconsin company, subsuming the Madison case within
the broader investigation. The preliminary hearings in the
Madison case had revealed "disturbing growth" in the
company's maintenance costs and investment in physical
plant during a period of declining revenue brought on by
the Depression. The PSC also noted the "unsoundness" of
determining rates applicable to a state-wide system on a
local area basis, especially as Milwaukee and other cities
were petitioning the board to review their rates as well.
^^Francis X. Welch to La Follette, 30 March 1931, with
undated attachment, Lilienthal to La Follette, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 52.
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The Commission claimed that a comprehensive review should
also result in an economy of effort and money.
The order made clear that the PSC intended to use the
precedents established by the Smith case to draw AT&T into
the regulatory fray. Noting the decision written by Chief
Justice Hughes, the order stated that "the Western Electric
relationship is a vital issue." The commissioners agreed
that the "large scale production and the special business
and legal relationship" between Western Electric and Bell
subsidiaries such as the Wisconsin company resulted in
"economies of production and distribution" for the AT&T
system. Listing several hundred-thousand dollars in plant
investment and maintenance, the commissioners claimed that
"most, if not all, of the equipment in these accounts
represents purchases from the Western Electric Company....
the total amount involved will, undoubtedly, represent a
substantial fraction of the total rate base." At issue for
the PSC was how to disentangle the various costs and
benefits entwined in this "special relationship."
^^Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, "In the Matter of
the State-Wide Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion of
the Rates, Rules, Services, Practices, and Activities of the
Wisconsin Telephone Company," 29 July 1931, Docket No. 2-U-35,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, p. 45.
The reports, orders, and hearing testimony for 2-U-35
comprise over ten large boxes of unprocessed records. No box or
folder numbers are available. All related memoranda and
correspondence that were filed within the PSC's central files are
part of the Historical Society's processed collection, and box
numbers will be provided for citations of that material. Unless
otherwise noted, all PSC documents cited are from the State
Historical Society's Madison archive.
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Answering such questions presented a formidable task;
in his 1931 Columbia Law Review article Lilienthal had
characterized the problem as "puzzling in the extreme."
Facing such complexities, the commissioners placed their
faith in the abilities of their new staff of experts. "We
cannot believe," they claimed,
that the resources of regulatory technique will be
found inadequate to meet even so involved and
intricate a problem as this Western Electric
relationship presents.
Postponing its decision on the Madison request, and
planning to test the strength of its new activist agenda,
the PSC had raised the ante.^^
On top of an already heavy workload, the PSC staff
began the laborious process of preparing the telephone
case. Under the direction of Rates and Research chief E.W.
Morehouse, the staff requested a voluminous array of
engineering and accounting reports from the Bell system.
No doubt burdened by the requests, but also disinclined to
extend their fullest cooperation, AT&T and Western Electric
balked at the PSC's long list. Claiming that it could not
isolate out data for items such as the cost of sales and
net profit figures on sales to Wisconsin Telephone, Western
Electric wrote that there was "no practical method" of
procuring the material, "and we therefore had to state in
answer to such requests 'Information not available.'"
2^PSC, 2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 21-2 2.
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Stymied in his repeated attempts to clarify why such data
were unavailable, Morehouse suggested in a late October
memo to Lilienthal that the PSC should send its chief
accountant to the corporate offices in New York; there,
they could determine what was and was not actually
available in the company's ledgers.
Lilienthal 's efforts to indirectly regulate AT&T
through its Wisconsin subsidiary reflected his belief that
state commissions could control the utility industry more
effectively than any federal agency. This was a pragmatic
judgement on his part, based upon political considerations
and his appraisal of legal doctrine in the aftermath of the
Smith et. al . decision. Lilienthal was not blindly hostile
to federal intervention, but after ten years of
intermittent skirmishes with federal regulators, he simply
had little faith in national initiatives. Lilienthal had
outlined this position in an August 1931 letter to
Richberg. Writing on behalf of the subcommittee on holding
companies of the Progressive Conference held the previous
spring, Lilienthal explained that they were encouraged by
recent advances made by the most active state commissions,
notably Wisconsin, New York, and California. Noting that
although "we are none of us theoretical state's right
people," his subcommittee opposed swift Congressional
2^E.W. Morehouse to Lilienthal, 26 October 1931, PSC, Series
1825, Progress File, Box 11.
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action on holding company legislation because "there is
more hope for regulatory success" at the state level.
Relying on Washington "puts all of one's eggs in one
basket
... [and] much or all might then depend upon three men
appointed by the President." Having directly encountered
the shortcomings of presidential appointees hostile to
railway labor, Lilienthal was understandably wary of
federal control.
Lilienthal 's attitudes regarding public ownership of
utilities embodied a caution quite similar to his position
on federal regulation. He did not share the La Follette
administration's unqualified support for a vigorous
expansion of municipal plants; he much preferred a more
modest policy of establishing fewer publicly-owned plants
to serve as "yardsticks" against which the operating costs
and efficiencies of the private sector could be compared.
It was simply not politically feasible to expect widespread
socialization of utilities in the near future, Lilienthal
believed, therefore increasing the value and necessity of
more competent regulatory oversight. In these matters,
Lilienthal identified closely with Morris L. Cooke, the
^^Lilienthal to Richberg, 7 August 1931, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 53.
In his examination of the origins of the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act of 1935, Philip Funigiello portrays
Lilienthal as an ardent supporter of state control, but the study
does not explore the rationale behind Lilienthal 's position.
See, Philip F. Funigiello, Toward a National Power Policy. The
New Deal and the Electric Utility Industry. 1933-1941
(Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1973), p. 22.
I100
Philadelphia social engineer and leader of the reformist
wing of the Taylor Society. Cooke had been promoting the
yardstick concept since the 1920s, when he had pointed to
the success of Canada's Ontario Hydro power program. The
engineer and the lawyer were introduced through Felix
Frankfurter in 1929, and by the time of Lilienthal's move
to Wisconsin, Cooke was becoming a close ally and
confidante.
The depth of their mutual commitment to regulation was
revealed in early 1932. Cooke and Lilienthal organized a
conference on regulatory technique to be held in New York
City in April. Attendance was by invitation only, and the
two worked quietly to exclude anyone who was too strongly
|
identified as a proponent of public ownership. In private
correspondence Cooke and Lilienthal agreed to exclude many
of their closest associates, including Nebraska senator
I^'^Lilienthal to Cooke, 11 January 1932, Papers of Morris L.
Cooke, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Box 53
(hereafter cited as Cooke Papers)
.
In 1928, Cooke expressed his support for the yardstick
concept in a series of letters to Arthur E. Morgan, then
president of Antioch College. "I am not a 'public ownership'
man," Cooke stated. "But I am firmly convinced that we are well
advised to have a few publicly owned and operated electric plants
to act as yard-sticks and to exert the same type of influence on
the private companies as is doubtless being exerted by the
Ontario [Hydro] System." Cooke to Arthur E. Morgan, 21 March
1928, Cooke Papers, Box 37.
Foreshadowing the future rift on the TVA board, Cooke and
i; Morgan's exchange became rather heated. Morgan argued that there
\> were not enough well-trained and virtuous experts to adequately
\ staff any expanded public bureaucracies; Cooke differed. Cooke
t remained implacably hostile toward Arthur Morgan during the
1930s. See chapters 3 and 6 below.
I
I
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George W. Norris, Judson King of the National Popular
Government League, and Amos Pinchot. In a public letter to
Kendall Banning of the trade journal Public Utility
Fortnightly, Lilienthal explained the conference as
a gathering of those who believe regulation has a very
important place in our national utility program and
will have such a place for some time to come. We will
counsel with each other as to regulation in contrast
with but by no means in opposition to public
ownership.
Lilienthal was not fundamentally hostile to either federal
regulation or public ownership, but prior to the 1932
presidential election he remained convinced that aggressive
investigations by state commissions represented the best
means available for serving the public interest.^®
The Wisconsin telephone case was much more than an
attempt by Lilienthal to strengthen the indirect regulation
of holding companies by state commissions. Lilienthal
intended to use the hearings as the first in a series of
blows that would eventually smash the entire rate structure
and drive down all utility prices. He had previously
received Cooke's assurance that "the quickest way of
^^Cooke to Lilienthal, 13 January 1932, and Lilienthal to
Cooke 19 January 1932, Cooke Papers, Box 53; Lilienthal to
..Kendall Banning, 14 April 1932, Lilienthal Papers, Box 55.
While public ownership advocates were noticeably absent from
the April conference, the tone of the presentations bore a marked
ij animus toward the private sector. James Bonbright described the
tl current holding companies "a great social menace." Combination
in the utility industry had been carried, he continued, "to a
point far beyond that of maximum economy. Normal growth has
I
given way to giantism [the large systems] must be regarded as
I an economic disease." New York Times 9 April 1932, 19:1.
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exposing the inherent fallacies of the present day rate
schedules is through proper reporting if fundamental
data for a state was properly collated company by company
the logic of marked reductions would be irresistable
[sic]. Once the PSC sharpened its technique with the
telephone investigation, it could then move inexorably
through the roll of utilities.
Lilienthal was not going to let proper reporting stand
as the lone means towards the end of lower rates. He
fashioned a far more ambitious strategy. Lilienthal noted
that the Supreme Court in Smith et. al. had upheld the
"Bluefields doctrine" which held that a fair rate of return
was "equal to that generally being made at the same time
and in the same general part of the country on investments
in other business undertakings." In a report made that
spring to the governor, Lilienthal insisted that with the
country mired deeply in a depression, the PSC must "take
into consideration that fact that other businesses are not
earning returns at all comparable with those which are
claimed by or made by the telephone company." After
hearings that would illuminate the depths to which the
economy had plummeted, Lilienthal advised La Follette, it
would prove to be both fair and legal to reduce telephone
rates. The commission had already implemented this
2'Morris L. Cooke to Lilienthal, 3 October 1931, Cooke
Papers, FDRPL, Box 53.
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approach in a minor decision on 21 March, when it noted
that the current "widespread distress" should force
utilities "to reduce rates as general prices and the
incomes of customers go down."
If there were any lingering doubts that the PSC would
use the telephone case as a precedent for other utilities,
Lilienthal removed them four days before the hearings
began. On 7 May 1932, he sent a letter to every major
public utility in Wisconsin informing them that the PSC
would hear testimony from various state and national
experts concerning economic conditions within the state and
across the country. The specific issue was telephone
rates, "but inasmuch as the subject-matter may relate to
other utilities..., the Commission takes this method of
calling the attention of all utilities in the state to
these proceedings." When he received a copy of this edict,
an elated Morris Cooke urged on his friend: "I extend to
you my hearty congratulations. More power to your arm!"
After nearly a year of preparation, the PSC was ready.
The hearings began with testimony on economic
conditions in Wisconsin. Several witnesses sketched bleak
pictures of the state's agricultural and industrial
landscape. G.T. Gustafson, an economist with the
^°"Smith et. al.. Supreme Court Recorder , p. 72; Lilienthal,
"The Work of the PSC," p. 14; PSC decision as quoted in Milwaukee
Journal, 1 May 1932, 2:1; Cooke to Lilienthal 17 May 1932, with
enclosure of 7 May 1932, Cooke Papers, FDRPL, Box 53.
104
Department of Marketing and Agriculture, stated that during
1929-1931, gross farm income had declined from $454 to $253
million. The well-known labor economist John R. Commons
noted that employment in Wisconsin's major industrial
centers was declining precipitously, and cities that had
endured more modest drops still suffered from wage and
workweek cuts. Beloit, for example, had lost about 2 0
percent of its jobs— a marginal hit compared to
Milwaukee's 30 percent and Racine's 48 percent declines.
The Commission's E.W. Morehouse then juxtaposed these
figures against the healthy dividends declared by several
Wisconsin utilities whose majority shareholders were
national holding companies. As yet unstated, the
implication of Morehouse's observations was that while the
average citizens and businesses faced hard times, the
holding companies callously manipulated their subsidiaries,
mandating the dividend declarations that ignored the plight
of others and imperiled the solvency of the operating
utilities— only to meet the overextended debt obligations
of the parent firms.
The Commission's examination of these witnesses
introduced another aspect of its strategy. Under
Lilienthal's guidance, the PSC planned to compel lower
utility rates on the basis of judicial precedent, but it
^^PSC, 2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 880-882, 971; Milwaukee Journal, 11 May, 1:1, and
12 May 1932, 3:1.
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also sought to establish that such cuts were vital to
economic recovery. To build this case, the PSC had to show
that the Depression was much more than a temporary cyclical
downturn, that the economy was not responding to the
current government prescriptions, and finally that utility
prices were a primary obstacle to recovery. With
Lilienthal asking Commons if he foresaw economic
improvement, the Wisconsin economist answered negatively,
"Rather a falling off," Commons responded. The labor
economist ridiculed the Hoover administration's attempts to
inflate bank credit, then added,
So far the government efforts to ease up the money
market have had no effect on business. They have
loaded up the banks with money but business is not
borrowing and the banks are not lending.
The PSC turned to Gustafson for his opinion on the impact
of high fixed utility rates. The agricultural economist
observed that lower crop prices resulted in a greater
percentage of farm income going to fixed charges, sharply
reducing farmers' investment in new equipment and personal
purchases. With Gustafson 's and Commons's testimony, the
PSC began constructing a scenario for utility regulation
during depression that would shape Lilienthal 's regulatory
strategy for many years after he left Madison.
The Commission next planned to hear testimony on the
national situation, and build the theoretical basis for its
^^PSC, 2-U-35, In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company, pp. 1011-1012; 882.
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Claims regarding the rigidities in the price system.
Mathew Sammond, the Telephone Company's counsel, objected
to all the previous testimony on economic conditions. "The
utilities are dependent upon a level of prices and rates
with relation to their investment... regardless of economic
conditions," Sammond charged. The company counsel argued
that utilities had never been allowed to enjoy the full
fruits of the most prosperous years, and should not be made
to endure the worst of times. Sammond requested that the
prior testimony be struck from the record, and that the
roll of witnesses scheduled to address these issues be
suspended."
Because the commissioners sat as the judges in a
hearing initiated and prosecuted by their own staff, there
was little mystery surrounding the ruling on Sammond 's
motion. Lilienthal gave the motion extensive, but
certainly not objective, consideration. In fact, the young
commissioner had anticipated the argument several months
earlier, and had worked closely with James Bonbright on the
Commission's response. Meeting with Bonbright in late
January, Lilienthal discussed the PSC's plans and secured
the Columbia economist as a witness for the hearings.
Shortly before the hearings began, Bonbright sent
Lilienthal a lengthy draft of potential testimony and
"PSC, 2-U-35, In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
! Company, p. 1014.
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Objections, which included the observation that claims of
constricted profits for utilities during the 1920s were
fallacious. The rates of return acted more as a floor than
as a ceiling, and Bonbright rattled off numerous examples
of utilities that earned fifty to one-hundred percent more
than the regulated base. It should not be the PSC's intent
to require utilities "to submit to the drastic drop in
earnings" suffered by so many businesses, he wrote.
However, "the contention that the Bell System should be
protected against sharing the burden of the depression, so
far as that is possible by maintenance of rates," Bonbright
countered,
would amount to a contention that one of the most
prosperous corporate systems in the history of this
country should be relieved of its share of sustaining
the burdens necessary to overcome this world-wide
crisis
.
Writing for the Commission, Lilienthal denied Sammond's
motion on all counts. Several factors made this testimony
relevant, he told the company counsel, including the
"spectacular fall" in the general commodity price level,
the decline in labor and supply costs paid by the company,
and the consequent rise in the purchasing power of each
dollar paid out by consumers in rates and by the Wisconsin
company as dividends to AT&T. "We would both stupid and
blind," Lilienthal stated, "if we failed to inform
ourselves of the extent to which the depression has changed
the whole economic fabric of the community affected by this
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proceeding. This depression is no minor business
disturbance. "^^
Anxious to expedite the hearings, Lilienthal had in
fact let the testimony continue while he considered the
objection. Frederick C. Mills testified first. A Columbia
economist affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Mills was completing a long-term study of price
trends, published later in 1932 as Economic Tendencies in
the United States. Mills outlined the current imbalances
in the price system. From September 1929 to March 1932,
factory payrolls had declined by more than 50 percent, but
the cost-of-living had dropped by just 21 percent; the
story was similar for agriculture, only the numbers
differed slightly. The wide gap between wages and living
costs cut deeply into aggregate purchasing power. Mills
pointed out. Lilienthal asked Mills if prices would
balance out "automatically." Such a natural equilibrium
could only have been reached had the adjustments occurred
over decades, the economist testified. The rapid and
intense nature of the current price breaks created what
Mills characterized as a "log jam." Mills continued by
arguing that the road to recovery would be opened by
•'^James C. Bonbright, "First Draft Synopsis of Testimony on
Wisconsin Telephone Rates," n.d. (ca. April-May 1932), pp. 8-9,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 55; PSC, 2-U-35, In the Matter of the
Wisconsin Telephone Company, "Ruling Upon Motion to Strike
Testimony Relating to Economic Conditions," 1 June 1932, A. A.
Berle Papers, FDRPL, Box 14.
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breaking down the "differential advantages" held by certain
economic sectors, such as the utility industry. still
leading his witness closely, Lilienthal asked if sectors
clinging to these advantages by defensive methods, such as
resisting rate cuts, might imperil themselves, resulting in
"their own ultimate disadvantage [and] ...carrying with it
also the implication that that defensive attitude may
seriously injure the entire economic system." Mills
responded briefly to the commissioner's lengthy query.
"I am sure of it," he replied.
Jacob Viner followed Mills. At that time one of the
country's foremost neo-classical economists, Viner affirmed
his colleague's claim that while maladjusted prices were
not the catalyst for the depression, they were directly
responsible for prolonging the slump. Asked what would
happen if utility rates and other "undeflated prices" did
not come down, the University of Chicago economist
responded that "there would result widespread insolvency,"
increased unemployment..., and quite conceivably,
extensive collapse of our present economy. The
failure of utility prices to fall has been an
important factor in reducing the buying power of the
country's shrunken national income.
^^PSC, 2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 1103-1106; for background information on Mills's
work with the NBER, see, Guy Alchon, The Invisible Hand of
Planning. Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 163, 165.
^^PSC, 2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," p. 1210; Milwaukee Journal, 16 May, 1932, 5:1.
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Viner's unequivocal declarations provided an imprimatur
from mainstream economic thought for Lilienthal's drive to
topple what he viewed as a grossly top-heavy rate
structure
.
Bonbright, the last economist to march through the
Madison hearing room, delivered the longest and most
compelling testimony. A trenchant critic of the previous
decade's speculative excesses, Bonbright directed his first
salvos at the federal government, not at the priv.ite
sector. After noting that the president had ultimately
recognized the severity of the slump by declaring an
economic emergency, Bonbright asserted that Hoover's
efforts fell far short. Referring specifically to the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Federal Reserve
policies, he echoed Commons's view that an inflation of
bank credit would not revive commerce. "It seems now
clear," Bonbright asserted, "that further and more drastic
emergency measures are necessary, because those now adopted
are inadequate." Without further action, relative
imbalances in the price system would remain and the crisis
would deepen.^''
On Viner, see Joseph Dorfman, The Economi c Mi nd in Auk mi can
Civilization, v. 5. 1918-1933 (Now York, Augustus M. K(>ll(>y,
1969; orig. ed. 1959), pp. 480-4B0; also r.oe J. Ronnie Davis, The
New Economics and the Old Economists (Ames, Iowa St.ilc university
Press, 1971) .
^^PSC, 2-U-35, "In the M.itter of Wisconsin Telephone
Company," pp. 1446-1450.
Ill
At several points in the examination, Lilienthal
turned his witness to the theme that the country faced a
profound economic emergency. "Ordinary standards of social
legislation," Bonbright answered, "[and] regulation of what
constitutes fairness between different classes of producers
and consumers... simply cannot be applied at this time."
Whereas the regulation of utility rates normally dragged on
for years, Bonbright urged the PSC to take "immediate
although moderate action to reduce those important prices
within your jurisdiction which are so clearly out of line
with the newer levels of other prices." He conceded that
moderating the cuts to avoid sending companies into
bankruptcy was a complex but necessary task. Still, the
Commission had to cut rates. ^®
Bonbright concluded his testimony by discussing the
reproduction cost, or present value, method of utility
valuation. He had never supported this methodology,
because it required frequent and cumbersome revaluations
and rested on faulty assumptions. After being repeatedly
upheld in the courts, reproduction cost was the rule of the
land, however, and the recent severe deflation gave present
value a very different twist than during the 1920s. "Now,"
Bonbright predicted, "really comes the test." Will rates
come down during a period of low and falling prices, ho
^''PSC, 2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," p. 1451.
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asked. Ultimately, "strict application" of the method was
impossible, as the deflationary spiral was so sharp that
actually corresponding rate cuts would imperil even the
most well-managed public utilities. Again, Bonbrighfs
called for "immediate although moderate action." By
balancing the public's interest in lower rates against the
need for a financially stable utility sector, competent
regulators could produce a ratemaking calculus that would
yield a just result.^'
Upon completion of the first round of hearings, the
PSC on 30 June issued a temporary finding in the telephone
case, ordering local telephone rates cut by 12.5 percent
across the state. Citing the need to respond in a timely
manner to the current economic emergency, the Commission
based its order on preliminary findings of the ongoing
investigation. Part of the cut came from the Commission's
careful review of the company's accounts. Claiming that
AT&T's toll system must pay for itself, the order shifted
over $300,000 in long-distance operating costs off of the
local exchanges. The greatest proportion of the cut was
due to the economic decline, however. Citing the decrease
in the dollar value of the telephone service, the finding
stated that
while the tendency of the courts in recent years
has been to give primary consideration to the
^'PSC, 2-U-35, "In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone
Company," p. 1494; Bonbright, "First Draft Synopsis," p. 5.
113
return upon value, it mustnot be forgotten that it is still the law that
rates, regardless of their effect upon thefinancial condition of the company, cannot exceedWhat the services are reasonably worth.
Skeptically described in a New York T^m^<:. editorial of 8
July as a "novel principle of rate-making," that may not
withstand closer scrutiny, the order quickly drew fire. As
expected, the company filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin. The federal judges
issued a temporary restraining order against the reduction,
and both sides prepared for a late September court date.^°
Building an investigation around the purchasing power
and rigid price theories of the Depression, Lilienthal
sought to ground the PSC firmly within the American
mainstream. Both analyses were at that time commonly held
economic doctrines. Both could serve widely divergent
political purposes, however. A flag bearer for the gold
standard, H. Parker Willis opposed inflation and advocated
the selective reductions in certain prices in defense of a
"sound currency." At the same time, many advocates of the
purchasing power dictum hoped to prop up rather than slash
prices through production controls and cartelization.
Seeking also to sustain wages through complementary labor
codes, these underconsumptionists would initially support
^°New York Times
. 6 July 1932, 34:1, and, 8 July 1932, 16:2;
"Public Service Commission of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Telephone
Company," Supreme Court Recorder 53 (October Term, 1932), pp.
514-515.
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early New Deal measures such as the National Recovery
Administration and the first Agricultural Adjustment Act/^
What made the PSC's work different, however, was
Lilienthal's linkage of the two theories, and his use of
this rate case as a step toward a dramatically restructured
political economy. Lilienthal believed that breaking down
rigid utility rates through more efficient regulation and
expanded state intervention would increase the public's
disposable income and stimulate consumption. As he stated
in a speech to the National Association of Power Engineers,
"unless we solve the problems of distribution of mass
purchasing power, then your efforts in improving
engineering technique and devising means of increasing
production will be doomed." Solving those problems within
the utility sector meant greater government regulation, for
as Lilienthal pointed out in a newspaper interview, "there
are only two kinds of prices: those that react to
competition and those that are controlled by the state and
for which the state is responsible." Within the highly
monopolistic utility industry, the "price competition which
has been so potent in reducing prices in other enterprises,
has failed to operate in this case," Bonbright noted in his
testimony. The state had to adjust utility rates in cases
^^Dorfman, The Economic Mind
, pp. 698-702; an excellent
survey of the various analyses is, Theodore Rosenof, Dogma,
Depression, and the New Deal. The Debate of Political Leaders
over Economic Recovery (Port Washington, NY, Kennikat Press,
1975)
.
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Where prices proved unresponsive to market forces, in this
situation, regulators would chart the course toward the new
politics of consumption/^
In its focus on price rigidities as a brake on
purchasing power, Lilienthal's work reflects the roots of
later New Deal policies. By 1937-1938, a core element
within the Roosevelt administration began turning toward
the nature of monopoly capitalism and the problems of
"administered," or rigid, prices. Influenced by the 1935
publication of Industrial Prices and Their Relative
Inflexibility by Gardiner C. Means, a close associate of
both Bonbright and A. A. Berle, New Dealers including Leon
Henderson and Assistant Attorney General Robert T. Jackson
advocated wide-ranging efforts to sustain mass consumption,
in part through an ambitious trust-busting program designed
to restore price competition. Bringing their case to the
public through the hearings of the Temporary National
Economic Committee and initiating anti-trust litigation,
the New Deal's anti-monopolists shared Lilienthal's concern
with logjams in the price system. Cutting prices, rather
than production and employment, would revive demand and
restore prosperity, they argued. '^^
'^^Lilienthal
,
Speech to the National Association of Power
Engineers, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6 September 1932, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 17; Milwaukee Journal 1 May 1932, 2:1; PSC, 2-U-35,
"In the Matter of the Wisconsin Telephone Company, p. 1489.
^%illiam E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal. 1932-1940 (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 245-248,
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With his experience centered in utility regulation,
Lilienthal did not embrace the anti-trust agenda of
Henderson and Jackson. Lilienthal accepted the continued
development of larger and more complex forms of corporate
organization, and envisioned a much broader arena of
regulatory activity, for the techniques refined in the
laboratory of the utility commission could then be applied
to other sectors. "Whether we individually approve of the
tendency or not, it must be apparent to everyone that we
are in a period of increased community control of business,
rather than less," the young commissioner declared in a
speech to business groups in Sheboygan, Wisconsin. He
added that "The lessons we learn in the public utility
field we can adapt to the other fields as they call for
control," and urged his listeners to display "the
capacity, the resourcefulness, and the courage for the
undertaking. I am hopeful," he continued,
that we can somehow fashion an instrument of
government which will protect us against the control
of these business giants which we ourselves have
created, and which uncontrolled have often inflicted
such grave injuries upon our community and national
life.
The public sector must answer corporate capitalism's
increasing complexity with more sophisticated regulation,
Lilienthal maintained. Despite relying heavily upon claims
of an economic emergency during the hearings as the basis
257-259; Rosenof, Dogma. Depression, and the New Deal . pp. 98-
105.
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for the 12.5 percent rate cut, Lilienthal sought a more
permanent and expansive regulatory framework that would
necessarily persist long after the emergency had passed/^
With the hearings temporarily adjourned and the rate
issue in the courts, by late summer 1932 the Commission's
activities reverted to the back pages of the press. Most
people had turned their attention to the primary elections,
which featured a rematch of the 1930 race between plumbing
magnate Walter Kohler and La Follette for the top spot on
the Republican slate. La Follette had to defend his record
against the vituperative attacks of Kohler and his fellow
conservatives, but the governor's most formidable opponent
turned out to be the Depression. Popular discontent over
the economy pushed La Follette out of office just as
abruptly as it had helped sweep him in only two years
earlier .^^
Despite anticipating some backlash against the
incumbent, most La Follette loyalists were stunned by the
defeat. Lilienthal was no exception. Moving to Madison
less than two years ago, Lilienthal had mapped out a long-
term strategy for restructuring the Commission. Now,
^^Lilienthal Speech to a joint meeting of the Lions,
Kiwanis, and Rotary Clubs of Sheboygan, Wisconsin, 23 March 1933,
PSC, Progress File, Box 7.
^^Miller, Philip F. La Follette
. pp. 30-34. Buried in the
avalanche of stories about the stunning reversal between Kohler
and La Follette was the first sign of a major party realignment
in Wisconsin, as turnout for the Democratic primary increased by
almost 800 percent over the 1930 election.
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expecting to share a fate common to all political
appointee's whose patrons stood defeated, he anticipated
unemployment. Lilienthal quickly began to explore
alternatives. One day after the primary, wrote Robert M.
Hutchins, the president of the University of Chicago, to
inquire if the school was going ahead with a plan to
develop a program in public utility economics. If so,
Lilienthal wished to discuss "the possibility of my
organizing and carrying on the work of such a department."
He also conferred with Berle about a federal position. By
this time, Berle had joined Franklin Roosevelt's "Brains
Trust," and was feeling fairly sanguine about his
candidate's chances in November. Writing Lilienthal in
late September, Berle indicated that he was "prepared to
make a bold attempt to get you some kind of a berth," in
either the Interstate Commerce Commission or a new
department that would undertake the regulation of public
utility holding companies. Berle counseled Lilienthal that
the Roosevelt candidacy represented the only real
possibility of staying in public service, for, "so far as
political backyards go, the Roosevelt backyard is the only
one we can play in, now that Wisconsin has gone back on its
favorite grandson." Lilienthal gave this option a great
deal of thought and drafted a confidential proposal to
Berle regarding the formation of a Federal Utilities
Commission. Convinced that the new governor would not
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reappoint him, Lilienthal gave serious thought to making
Washington his new backyard/^
In fact, Lilienthal 's position was more secure than he
had anticipated. His bellicose rhetoric and the
commission's well-publicized hearings had drawn the
public's attention; the high profile set by the youngest
commissioner paid dividends. Lilienthal and the PSC became
issues during the fall campaign, and the Democratic
candidate, former Madison mayor Albert Schmedeman, pledged
his support for La Follette's regulatory appointees and
their policies. When Schmedeman emerged as one the many
Democratic victors in the 1932 electoral avalanche,
Lilienthal was assured of a job after the inauguration of
the new governor. Although rumors persisted that he was one
of several La Follette Progressives who would follow their
outgoing executive to Washington, Lilienthal remained in
the state for the moment, and used his job security to
renew the rate fight and expand the regulatory range of the
PSC.^''
^^Lilienthal to Hutchins, 21 September 1932, Lilienthal
papers. Box 56; Berle to Lilienthal, 22 September 1932, and
Lilienthal to Berle, 8 November 1932, Berle Papers, Boxes 9 and
14 respectively.
The Federal Utilities Commission proposal contained several
controversial points, including stripping the ICC of regulatory
control over telephone and telegraph systems. However, the memo
essentially reflected Lilienthal 's continued commitment to
strengthening state commissions, with the FUC serving primarily
to gather information for and consult with the state agencies.
'^''Although later a strident critic of Roosevelt's, in 1932-
1933 La Follette was rumored for several spots in the new
120
While the rate investigation and litigation continued,
Lilienthal also pursued other means for strengthening the
state's regulatory powers. As with the preparation of the
rate case, he again relied heavily upon outside expertise.
This time Lilienthal turned to A. A. Berle to aid in
revisions of the state's "Blue Sky" laws, which already
gave the PSC limited regulatory control over the sale of
securities within Wisconsin. In February 1932, the young
commissioner had first suggested in one of his freguent
letters to Berle that they work together to update
Wisconsin's antiquated securities statutes, for "it may
be," Lilienthal wrote, "that in the Wisconsin laboratory
something can be worked out along the trail which you have
been blazing as a pioneer." Berle consented, and they
began their collaboration.^^
One month later, Berle sent off a memorandum outlining
a legislative proposal that also provided Lilienthal with a
political strategy for securing its passage. "My view,"
Berle counseled, "is that the corporate [securities]
administration, including the Secretary of Interior (which was
slated for, and in Harold Ickes went to, a Progressive Republican
supporter of the President) , and the first ambassador to the
Soviet Union. Miller, Philip F. La Follette
. pp. 33-38.
^^Lilienthal to A. A. Berle Jr., 13 February 1932, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 55. The phrase "Blue Sky" laws was derived from
early efforts to curb unscrupulous securities dealers, who
allegedly would sell everything but the blue sky. The standard
history on this subject is Michael E. Parrish, Securities
Regulation and the New Deal (New Haven, Yale University Press,
1970) .
problem should be handled from the standpoint of the
protection of public savings." Observing that roughly 55
percent of savings were tied up in securities, Berle state
that the corporations that benefit from such investment
have virtually no obligation to individual investors.
Because of the loose incorporation laws of states such as
Delaware and the expense of legal action in any state, "th
handicap of the man whose small savings have been
squandered or lost or unfairly dealt with, makes it
impossible for the individual to help himself." This
savings strategy appealed to Lilienthal's penchant for
turning otherwise arcane technical matters into easily
understood matters for popular concern, locating securitie
regulation within the same politics of consumption that
characterized his efforts to popularize other venues for
regulation.^'
That summer, Berle delivered a report detailing the
specific statutory revisions that he suggested, but with
the rate case and the primary election occupying much of
his time over the summer of 1932, Lilienthal devoted littl
effort to the Blue Sky work until after the La Follette
defeat. He then began moving forward. In late September
Lilienthal seemed optimistic that despite the governor's
lopsided defeat the revisions could be pushed through the
^'Berle to Lilienthal, 14 March 1932, Berle Papers, Box 9.
For the development of Berle 's views on the stock markets as
savings institutions, see, Schwarz, Liberal . p. 57.
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spring legislative session. The spectacular collapse of
the financial pyramid constructed by Samuel and Martin
Insull, which had destroyed the holdings of a great number
of both institutional and individual investors, would "make
it much easier to put such a proposal through the
legislature I doubt it will be made the subject of
partisan politics," Lilienthal assured Berle.^^
By the new year Lilienthal was less sure of the bill's
success in the legislature, and he planned a publicity
campaign to bolster its chances. Lilienthal told Berle
that "the lobbies are so strong this year that it is only
by a good deal of direct hammering that we can hope to put
this over." Following Berle 's suggestion, he centered his
campaign around the issue of protecting people's hard-
earned savings. "I can think of no more appropriate
function of government than it should encourage reasonable
saving by protecting the fruits of that saving," the
commissioner declared in his campaign's inaugural speech.
Because the financial sector insisted that incorporation
laws alone provided adequate protection for investors,
Lilienthal launched a fiery attack against that specious
reasoning. He contended that Wisconsin was victimized by
the lax incorporation procedures of other states, notably
Delaware's "abject surrender of the sovereign power of
^"Lilienthal to Berle, 23 September 1932, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 55.
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legislative discretion." He compared Delaware's laws to
Nevada's divorce and gambling statutes, in an invective
charging that "if a state wants to prostitute its
sovereignty to such ends no other state can complain," but
the others must move to protect their own interests.
In a somewhat more subdued public report outlining the
need for the new legislation, Lilienthal continued his
appeal to popular sentiment. Of the over $450 million
worth of securities sold in Wisconsin from 1926-1930, most
were bought "not by millionaires, but by average Wisconsin
citizens [as]... the nest egg for a rainy day." He charged
that Wisconsin financial houses were "in pawn" to big city
bankers, and got the "dregs" of issues not sold in New
York, Chicago, or Boston. Lilienthal pointed to the PSC's
successful oversight of real estate bonds as offering the
regulatory alternative to financial anarchy. Less than 20
percent of those bonds were currently in default in
Wisconsin, he stated, compared to a national average of
over 80 percent. Although he also worked the state house
corridors in behalf of the bill, Lilienthal counted on his
outreach strategy to forge a popular base among Wisconsin's
citizenry in support of regulatory expansion. In a letter
to Felix Frankfurter, he returned to the pugnacious theme
^^Lilienthal to Berle, 14 January 1933, Berle Papers, Box
14; "Protecting the Investor in Corporate Securities," Speech to
the Optimists' Club, Madison, Wisconsin, 30 January 1933, PSC,
Series 1937, Articles and Addresses.
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he had expressed earlier to Berle. "My attack on the Blue
Sky problem," he wrote to his Harvard mentor, "has been...
to hammer away at the kind of ^protection- to investors
that the existing set provides.... m one form or another I
hope to keep hammering away at this theme." m this match
with corporate capital, the utility commissioner retained
some of the spirit of the college boxer."
Lilienthal would not oversee the implementation of the
Blue Sky law (enacted in May) , nor would he witness first-
hand the decade-long legal fracas over the telephone rate
case. He was growing frustrated by the seemingly endless
courtroom maneuvers of the utilities, which stymied his
intentions to effect quick and significant rate cuts. By
April 1933 it seemed certain that he would be joining the
Roosevelt administration. Relying upon the alliances he
formed through his regulatory work, Lilienthal explored
several possible alternatives. Berle offered to try and
secure Lilienthal an appointment as Solicitor General, or
as an Interstate Commerce Commissioner. Then Bonbright
wrote with another offer. The Columbia economist stated
that he had suggested to the president that Lilienthal be
selected to fill an opening on the Federal Power
Commission. The alternatives narrowed quickly after 18 May
1933, when Roosevelt signed the legislation creating the
^^Lilienthal
,
"Report on the Securities Law in Wisconsin,"
n.d. (ca. February 1933), Berle Papers, Box 14; Lilienthal to
Frankfurter, 9 February 1933, Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
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Tennessee Valley Authority. Lilienthal immediately became
one of the top candidates for a position on the three-
person directorate. In late May, Lilienthal met with Arthur
E. Morgan, the president of Antioch College well-known for
his work in flood control and social planning, whom
Roosevelt had already chosen to chair the board of the new
Authority."
At their meeting in Chicago, Morgan offered Lilienthal
a place on the directorate. They specifically discussed
the potential role for the young Wisconsin utility
commissioner, a matter that would become increasingly
important
—
at times overshadowing all other issues at the
Berle to Lilienthal, 15 April 1933, Bonbright to
Lilienthal, 19 April 1933, Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
Lilienthal 's response to Bonbright 's offer regarding the
Federal Power Commission further illustrates that his earlier
support of state over federal regulation was largely contingent
and not grounded in any ideological position. Having previously
suggested to Berle the formation of a Federal Utilities
Commission that was primarily structured to support the work of
state commissions, Lilienthal now responded to the FPC position
by stating that he would only be interested if the FPC was given
"powers commensurate with the pressing need for federal
regulation. As the matter now stands the commission has almost
nothing to do." Lilienthal to Bonbright, 24 April 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
On the growing dissatisfaction among Lilienthal and his
colleagues regarding the efficacy of state commission regulation,
see the 1938 Congressional testimony of Leland Olds of the New
York Power Authority. Given the Supreme Court's validation of
reproduction cost methodology, commissions found it nearly
impossible to cut rates, because most courts found such cuts to
be confiscatory of the company's property. This procedure. Olds
noted, "practically removed rate determination from the
commissions to the courts." The TVA would afford Lilienthal an
opportunity to develop new means for forcing down the rates in
the private sector. Olds testimony, 15 December 1938, Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Tennessee Valley Authority ,
75th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 5809-5811.
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Authority. Lilienthal wrote Frankfurter that he "had an
understanding with Chairman Morgan that I am to be counsel
for the corporation and generally to concentrate on the
power side of the project." Given an opportunity that, in
his own words, "just seemed too attractive not to accept,"
he took the position. Matters moved rapidly in the early
days of Roosevelt's presidency; on 10 June 1933 the Senate
approved without objection Lilienthal 's appointment as
Director and General Counsel of the TVA. By the end of the
month Lilienthal left Wisconsin.
While Lilienthal had only two years to begin the task
of building an effective regulatory apparatus in Wisconsin,
he would enjoy a much longer stay at the TVA. He brought
with him much that would be of value in his new post.
Several key PSC staffers would join him, or serve the new
agency as consultants. He had learned new skills in the art
of public relations. Finally, he had begun to shape the
politics of consumption that would inform all of his work
at the Authority. As in Wisconsin, Lilienthal quickly set
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 5 June 1933, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 59.
In his study of Berle, Jordan Schwarz accurately points out
the crucial role played by Berle in securing Lilienthal an
appointment. However, in accenting the well-known personal and
political animosity between Berle and Felix Frankfurter, Schwarz
ignores the continuing close relationship between Lilienthal and
Frankfurter. For example, see, "The RFC appointment entitled
Berle to a place in the New Deal's inner councils, which he used
to seek positions for allies such as David E. Lilienthal and
others, just as Frankfurter pushed his friends and former
students for administration jobs." Schwarz, Liberal , p. 88.
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himself to the task of molding an agency that could
implement his strategy of promoting cheap power and
government intervention as remedies for an ailing economy.
Frankfurter accurately counseled his former student that "a
truly alluring job lies ahead of you... but don't expect to
ride any other horse than that for a long time." Despite
experiencing some rather sharp jolts during the ride,
Lilienthal did indeed remain there for quite some time,
serving for twelve eventful years and leaving only in the
waning days of the Second World War.^^
^^Frankfurter to Lilienthal, 6 June 1933, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 59.
CHAPTER 4
THE AUTHORITY AS INSTRUMENT: STATE-BUILDING AS ATECHNOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE AT THE TVA IN THE 1930S
Just over one month after his inauguration, on 10
April 1933 Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to Congress
requesting legislation creating a Tennessee Valley
Authority. Little more than a page in length, the brevity
of the message belied the breadth of its implications.
Decrying the "continued idleness of a great national
investment" at Muscle Shoals in northern Alabama, the note
signalled the president's intent to fulfill a campaign
promise and break the decade-long legislative stalemate
that had left Muscle Shoals in limbo throughout the 1920s.
While marking the end of one series of controversies
concerning the Wilson Dam, its hydroelectric power
capacity, and its adjacent nitrate plants at the Shoals,
the message set in motion a new round of struggles that
made the Tennessee Valley one of the flashpoints of
Roosevelt's New Deal.
The new president laid out the by now familiar themes
of flood control, soil erosion, agricultural reform, and
industrial development that were to complement the TVA '
s
hydroelectric power program. Roosevelt also declared his
support for the agency's formation as a quasi-autonomous
public authority, "a corporation," he wrote, "clothed with
the power of government but possessed of the flexibility
and initiative of a private enterprise." Roosevelt
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provided few substantive details in his message, and turned
the matter over to Congress. Drawing upon bills vetoed by
Roosevelt's two Republican predecessors and taking only six
weeks to push the proposal through both houses and a joint
conference, Congress delivered the bill to the White house.
On 18 May 1933, Roosevelt signed the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act.''
This chapter will focus on the forging of the TVA '
s
bureaucracy, and how the agency's organizational structure
informed its policies. Broadly construed, the process of
state-building and the creation of an administrative
infrastructure at the TVA was an exercise in the design and
construction of a new technology. In this case, the
technology was the agency; the Tennessee Valley Authority
was a tool, or a set of tools, and the forging of the
Authority becomes, then, a technological enterprise. While
political historiography has commonly cast the state in
this manner, Lilienthal too fit his agency precisely within
this framework. In a chapter of TVA; Democracy on the March
Tranklin D. Roosevelt, "A Request for Legislation to
Create a Tennessee Valley Authority," 10 April 1933, House
Document No. 15, 73d Congress 1st Session.
There has been a great deal written about the Muscle
Shoals controversy, but a useful place to start is the
first chapter of Thomas K. McCraw ' s succinct history of the
TVA's early years, TVA and the Power Fight. 1933-1939
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 1-25. A more
detailed appraisal is available in Preston Hubbard, Origins
of the TVA: The Muscle Shoals Controversy. 1920-1932
(Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1961)
.
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entitled "Modern Tools for a Modern Job," Lilienthal notes
that
A new and modern task requires new and modern tools; aspirit of enterprise and a creative modern outlook arequite as necessary in devising the mechanics ofgetting things done as in establishing goals andpolicies For such an undertaking Congress and thePresident invented an entirely new kind of governmentimplement.
The TVA
,
Lilienthal goes on to claim, is "a significant
departure as an instrument of twentieth-century
democracy. "^
If we take seriously the notion that state capacity is
indeed a tool, that administrative forms are a technology,
we can look to recent developments in the history of
technology for insight into this process of state-building.
In his article "Do Artifacts Have Politics," Langdon Winner
has suggested that technologies are ideological constructs.
It follows from this that the choices that lay behind the
design of an instrument, in this case an instrument of
state, reflect the patterns of power that exist when that
the tools are forged. The designers inscribe their
politics within their machinery, but the technology is not
simply socially determined, for the new structures then
influence the course of future developments. Once
constructed, the machinery will tend to reinforce specific
social and political arrangements, as Winner argues,
^Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March , p. 167.
For a review of the historical literature, see the
introduction to this study, above.
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"because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material
equipment, economic investment, and social habit, [and]...
flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the
initial commitments are made." m the summer of 1933, the
TVA's designers were fixing in place those initial
commitments.
Despite a lengthy prehistory played out during the
Muscle Shoals debates of the 1920s, in the summer of 1933
the TVA lacked a clear and precise form. The authority had
a three-member board of directors: Arthur E. Morgan,
Roosevelt's first choice for the board and its chair;
Harcourt A. Morgan, an agricultural scientist and president
of the University of Tennessee— and though Canadian-born,
the board's southerner; and, Lilienthal. Beyond the
board, however, the TVA initially had no personnel or
organizational apparatus. The authority had the fairly
specific directives of selling the power from Wilson Dam,
experimental fertilizer production, and flood control, but
it also had such ambiguous and ill-defined mandates as
planning and regional development. Over that first summer,
the board had to establish the authority's priorities,
develop procedures for both policy-making and
administration, and forge an effective bureaucracy.
^Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" in, The
Whale and the Reactor. A Search for Limits in an Age of
Hicfh Technology (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1986)
, p. 29.
132
The full extent of each director's responsibilities
was not clearly articulated during the TVA's first months.
Still, there was little doubt that Lilienthal was brought
in as both director and general counsel to help shape the
agency's electric power program rather than attending only
to the more mundane legal affairs of the Authority. Arthur
Morgan had confirmed this role in their first interview,
and the initial board meetings reinforced this informal
delegation of powers. Since there was no general manager,
it was also apparent that the directors would be doing much
more than making policy, and would directly involve
themselves in policy implementation and administration.
This murky mix of responsibilities and the imprecise
delineation of power among board members helped precipitate
a struggle that took years to resolve. However, the
earliest impact of the agency's odd structure its provision
of wide discretionary powers to each director. While the
Morgans began assembling their own staffs (Arthur focusing
on forestry, water control, and regional planning; Harcourt
tending to the fertilizer program and agricultural
revitalization) , Lilienthal moved ahead in the power
arena.
Just shy of his thirty-fourth birthday when he came to
the TVA that June, David Lilienthal was clearly the most
^C. Herman Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority.
A Study in Public Administration (Chapel Hill, University
of North Carolina Press, 1943)
.
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junior member of the board of directors, with A.E. and
H.A. Morgan at fifty-five and sixty-five years-old,
respectively, age was only the most obvious but probably
the least important marker. At the president's discretion,
Arthur Morgan had held a tacit veto power over the
subsequent selections for the board, and with the others'
assent, had assumed the chairmanship at the initial board
meetings. Each man had one vote on the board, but it
appeared that the chair would be first among equals. H.A.
Morgan was considered crucial for introducing the new
agency into Southern social and political pathways. The
three directors received staggered terms of appointment.
A.E. Morgan held a nine-year term; H.A. Morgan got six
years; Lilienthal was appointed for three years. By the
end of the summer, however, Lilienthal had secured
increasing power for the TVA divisions controlled by him.
Through calculated maneuvering and an almost fevered
commitment to protect what he perceived as the public
interest, and despite a bitter struggle among the
directors, the trajectory Lilienthal established in that
first crucial summer eventually established his place as
the board's dominant force. Amorphous at its inception,
the TVA that emerged bore the indelible marks of the
personality and politics of David E. Lilienthal.^
^For information on Arthur Morgan's role in the
selection of Lilienthal and H.A. Morgan, see, Roy Talbert
Jr., FDR's Utopian. Arthur Morgan of the TVA (Jackson,
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Construction at the TVA, then, involved much more than
simply building dams and high-tension wires, and began
before any directors were named to the board. "The choice
of tools," Lilienthal insisted, "is vital." The first
choice for the TVA was its creation as a public authority—
a government-owned corporation. The authority as a form of
public administration has roots at least as far back as
Elizabethan England, but its use did not become widespread
until the twentieth century, when the Port of London
Authority and the Panama Canal Corporation emerged as early
and successful examples of the format. Governments used
the corporate form primarily during periods of emergency or
wartime, for activities that were more commercial and not
considered to be traditional sectors of state
responsibility. The federal government incorporated
numerous agencies during the first World War, such as the
War Finance Corporation and the Emergency Fleet
Corporation. Some authorities emerged after the war at
both the national and local levels, most notably the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey in 1921. But it was
not until the 1930s that the number of public corporations
surged in the United States. Indeed, one contemporary
scholar observed that the Roosevelt administration used the
device "so frequently that it came to be regarded almost as
an invention of the New Deal." Authorities multiplied
University Press of Mississippi, 1987), pp. 90-96.
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locally as well, as Robert Moses, the architect of
metropolitan New York's highways, housing, and park
systems, made the public authority a trademark of his
work.*
Public authorities had two extremely significant
benefits, proponents claimed. First, they were reputedly
far more efficient than traditional government
bureaucracies; second, organizational autonomy allowed them
to operate in an apolitical or even anti-political manner--
free from the taint of patronage and backroom dealing that
supposedly permeated other public agencies controlled by
Congress, the White House, or political parties. These
benefits made authorities particularly well-suited for
action during an emergency such as war or the Depression,
when the country needed its administration to stand above
traditional political differences and act in a quick and
decisive manner. The dual factors of flexibility and
"There is little historical literature on public
authorities and government-owned corporations. However,
useful information can be found in studies by contemporary
political scientists and public administration specialists.
See, Pritchett, The Tennessee Vallev Authoritv ; and
"Government Corporations in the United States,"
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 19(1938): 189-200
(quote cited is on p. 190) ; also see Erwin Wilkie Bard, The
Port of New York Authority (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1942) .
Regarding Moses's use of the Authority form, see
Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker. Robert Moses and the Fall
of New York (New York, A. A. Knopf, 1974), pp. 15-16, and
615-639.
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autonomy seemed to make the corporate form the appropriate
technology for the New Deal in the Tennessee Valley/
As the Muscle Shoals project had begun in wartime, and
the agency's dominant functions would have been the
production and sale of fertilizer and electricity, earlier
legislative versions of the Muscle Shoals plan had also
proposed incorporation. The inclusion in the 1933 version
of broader regional economic and social development lent
the new agency the titular distinction of becoming an
"Authority"
— still a corporation but one involved less
strictly in commerce and charged with the more steward-like
purpose of "controlling [the valley's] development through
the expenditure of public funds or the guidance of public
authority." But whether a Corporation or Authority, the
agency was cloaked in the rhetoric of flexibility and
autonomy.®
In his letter to Congress, when Roosevelt suggested "a
corporation clothed with the power of government but
possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private
enterprise," he was echoing a commonly-held sentiment about
unwieldy and inefficient public agencies. The TVA needed
to be free of the regulations and statutes that normally
have drawn much of this administrative and
institutional history from the works of C.H. Pritchett. In
addition to the studies cited above, see also, Pritchett,
"The Paradox of the Government Corporation," Public
Administrative Review 1 (1941): 381-389.
8Pritchett, The TVA
. p. 30.
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bound government in so-called "red tape." The political
scientist C.H. Pritchett observed that ordinary cabinet-
line bureaus were often forced to "sacrifice efficiency to
scrupulous legality." m short, under normal
circumstances, the government could not get things done.
The report of the joint legislative conference on the TVA
bill reaffirmed this, stating, "we are fully persuaded,"
that the full success of the Tennessee Valley
development project will depend more upon the ability,
vision, and executive capacity of the members of theboard than upon legislative provisions. We have
sought to set up a legislative framework, but not to
encase it in a legislative straitjacket
. We intend
that the corporation shall have much of the essential
freedom and elasticity of a private business
corporation.
Under the TVA Act, Congress released the new agency from
the restraints of civil service hiring, as well as federal
accounting and procurement practices. Unfettered, it was
hoped that TVA would indeed get things done.^
To provide maximum flexibility to the new corporation,
Congress left much of the language of its legislative
charter purposely vague. While committing the Authority to
regional planning and development, the act specified little
as to what these responsibilities would entail. Notably
absent as well were any guidelines for an administrative
format. The original House version of the bill, sponsored
by Democrat Lister Hill of Alabama, provided for a general
'united States House of Representatives, Report No.
130, Joint Conference Report on H.R. 5081, TVA Act, 73d
Congress, 1st Session, p. 19.
138
manager to implement the policies set by the board of
directors. George Norris's Senate bill contained no such
provision, however, and the final version followed his
proposal. In a marked break with precedent, the act did
not forge any formal ties between the TVA and any Cabinet
department. Prior to the New Deal, most government
corporations had to have a Cabinet member from a closely
related department on their board of directors. In what
became a model for the corporations formed during the
Roosevelt administration, however, the TVA had no such
requirement, leaving the agency, in C.H. Pritchett's words,
"typically independent of the regular system of
departmental responsibility." This design gave the its
board enormous discretionary control. As both primary
policy-makers and administrators, with little direct
accountability to either the executive or legislative
branches of government, Lilienthal accurately observed in a
July 1933 speech that the directors held "powers almost
unheard of in ordinary governmental departments . "^°
^°Pritchett, The TVA
. pp. 136-137, and, "The Paradox of
the Government Corporation," p. 385; Lilienthal, "A New
National Conservation Policy," Address to the International
Congress of Women, Chicago, Illinois, 18 July 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.
This model of relative autonomy extended even to
previously established corporations. Legislation amending
the charter of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
removed the Treasury Secretary from its board. However, by
the late 1930s, the model was under attack from both
Congress and the cabinet. By 1941, only the TVA and the
FDIC remained free of more direct control within a Cabinet-
line hierarchy. The struggle over political control and
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Freed from traditional accountability, the TVA seemed
to stand above politics. The Authority cultivated this
image carefully, and quite successfully. Contemporary
observers, and historians since, frequently noted the
agency's immunity to corrupting political influence. After
a visit to the valley, one journalist noted that "there
seems to be next to no politics in the TVA. The
directors... do not answer to any government department.
They are not subordinate to Mr. Ickes, or to Jesse Jones,
or least of all to Mr. Farley." This mythology held sway
for decades. In his multi-volume history of the New Deal,
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote,
protected by statute from political interference, TVA
guarded its chastity jealously.... The righteousness
was doubtless excessive. But TVA did maintain an
extraordinary enthusiasm and dedication.
TVA administrators guarded this apparent purity so closely
because it protected them from critics who could then be
painted as the agents of corrupting political influence.
What Lilienthal and his associates were building at
the TVA certainly was not free from politics, however.
accountability figured prominently in the attempts to
extend the TVA format to other regional agencies and in the
executive reorganization plans of the late 1930s. See
Pritchett, "The Paradox," and, Barry Karl, The Uneasy
State. The United States from 1915 to 1945 (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1983).
''''Paul Hutchinson, "Revolution by Electricity,"
Scribner's Magazine 96 (1934), p. 196; Arthur M.
Schlesinger Jr., The Politics of Upheaval. 1935-1936
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 375.
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Instead, what they were constructing was an emerging
politics of expertise, where a cadre of technically-
trained, objective experts would both make and implement
policy. Lilienthal was forging what one historian has
recently termed the "proministrative state," a politically
secure place where these experts could shape public policy.
Merging within the federal bureaucracy two movements that
previously had been following similar, but parallel,
trajectories, this institutional union of professional
expertise and public administration came to characterize a
system that seemed aloof from traditional politics. Its
dedicated public servants and professionals could determine
the "best" and most efficient solutions to the country's
social and economic problems, in an environment unhindered
by red tape and old-style patronage. As Lilienthal
explained in his 1944 paean, TVA: Democracy on the March .
an employee who owes his appointment to his political
standing is a man whose allegiance may not be solely
to the merits and the public purposes of the
undertaking. The whole enterprise would be infected
by half-technical, half-political judgments.... Once
politics enters, the entire edifice of an enterprise
built upon expert skills becomes unsafe.
This politics of expertise was not wholly new, but a wider
range for government intervention and the development of
institutional arrangements such as autonomous authorities
141
and corporations, assured for it a more permanent and
significant roleJ^
Most of Lilienthal's political terrain was national
rather than regional. By 1933 he was firmly situated
within the matrix of regulatory advocates and economic
reformers he had first encountered as a junior associate of
Donald Richberg. For Lilienthal, this reform network
served two purposes. He drew heavily from among his
closest colleagues within this network for constant
political support and advice. Morris Cooke, George Norris,
and, still, Felix Frankfurter helped Lilienthal chart the
course at the TVA. He rarely made a move without relying
on their counsel, particularly with regard to personnel
appointments at the Valley Authority. Drawing from
academia, state and federal regulatory bodies, and
sympathetic political circles, Lilienthal could staff the
Authority's departments with individuals who were not only
highly-qualified experts but who also shared his
ideological perspective. Thus, the lawyers, economists,
and engineers who Lilienthal brought to the valley would
turn their expertise to proving the social and technical
^^Lilienthal , TVA. Democracy on the March (New York,
Harper and Row, 1953; orig. ed. 1944), p. 180.
On the "proministrative state," see the excellent work
of Brian Balogh. For example, "Reorganizing the
Organizational Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in
Modern America," Studies in American Political Development
5 (1991): 119-172; and. Chain Reaction. Expert Debate and
Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power,
1945-1975 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991).
142
efficacy of a lower rate structure, a wider distribution of
power, and a more expansive regulatory presence.
Even before the TVA had secured sufficient office
space in the valley that first summer, Lilienthal began
assembling his legal and technical staffs. He divided the
legal department into two sections. The first would handle
what he termed the "routine business" of the Authority:
condemnations, personal injury suits, and similar affairs.
These lawyers would have to come from among members of the
state bars within the region. Lilienthal hoped to devote
as little time as possible to securing competent personnel
for that first section, for he viewed the second group as
far more important. The "Power Research" section of his
legal department would work closely with Lilienthal 's
technical staff, studying markets, drafting legislation and
power contracts, and cooperating with state, county, and
municipal governments. Primarily concerned with securing
aggressive and committed people, Lilienthal also took
control of hiring the utility economists and power
engineers who would informally comprise the power
department; he maintained direct charge until a Department
of Electricity was formed a full year later.
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 9 June 1933, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 59; despite the formation of the new department
in 1934, Lilienthal maintain a high level of daily
administrative responsibilities until a 1937
reorganization. See, Pritchett, The TVA , pp. 175-176.
143
Well aware that his La Follette lineage and Harvard
Law training branded him as an outsider to many
Southerners, and sensitive to the TVA's mandate for
regional administration, Lilienthal nonetheless had no
intention of limiting his personnel search to the Tennessee
Valley, or even to the South. Soliciting advice and lists
of candidates from his various advisers, he attached too
much importance to this agency's success to circumscribe
the talent pool for his staff in such an arbitrary manner.
Writing to Frankfurter, he stated that "we can ease
ourselves into the situation, I believe, better if we get
the right kind of southerners." Given Lilienthal "s
political connections to midwestern and Plains
progressivism, he would not make regionalism a primary
criterion, however, noting that "this is a national matter,
not a sectional one." And unlike H.A. Morgan's
agricultural programs, which were quickly identified with
the conservative forces of the South 's agricultural elite,
the starved condition of regulatory bodies in the region
left the new director without strong southern candidates
for his technical staff. In the end, few members of either
the Power Research legal section or the nascent Department
of Electricity came from the South.
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 9 June 1933; Lilienthal
sent similar letters to Cooke and Frank Walsh, the labor
lawyer and then a member of the New York Power Authority
The defining work on the agricultural programs'
conservative bonds is, Philip Selznick, TVA and the
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The lists of candidates and the ultimate appointees
reflect how both implicit ideological interests and
explicit political machinations were deeply embedded in the
supposedly value-free environment of administrative
expertise. Among those considered for Lilienthal's legal
staff were two Harvard Law graduates and Reconstruction
Finance Corporation staffers, Paul Freund and Frank A.
Watson; Freund, who went on to serve in the Justice
Department, had clerked for Louis Brandeis at the Supreme
Court. Also considered was John Wheeler, son of Montana
Senator and 1924 La Follette running-mate Burton K.
Wheeler. Lilienthal drew many of his closest staffers from
among former associates in both Chicago and Wisconsin.
Joseph C. Swidler had begun his law career in 1930 as
Lilienthal's junior associate. He remained in Chicago when
La Follette summoned his boss, but moved south in 1933 to
become assistant general counsel at TVA. Julius Krug had
been a utility economist at the Public Service Commission
in Madison, and followed what quickly became a well-worn
path from Wisconsin's capitol to the new agency. From
farther afield Lilienthal found that the network of
activist regulators and municipal plant administrators
provided a rich yield of sympathetic experts. Notably,
Llewellyn Evans, at one point a candidate for the position
Grassroots. A Study of Politics and Organization
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1949)
.
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on the board that went to Lilienthal, came to the power
department from Tacoma
,
Washington's municipal utilityj^
Despite a legislative mandate designed to bar the door
to a spoils system in an agency unfettered by civil service
procedures, political considerations very clearly
influenced several appointments among non-technical
professional staff. Lilienthal devoted special attention
to public and Congressional relations. Politics at the rVA
operated at different levels. Beneath the carefully
cultivated image of the agency's anti-politics, Lilienthal
in particular was a shrewd practitioner of the political
arts. Sharpening the skills he had acquired in Wisconsin,
Lilienthal reveled in the realm of deal-making and
carefully-measured political seismography . In mid-May, as
he had moved from a possible candidate to an imminent
nominee, Lilienthal began corresponding with Forrest Allen,
an editor at the Memphis Press-Scimitar , part of the
Scripps-Howard newspaper chain that backed Roosevelt, the
New Deal, and the TVA. Lilienthal had Allen perform some
political intelligence, giving the new director "some
indications of where to classify" various people ol local
significance and provide Lilienthal with a political
"pedigree" for each. Allen later became a member of the
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 9 Juno 1933; The Journals
of David E. Lili enthal . Volume One . The TVA Yo.i rs. 1939-
1945 (New York, Harper and Row, 196-1), pp. 72-7 1, 92-93 ;
Roy Talbert, Jr., FDR's Utopian. Arthur Morgan of the TVA
(Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, I9H7), p. 92.
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agency's public relations office. V.D.L. Robinson, an aide
to Tennessee senator Nathan Bachman, received a position in
the Authority's information division and worked as
Lilienthal's personal assistant. Along with Forrest
Allen's appointment, Robinson helped to secure the new
director's exposed flank as a northerner unfamiliar with
the region and its political environment. Another former
senatorial aide took charge of the TVA's Washington office.
Marguerite Owen left George Norris's staff to become the
agency's chief Washington lobbyist. She became a close
Lilienthal ally, working with him in a number of battles
with Congress and in the divisive internal struggle that
would rock the TVA during the mid-1930s.
Despite the highly politicized nature of these
appointments, none ignored the importance of competence.
Krug and Swidler went on to have long and distinguished
careers in public service— Krug as the Secretary of the
Interior from 1945-1949 and Swidler succeeding Lilienthal
TVA general counsel and later as chair of the Federal
Communications Commission under John F. Kennedy. Llewellyn
Evans was later described as "a prophet and visionary," who
also "had a firm grasp on the technicalities of power
generation and transmission." At numerous points in her
career, Owen helped pull the TVA out of hostile political
currents. The interests of politics, ideology, and
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expertise meshed in a seamless weave within the TVA's
administrative apparatus. ''^
As had been the case in Wisconsin, Lilienthal was able
to rapidly assemble an agency staff. These experts then
faced the formidable task of planning a major expansion in
the generation and marketing of TVA electricity. To begin
with, they had to answer the intricate issues every
electric utility had confronted, such as load and capacity,
distribution networks, and the relationship between rate
structure and market demand. The Muscle Shoals experience
provided only the barest of precedent for the new
Authority; previously, all of Wilson Dam's hydro power was
sold directly to the Alabama Power Company, one of several
regional affiliates of the giant holding firm, Commonwealth
and Southern. The TVA had no power lines reaching into the
valley. It had no customer base— wholesale or retail,
commercial or domestic.
Yet the power staff did have an agenda. Its mission
was to drastically lower the prevailing rate structure,
particularly for domestic and small commercial users of
^^Allen-Lilienthal correspondence, May-June 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59; quote from Lilienthal to Allen,
19 June 1933.
On Robinson's appointment, see, Talbert, FDR '
s
Utopian
, pp. 152-154; Marguerite Owen wrote her own account
of her years with the TVA, The Tennessee Valley Authority
(New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973) . For the laudatory
appraisal of Evans, see, an oral history with Joseph C.
Swidler, as quoted in Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis ,
p. 379.
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electricity. Doing this, they claimed, would ultimately
raise consumption levels so significantly that the lower
per unit revenues would be financially justified. Further,
beyond the immediate concern for the TVA's operating costs,
Lilienthal and his staff promoted broader hopes that the
lower rates would leaven the depressed American economy
while allowing millions of presently excluded citizens
access to the emancipative promise of electric current.
Although the TVA shared many of the technical problems
of forecasting load and demand common to all power
companies, establishing a rate structure initially posed
the most vexing and unigue problem for the Authority. As
Lilienthal had learned in both his work with the railway
labor unions and the Wisconsin PSC, rate-making was always
a confusing and contentious craft, requiring a lengthy
fact-finding process that was open to an array of often
contradictory interpretations. Rates were normally based
on the valuation of the investment necessary to produce the
service, whether railroad freight delivery or electric
current. Valuation of property and operating cost analyses
were at the heart of many of Lilienthal 's prior political
^^For a discussion of this economic argument, see
Chapter 2, "Rates and Regulation;" a useful study of rate-
making at Ontario Hydro is Keith Miller, Power at Cost.
Ontario Hydro and Rural Electrification. 1911-1958
(Montreal, McGill University Press, 1991); further analysis
of Lilienthal 's claims for electricity as a liberating
technology will follow in Chapter 4, "Selling State Power,"
below.
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battles, and he knew that the rates he announced would
provoke bitter criticism from the TVA's opponents within
the private sector. TVA power rates would have to
withstand intense scrutiny while also enticing enough
interest to create a revenue-producing market that would
solidify the agency's political support; Lilienthal knew
that the rates mattered and therefore, so did the rate-
making process.
Some of the variables in the TVA's rate equation were
particularly complex. While the courts had resolved
certain debates over valuation methodology, there was no
base principle guiding valuation estimates for power
produced from a multi-purpose dam. The Wilson dam, and
every other dam planned by the Authority for the Tennessee
River and its tributaries, served three inseparable
functions: flood control, navigation, and hydroelectric
power. To arrive at an "actual" valuation of the TVA's
power system, Lilienthal 's power experts would have to
divide out and allocate each dam's costs among the three
functions— an inevitably lengthy process with few
precedents. The TVA also found it impossible to arrive at
a base "original cost" valuation for the Wilson Dam. The
staff contended that original cost methodology, the
valuation principle upheld by the Supreme Court, could not
be applied at Wilson, because its construction had begun
during the highly inflationary war period, and then its
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completion had been delayed an additional several years.
To further complicate matters, many of the agency's
advocates from the president down touted its impending rate
structure as a "yardstick" against which the allegedly
unfair charges of the private power firms could be
compared. While the term never appeared in its legislative
charter, and the vast differences between the TVA and the
private utilities negated the value of any comparisons,
most people agreed with Franklin Roosevelt, who, during the
1932 campaign pledged that public power projects such as
Muscle Shoals "will be forever a national yardstick to
prevent extortion against the public and to encourage the
wider use of that servant of the people— electric power."
Together, these issues made an already arduous process even
more cumbersome
.
For a contemporary analysis of the allocation
question, see, Horace M. Gray, "The Allocation of Joint
Costs In Multi-Purpose Hydro-Electric Projects," American
Economic Review 25 (1935): 224-235; cite FDR's Portland
speech
.
The standard monograph on the development of the TVA's
power program remains McCraw's, TVA and the Power Fight ,
esp. pp. 30-34 and 70-74 on the yardstick issue.
A study of federal power policies conducted by the
Twentieth Century Fund in the late 1930s provides very
valuable data and analysis of TVA rates. With full
publication delayed by the war, a summary was published in
1944 as The Power Industry and the Public Interest (New
York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1944) , with the full report
coming out four years later as. Electric Power and
Government Policy. A Survey of Relations Between
Government and the Electric Power Industry (New York,
Twentieth Century Fund, 1948)
.
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By August, pressure was mounting from numerous
quarters for the announcement of a TVA rate schedule. The
number of inquiries from various municipalities seeking
access to the anticipated cheap power grew each week.
Private utilities also anxiously awaited the news. To have
a schedule in place so soon, Lilienthal knew that he would
have to come out with rates that were not as fully grounded
in verifiable operating costs and valuation data as he
would have wished. As he wrote that summer to his
Wisconsin associate and friend, E.W. (Ed) Morehouse,
"before we go ahead on them [the rates] we want to be as
nearly sure that we are on the right track as possible, and
yet we have to act pretty fast." The objective was a rate
structure radically lower than any offered by the
surrounding power companies: low enough to draw greater
consumption within the cities and towns clamoring for the
new power, but also sound enough to withstand the
inevitable attacks from hostile observers within the
politically weakened but still formidable utility lobby in
Washington.
These pressures forced the TVA staffers to short-
circuit so much of the normal rate-making process that
Thomas McCraw's landmark history of the agency
characterizes their efforts as "basically (and necessarily)
^'Lilienthal to E.W. Morehouse, n.d. (ca. August 1933)
,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 60.
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an exercise in intuition." But as a contemporary study of
electric power suggested, the "TVA rates were not, however,
drawn out of a hat." if the twin constraints of time and
politics did limit the scope of the work that underpinned
the first schedule, Lilienthal and his staff were not
operating completely in the dark. Llewellyn Evans turned
to the agency's hydraulic engineers for the Wilson Dam's
operating costs from the 1920s. Construction and operating
cost estimates for future dams were already available, and
the TVA's experiment with low rates was not without
precedent. The power division used data from the Ontario
Hydro system and Evans's Tacoma municipal plant as models
for their own enterprise. A three-year long study
conducted by Lilienthal 's regulatory allies at the New York
Power Authority provided extensive evidence linking low
rates to increased consumption patterns that would thereby
secure satisfactory returns for an operating utility.
Summarizing the Power Authority's study, Julius Krug stated
that it "demonstrate [d] very clearly in that study that
with increase in use, distribution costs decrease very
substantially.... You can pretty much double the amount of
energy sold over distribution systems without materially
increasing the cost of providing service." Armed with this
variety of data, the TVA experts were engaged in much more
153
than pure-and-simple guesswork; there were no rate schedule
dartboards hanging in the power division's offices. 20
To have their rates ready by the summer's end,
Lilienthal and Evans made two significant decisions. m a
short-term resolution to the allocation-valuation dilemma,
the power staff formulated a base figure for the Wilson Dam
property by what became known as the "prudent businessman
principle." As Lilienthal later explained this highly
controversial method to a Congressional committee in 1938,
the TVA determined what "a prudent businessman would pay"
for a hydroelectric dam with generating capacity comparable
to that at Wilson. Attacked by private utilities as
hopelessly subjective, Lilienthal claimed that this
principle was burdened with different, but not greater,
ambiguities than original cost valuation which was
essentially unusable for Wilson Dam. In any event, the TVA
viewed these estimates as transitional figures that could
be revised once a more permanent allocation system was in
place . 2^
''''McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight , p. 60; Twentieth
Century Fund, Electric Power and Government Policy
, p. 594;
Krug testimony. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Tennessee Valley Authority
. 75th Congress, 3rd Session, 14
Parts (May-December 1938)
, pp. 738-740 (hereafter cited as.
Joint Investigation of TVA )
.
^^Pritchett, The TVA
. pp. 82-83; Lilienthal testimony,
23 July 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA . pp. 5308-
5309.
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The second decision reflects just how deeply the
ideological currents common to Lilienthal and his staff
permeated their techniques at the TVA. Working with
reasonable, but admittedly rough, cost estimates, the power
division turned the normal rate-making process on its head,
and decided to let their projections for anticipated
residential consumption levels serve as a determining
factor for the TVA's base rates. Had they followed the
standard practices of the private firms, the TVA rate-
makers would have established a running average consumption
level from several previous years' usage in the region.
They would then have set rates that would guarantee
satisfactory revenue from secure, already-existing demand.
Instead, Evans and the staff relied on consumption patterns
in low-rate systems such as Ontario Hydro, and projected
annual domestic consumption at 1,200 kilowatt hours (KWH)
per year, a figure that was twice the national average.
Forecasting such a tremendous boost in power
consumption, the TVA could then offer the sharply lower
rates that its proponents believed would produce sufficient
revenue while making power an affordable commodity. As
Lilienthal later explained the issue,
one principle of pricing must be clearly recognized,
or the entire social significance of the yardstick is
lost: the rate charged for electricity, within wide
limits, determines the cost, it is the rate that
determines the cost.... And by a happy coincidence, the
social objective of wide utilization of electricity,
and the business principle I have just stated, work in
harmony.... In a wide field of mass production, as
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Z7lTit i;j^^^^^ed den.and results in less costper uni . Limited production means high costs; wideconsumption produces low costs.
Lilienthal and Evans did not turn rate-making into a
political act, for it had always been so. What they did
was transform it into a tool serving an emergent
consumption-driven political economy. ^2
As Evans constructed a preliminary set of rates,
Lilienthal assembled an outside consulting team to review
the staff's work. This team's members were all highly
regarded experts, but they were also closely identified
with the low-rate regulatory agenda, as well as friends or
colleagues of Lilienthal ' s: James C. Bonbright from
Columbia; Haninah Zinder and Ed Morehouse from the
Wisconsin PSC; Martin Glaeser from the University of
Wisconsin's Economics department; Leland Olds and Mile
Maltbie from New York State's Power Authority and PSC. The
advisors' highest priority was to help Evans fine-tune the
initial TVA rates for immediate release. After applying
the finishing touches to that schedule, the group was to
break up into various committees and prepare detailed
studies of the valuation and allocation issues, ultimately
Electric Power and Government Policy
, pp. 591-598;
Lilienthal testimony, Joint Investigation of the TVA , pp.
795-796.
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establishing a more firmly grounded methodology for the
Authority's power program. ^-^
The first goal proved by far to be the easier of the
two tasks. The consultants offered only minor revisions
to Evans's rate structure, and they passed the completed
schedule on to Lilienthal. In mid-September, the director
released the new rates. At three cents and under per KWH
for normal domestic consumers, the TVA's prices were indeed
radically lower than those of the surrounding companies,
undercutting the privately-held Alabama, Georgia, and
Tennessee utilities by between 40 and 60 percent. While
these rates were a bold departure from the regional norm,
and attracted considerable national attention, they were
not the high-risk gamble they have sometimes been
considered. Lilienthal had recruited a team of extremely
competent rate-makers who combined advocacy of the low-
price agenda with a firm grasp of the realities of utility
economics. From the Pacific Northwest to Ontario, there
were enough examples of a highly elastic demand for
electricity. For these people, the TVA would be one more
step, albeit a giant step, in their implementation of an
already working model.
'^^Pritchett , The TVA
. pp. 86-87; Lilienthal testimony,
Joint Investigation of the TVA
. p. 707.
^^McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight , pp. 59-61; Electric
power and Government Policy
, pp. 596-598.
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Completing the second goal proved far more difficult
for Lilienthal's consultants and power staff, however.
Establishing long-term valuation and allocation principles
involved technical complexities that challenged even the
collective expertise gathered at the TVA. The allocation
issue, in particular, raised a number of daunting
questions. Apportioning the value of multi-purpose dams on
a cost-benefit basis was nearly impossible. How, for
instance, could one measure the public's interest in flood
control? As Horace Gray, a contemporary economist, noted,
the non-vendible character of certain utilities
renders allocation by reference to a free market
impossible. The intangible nature of certain
benefits... make[s] it difficult to allocate costs.
Gray concluded by declaring that "no objective formula is
possible; joint costs," he wrote, "must be allocated by
reference to social policy." The lack of clear precedents
made the task both more complex and more significant. As
the study dragged on into 1934 and 1935, Lilienthal urged
caution upon his colleagues. The Authority had its initial
rates in place, and he wanted to be sure that the final
recommendations were theoretically sound and politically
defensible. "It is the first case of such apportionment,
so far as I know, among the Federal power projects," he
advised Bonbright, "and to that extent may become a settled
part of national power policy." Facing such an array of
158
variables, the power division moved slowly on these
matters."
Technical complexities were not the only source of
delay in implementing a more conclusive power policy. As
early as July 1933, an internal struggle between A.E.
Morgan and Lilienthal was emerging within the TVA's board.
Ultimately, the fault lines that split the board reveal a
deep ideological divide between the two directors that
engulfed the agency in a bitter and protracted public
controversy. The catalyst that triggered the opening
rounds in this struggle, however, was the power issue.
Differences between Morgan and Lilienthal regarding
specifics such as allocation methodology and concerning the
more general tenor of the power program were the first
signs of the TVA's impending crisis. The ambiguities in
the Authority's policy-making and administrative structures
during its first months complicated the board's policy
dispute, and the temporary resolution of this struggle
carried significant implications for the future course of
the TVA.^^
Unlike Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan had little direct
experience with either the politics or technigues of the
^^Gray, "The Allocation of Joint Costs," p. 224;
Lilienthal to James C. Bonbright, 12 September 1935,
reprinted in, Joint Investigation of the TVA
. p. 713.
^•^The best narrative account of the Morgan-Lil ienthal
struggle is, Thomas K. McCraw, Morgan vs. Lilienthal: The
Feud within the TVA (Chicago, Loyola Press, 1970)
.
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electric power business. That inexperience, of course, had
been the primary reason for Lilienthal's appointment to the
board. And although Morgan exhibited an often dogmatic and
unyielding personality, he hoped to steer his agency toward
close cooperation and compromise with the private power
sector. He advocated allocation methods and a base
valuation for Wilson Dam's operating costs that would have
boosted TVA's power costs, and thus forced rates higher as
well. The TVA chair opposed aggressive competition by the
agency for sales territory then controlled by the private
utilities, and he made conciliatory overtures toward
Wendell Willkie, the head of powerful Commonwealth and
Southern utility holding company. "I think we should treat
legitimate power development as an honorable and desirable
activity," Morgan stated in a mid-July memo to Lilienthal,
and that we should not unnecessarily stimulate any
competitive activity which will destroy invested
values. Moreover, I think that we should assume
reasonableness, fair play and good will on the part of
the utilities unless experience in our own relations
with them demonstrates the contrary. (emp. his)
The staff of social planners that Morgan assembled around
him also reflected this cooperative demeanor. Earle
Draper, a noted regional planner hired by Morgan who played
a central role in designing the town of Norris, echoed the
chair's sentiments in a press interview when he stated that
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"care is to be taken that whatever power is developed will
not compete with existing power interests . "^^
All of this rankled Lilienthal, whose combative
attitude toward the utilities had been well illustrated in
Wisconsin. Answering Morgan's overtures to the utility
industry, Lilienthal issued his own lengthy memorandum. He
strongly urged his fellow directors to make no territorial
concessions at this early stage. "I must repeat my deeply
felt disagreement with such a policy and such a procedure,"
he wrote. Lilienthal then went on to further warn against
a conciliatory approach. "Candor compels me to say," he
wrote,
that I am most skeptical that we can hope for genuine
'co-operation' with the private utilities.... To
premise our policies at this time on the willingness
of the privately owned utilities to work with us,
seems to me to be running counter to every reasonable
expectation.
After outlining his recommendations for a more aggressive
posture, Lilienthal signalled his intent to introduce the
issues for formal consideration at a board meeting in late
July. 2^
On the allocation and valuation questions, see,
Pritchett, The TVA
. pp. 84-91; on Morgan's general approach
to the power issue and his personality, see, Talbert, FDR '
s
Utopian
,
esp. pp. 128-149; A.E. Morgan to Lilienthal, no
date (ca. mid-July 1933), Lilienthal Papers, Box 60; the
Draper interview is quoted in a letter from John P.
Robertson, secretary to George W. Norris, to Morris Cooke,
22 July 1933, Cooke Papers, Box 53.
^®Lilienthal to Arthur E. Morgan, 21 July 193 3,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 60.
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That differences between the two men would surface was
probably inevitable. What was not inevitable was the
junior director's early and decisive break with Morgan on
these matters, and his efforts to almost completely sever
Morgan's influence over TVA power policy. Behind his
aggressive public stances, Lilienthal often assumed a
deferential posture toward his direct superiors, seldom
challenging their positions. As a sympathetic biographer
of A.E. Morgan described this character trait, "he made
friends in high places with astonishing ease, along with a
certain amount of cultivation. Lilienthal 's letters to his
mentors and confidants verge on sycophancy." Although the
portrayal may have been shaded by the author's inclination
toward Morgan, such a depiction is close to the mark. In
taking these dramatic steps, Lilienthal was not acting
alone, but was instead moving under the direct guidance of
his closest advisors. George Norris, Morris Cooke, and
Felix Frankfurter were all observing the activities at the
TVA, and were all equally disturbed by Morgan's
conciliatory stance. Confiding with each other and then
with Lilienthal, the three urged him forward in his
confrontation with Morgan.^'
Morris Cooke began sending out warning signals in
early July. He wrote to Norris, Frankfurter, and
Lilienthal, expressing his concern that the TVA chair was
29Talbert, FDR's Utopian
, p. 96.
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setting the new agency on a dangerous course. "i am
convinced that the Administration is, in this matter,
headed right into serious trouble," Cooke stated. He noted
that he found Morgan's "idealism, versatility, and
engineering capacity" admirable, but "he has self-
confidence raised to the nth power and— in the political
and electrical fields especially— a naivete that I have
never seen paralleled." Citing a specific example of the
potential trouble, Cooke told of a meeting he had with
Morgan's "personnel man" regarding the TVA's hiring
practices. They met at Washington's Cosmos Club in early
that July, and according to Cooke, this man asked
within hearing of a miscellaneous group "Who should
build the Cove Creek Dam?" Having changed the subject
I returned at a more opportune moment with the query
—
"How will you choose the engineer to build Cove Creek
Dam?" Answer
— "I ask every man I meet and about one
out of three write me when they get back to their
offices
.
"Allowing the private power interests to know your mind,"
Cooke wrote to Lilienthal, will be "sure to end
disastrously." For Cooke, committed to the position that
ideological perspective was embedded within engineering
technique, this was indeed a dangerous course.
^°Cooke to Felix Frankfurter, 13 July 1933, Cooke
Papers, Box 57; Cooke to Lilienthal, 26 July 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
In FDR's Utopian
. Talbert speculates that it may have
been Cooke that originally brought Arthur Morgan to the
attention of President Roosevelt, and helped Morgan secure
the TVA position. Cooke's correspondence seems to indicate
a deep and early mistrust for the TVA chair. See the
letter of 13 July to Frankfurter, "When I heard of Dr.
Norris and Frankfurter reiterated this concern.
Senator Norris expressed great confidence in Lilienthal who
he stated "has been in the fight long enough to realize
what the commission [the TVA board] is up against. I know
as you do," he continued in a letter to Cooke, "how
important it is to have the key positions filled with men
who are not tangled up with the power trust They ought
to take off their gloves before starting— this is not a
kindergarten entertainment." Frankfurter warned Lilienthal
to pay close attention to Cooke, "who knows what he is
talking about when it comes to the engineering
fraternity. "^^
Lilienthal responded by noting that he "desperately
needs counsel" from his various advisers. He was doing all
he could to build a staff that was both competent and
ideologically committed, and offered as an example his
hiring of Llewellyn Evans. He also sent copies of his July
21 memo to Norris, Cooke, and Frankfurter, among others,
and shared with them his plans to exclude Morgan from any
further influence in the power program. Frankfurter wrote
Morgan's appointment I felt that the President had struck
as near twelve as we often come in human affairs;" and,
"The President has naturally 100 per cent confidence in his
Chairman— otherwise he would not have appointed him. But
I miss my guess if he knows his naivete. I have 100 per
cent confidence in what he would do if he but knew."
^^George Norris to Cooke, 8 July 1933, Cooke Papers,
Box 53; Felix Frankfurter to Lilienthal, 10 July 1933,
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
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back to his former student, applauding the proposed
administrative coup. "Of course you are right in your
position," he exclaimed, "Dead right.... Don't deviate from
your position Thank God you're on the job." At every
stage in this struggle, Lilienthal secured the backing of
his network of influential mentors.
After winning H.A. Morgan's support for the proposed
reorganization, guaranteeing at least a two-to-one
majority, the August board meeting became an anti-climax.
Arthur Morgan acquiesced, at least temporarily, to a formal
division of responsibility among the three board members.
Each director assumed primary policy-making and
administrative control over specific TVA functions: A.E.
Morgan to oversee forestry, flood control, and regional
planning, H.A. Morgan to have agricultural programs, and
Lilienthal to run the power section. In certain respects,
this formal sanctioning of the tripartite division merely
ratified how the agency had been functioning since early
June. But most importantly, it essentially barred Morgan
from making what Lilienthal regarded as unwarranted
intrusions into his domain. On September 2, Morgan wrote
^"^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 13 July 1933
,
and,
Frankfurter to Lilienthal, 29 July 1933, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 59; In addition to Norris, Cooke, and Frankfurter,
Lilienthal sent copies of his July 21 memo and
reorganization proposal to James Bonbright, Robert La
Follette Jr. , and Basil Manly; see correspondence in
Lilienthal Papers, Box 59.
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to Wendell Willkie that all negotiations regarding power
matters would now have to be directed through Lilienthal."
Shortly after the August resolution, Cooke reaffirmed
his belief in Lilienthal, and offered some warm personal
words for the 34 year-old, who felt physically and
spiritually drained by the struggle. "The fact that you
are standing manfully," Cooke wrote,
and I think adroitly for an interest which tens ofthousands have very much at heart must be yourinspiration and support when you need the OldGuard ordered out or any other special service all youhave to do is to ask. You are the right man in the
right place and in the End will win out.
There would follow many more opportunities for Lilienthal
to rely on Cooke's unswerving support.
On the details of this "trisecting of administrative
responsibility," see, Pritchett, The TVA
. pp. 156-158; on
the ideologically conservative implications of H.A.
Morgan's autonomous control over the agriculture program,
see, Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots ; copy of the letter
from A.E. Morgan to Wendell Willkie in "TVA: Miscellaneous"
folder, "Lilienthal Papers, Box 61.
Harcourt Morgan's close relationship with conservative
agricultural forces is paralleled in Lilienthal 's work by
the ties he establishes with the AFofL building trade
unions. What Selznick describes as the ideological
cooptation of the agricultural division occurred in the
power division as well, and emerged out of the imperatives
and internal logic of TVA's structure and policies. See
chapter 6 below.
^^Cooke to Lilienthal, 4 October 1933, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 59.
Cooke remained a close observer of the TVA, as well as
a (privately) strident critic of Arthur Morgan. Writing to
Frankfurter during the law professor's year at Oxford,
Cooke stated, "The TVA administrative situation is by no
means cleared up. They are struggling along with three
bosses, when one is suggested by good management. Antioch
Morgan could never be the general manager of this project,
but I think ultimately they will have to settle down and
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While the arrangement was at best a fragile truce
that would later break down, this administrative
compartmentalization left the agency- most junior director
in charge of that part of the TVA that was to have the most
significant and longest-lasting impact in American politics
and society. Lilienthal understood that the decisions that
he made during the agency's first years, when both a
bureaucracy and a dam system were being constructed,
carried enduring implications. In 1939, looking back at
that construction phase, he remarked in a letter to Newton
f
Arvin that he was now ready to focus his efforts on the
national economic reconstruction of which the TVA was one
small part. "With the power program on its feet, and
fortified by thousand-year dams and 20-year contracts not
subject to change by Congress, I hope to be able to devote
more and more time to this job," Providing cheap electric
power had always been one of the agency's central mandates.
But as the Authority's other functions receded in
importance and the TVA became increasingly focused upon the
power issue, Lilienthal and the infrastructure that he
forged defined the agency's future and its place in the
broader political landscape of the New Deal.-^^
act as board of directors and have one executive. . .
.
Lilienthal 's power ideas have largely won out." Cooke to
Frankfurter, 19 February 1934 , Cooke Papers, Box 57
^^Lilienthal, The Journals . I, p. 82.
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For Lilienthal, this future entailed a new political
economy that consciously linked low-cost production and
mass consumption; it was a future managed by policy-makers
who were the stewards of an interventionist state but were
immune from more traditional modes of political influence
and, ultimately, from public accountability as well.
Building an organization designed to produce and sell
electric power, Lilienthal was also generating state power.
iCHAPTER 5
SELLING STATE POWER: LEGITIMATING THE TVAAND THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION
Question: "What are they going to do with allthat power when they get it?"
Answer: "Make two bulbs of glass glow where
only one glew before."
Business WeeV 23 December 1933.
Lilienthal seemed more exhausted than exhilarated by
the August administrative coup that he and H.A. Morgan
engineered. In any event, he had little time to reflect on
its long-term significance or savor the personal triumph.
He forged an uneasy truce that staked out the working
boundaries for the agency's directors, wresting almost
total control over the power program while relinguishing
influence over the Authority's various other programs.
Still Lilienthal 's ongoing efforts to consolidate control
and create rationalized administrative structures neither
diminished nor simplified his role. His list of
responsibilities grew longer, and his profile, atop the
electricity department's flow chart, stood in much bolder
relief. Lilienthal was in charge of TVA's power.
The temporary resolution of the Authority's
administrative dispute allowed Lilienthal to assess the
TVA's political environment. He could not help but notice
an array of hostile forces ready to undermine the agency
and curtail its influence. Despite enjoying a
corporation's flexibility and autonomy, the agency was not
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immune to political and constitutional challenges to its
legitimacy. Opponents emerged from across the political
range- from the private utilities and their financiers who
openly fought any expansion of public power, to elements
within the Roosevelt administration, located primarily in
the Agriculture and Interior Departments, who waged an
initially more muted and cautious struggle against the
TVA's incursions into their "turf." Looking for
supporters, however, Lilienthal saw a more inchoate
political landscape. Aside from the small cadre of public
power and regulatory advocates and a few Congressional
stalwarts, the Authority did not have the backing of well-
defined forces in the political arena.
Without stronger institutional bases of support,
Lilienthal had to forge a popular constituency to
legitimate the Authority and secure its long-term
viability. Lilienthal thus used rate reductions to
consolidate a base; the TVA's foundation was cheap electric
power. Lilienthal worked to devise a low rate structure
and secure territory for TVA current while launching a
massive public relations campaign designed not only to sell
electricity but also to sell the Authority as the sole
provider and guarantor of the cheap rates. He struck
quickly. "Speed was important," Lilienthal reflected later.
. .. for only in a period of sweeping ^reform' or
^emergency' psychology could the job be started;
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carrying it on, if it should show early results
t?ad?Mona? j.^^^^-^^^ — the Republicans orr itio l Democrats got back.
The politics of consumption that he had begun shaping in
Wisconsin were taking more evident form. At the TVA
Lilienthal used affordable electricity as the axis from
which he spun off an ambitious political strategy that
linked the TVA and the New Deal to economic recovery,
unequalled material prosperity, and a democratic social
order .
^
The campaign's rhetoric functioned at several levels.
At its broadest, this rhetoric echoed commonly-held notions
that championed electric power as the deepest wellspring of
progress and modernity. In this respect, Lilienthal relied
upon popular expectations of electricity's unlimited
potential, tapping into the deep faith that most Americans
shared in the transformative powers of new technologies
since the westward expansion of the railroad and the
telegraph. But Lilienthal added new layers of meaning
through a new vocabulary specifically designed to highlight
the promise of TVA current. Although TVA-generated power
was the functional equivalent of that produced by the
private utilities, Lilienthal strived to create a unique
identity for TVA current. In his campaign, the TVA power
director went about securing his agency's legitimacy by
identifying abundant and affordable electricity with the
^Lilienthal, The Journals
.
I, pp. 79-80.
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TVA's public power; current from the private companies,
travelling the wires at the same frequency as TVA
kilowatts, was, he proclaimed, expensive, and therefore
undemocratic. As importantly, Lilienthal extended this
identification to the New Deal's wider array of regulatory
initiatives. Linking TVA electricity and the New Deal's
expansion of state prerogative, the agency profited from
the Roosevelt administration's broad base of support while
also extending the federal government's reach further into
the private sector. in effect, Lilienthal 's campaign at
once sold TVA electricity, the Authority itself, and state
power in general.
The Authority carefully orchestrated every aspect of
its public relations effort. In his pathbreaking critique
of the agency, TVA and the Grass Roots . Philip Selznick
observed that
"its [the TVA's] leaders have been especially
active... in propagating a systematic formulation of
its own meaning and significance. This self-analysis
of the role of TVA has been elaborated at length and
presented to the public at every possible
opportunity.... The elaboration of this interpretation
has been, indeed, a well-developed and effective
exercise in administrative self-consciousness.
At the center of this effort was Lilienthal. Since his
brief stay in Wisconsin, he had grown increasingly adept at
using the media to promote his agenda. The power chief
relished the added responsibilities that he assumed as the
Authority's pitchman. He admitted that much of his
salesmanship seemed ignoble, confiding in a letter to his
It
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friend Newton Arvin that "it was undignified as hell, like
an Indian root doctor," but Lilienthal believed that TVA's
strength depended largely on its ability to control its own
public image.
^
Added responsibilities exacted a high personal cost on
Lilienthal. He was driven by a psyche that mixed ambition
and a sense of high moral purpose, always a volatile
combination, and he devoted long hours and prodigious
amounts of effort to his work. In a self-appraisal written
in later years at the TVA, Lilienthal noted these very
characteristics. "You have been carried along so far," he
wrote, "by an intense and absorbing desire for achievement;
the contest spirit; make a place for yourself; get
somewhere, etc." At times he seemed indefatigable,
demanding a similar commitment from his assistants, and
carrying a haughty and zealous demeanor into his political
struggles. This drive emerged as much out of self-doubt as
it did from arrogance; while alternately combative or
dismissive toward opponents, he still melted into
sycophancy around his mentors. Continuing the self-study
noted above, Lilienthal went on,
in five years in public life you have leaped from
relative obscurity to a place near the top. What are
^Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots , p. 21; on
Lilienthal as the central figure in TVA promotional efforts,
Selznick, p. 22, notes that Lilienthal took, "the leading role in
public exposition of the official TVA doctrine."
The February 1939 letter to Arvin is quoted in, Lilienthal,
The Journals
.
I, p. 80.
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^avP^hi2^ H°-'^° ""^V ^^^^ have what youh e been driving for.... Somehow there never seemedany problem on that score during the exciting cHmbBut here you are, and now what does it mean wha^a^eyou going to do with your accomplishment?
Beyond the occasional stirrings of doubt, the workload and
anxieties also left him prone to periodic bouts of physical
and spiritual collapse, requiring days and sometimes weeks
of convalescence at home or at a retreat on Florida's Gulf
Coast.
^
Recurrent maladies, of both the mind and the body, did
not break Lilienthal's stride during his "exciting climb."
The ambition that fed on his personal insecurities also
served to shield those doubts from his public persona and
marked him as a willful, committed administrator. Whatever
fueled his personal drive, Lilienthal had to draw deeply on
his reservoir. During the TVA's early years the young
director faced a series of obstacles that imperiled the new
agency and could have blocked his ascent.
Lilienthal immediately took control of the Authority's
promotional work. He oversaw the design of the advertising
program at the TVA and its adjunct, the Electric Home and
Farm Authority (EHFA)
. These strategic components were
ideologically and geographically transmutable— identical
to promotional techniques employed by the agency's rivals
in the private utility sector but also by state-owned firms
both in the United States and abroad. The first floor of
^Lilienthal, The Journals , p. 67, see also pp 79-92
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TVA offices housed showrooms and sales displays that, with
a few alterations, the new agency could have pulled
directly from the floor plans of any number of light and
power companies. Similar to Ontario Hydro, its Canadian
progenitor, Ontario Hydro, which had wide stretches of
territory to cover, the TVA trucked a mobile kitchen across
the countryside. Preaching the gospel of salvation through
an all-electric home, the agency set up the kitchen
encampment in local communities to draw converts to the
miracle of kilowatts and appliances. Such marketing
gimmicks as brochures, newspaper advertisements, and
envelope stuffers in customers' bills reached across the
ideological spectrum.
If many of the TVA's techniques mimicked the private
sector, Lilienthal anticipated taking steps well beyond the
For a closer study of the EHFA, see chapter 5, below.
Although the two agencies were formally separate entities, theyjointly developed their promotional efforts.
Regarding the specific plans for TVA-EHFA outreach, see,
EHFA, "Notes on Board Meeting," November 17, 1934, and "Budget
for Promotional Division," n.d. (ca. late 1933, early 1934), both
in Record Group 234, Records of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation/EHFA, Box 15, National Archives (hereafter cited as
RG 2 34, RFC/EHFA, Box #).
There are histories of numerous utility companies that
detail their marketing techniques. An excellent early example
and a more recent work are, Nicholas B. Wainwright, History of
the Philadelphia Electric Company. 1881-1961
.
(Philadelphia,
Philadelphia Electric Company, 1961) and Craig Wollner,
Electrifying Eden. Portland General Electric. 1889-1965
(Portland, Oregon Historical Society Pres, 1990) . For
international comparisons, see Fleming, Power at Cost. Ontario
Hydro and Rural Electrification ; and William Luckin, Questions of
Power. Energy and the Environment in Interwar Britain
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989)
.
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range of normal utility propaganda. m a late-1933 memo to
the President, Lilienthal outlined his plan to mobilize the
resources of all possible government agencies on behalf of
the TVA. He argued that,
the Government has open to it avenues for the moving
of public opinion not properly available to private
enterprises. Whereas it was improper for the
utilities to use the school system for their
promotional purposes, it is entirely appropriate for a
non-profit governmental agency to use the school
system, the agricultural agencies... to facilitate the
social objectives of this program.
At a joint TVA-EHFA board meeting, H.A. Morgan strongly
supported his associate's proposal, stating that "what we
must have— and right down to the elementary schools, is
education for recovery." Under the direction of Eloise
Davison, a staff of home economists designed training
courses for domestic science teachers in the use of
electric appliances, complete with suggestions on
incorporating these advances into their curriculum. The
twin Authorities also produced a textbook for college home
economics classes. While Lilienthal insisted that the
book's content should be "strictly educational," this did
not rule out imprinting the book with the TVA-EHFA emblem
as well as a statement of the agencies' advantages and
objectives. "Education for recovery," it seems, was an
expansive pedagogy.^
^Memorandum, Lilienthal to Franklin D. Roosevelt, n.d. (ca.
late 1933), Lilienthal papers. Box 60; Notes on Meeting of Board
of Directors, 17 November 1934, and, Lilienthal to George D.
Munger, Commercial Manager of the EHFA, 30 May 1934, both in RG
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Along with his control of the promotional efforts,
Lilienthal also launched into public speaking. with only
brief interruptions, this tour ran continuously during his
13-year tenure at the agency. He stumped up and down the
valley, at village crossroads and in city banquet halls,
speaking before virtually any audience that would have him-
- chambers of commerce, farm groups, PTAs. He lectured
nationally, before the League of Women Voters among other
organizations, and over the airwaves from the studios of
the major radio networks. These engagements were the most
immediate st-p in the campaign because Lilienthal could go
out on the stump before the Authority's infrastructure was
in place. However, his long-term commitment to personal
public appearances reflects much more. On a personal
level, Lilienthal obviously enjoyed the attention that his
speeches garnered and slowly insinuated his own presence
into the public identification of the Authority's power
program. This identification served not only to magnify
his role and importance within the agency; the speechmaking
also gave him the broadest autonomy for imprinting his
specific vision upon the TVA. In so doing, Lilienthal
created the popular perception that his goals and those of
the TVA were identical.
234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15. As will be noted in Chapter 5, the TVA
directors sat as the board of the EHFA until the latter agency
was restructured during 1935-1936.
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As with its methods, the TVA derived much of its
rhetoric from the most traditional and widely-held
representations of electricity. Where the railroads and
the telegraph had once reigned as the guarantors of the
nation's progress, knitting the countryside together and
enabling the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny, electric
power stood as the latest incarnation of a technological
engine driving social change. with electricity's myriad of
actual and possible applications, its various promoters
proclaimed a new age at home, on the farm, and in the
factory. Historians such as Ruth Schwartz Cowan and David
Nye have explored this terrain, detailing both the rhetoric
and the reality of America's romance with electrical
technology. Employing a common vocabulary that spread more
quickly than any district's power lines, electricity's
adherents portrayed it as the perfect servant— silent and
unseen, yet ready at the flip of a switch; tireless and
wholly malleable, ready to be turned from one task to
another at the whim of its user.*^
Electricity was a servant, a slave, or, often enough,
a genii. A Woman's Home Companion article from 1935 echoed
the formulaic framework of these pronouncements in its
"Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Work for Mother. The Ironies of
Household Technolocfy from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New
York, Basic Books, 1984) ; and David E. Nye, Electrifying America.
Social Meanings of A New Technology. 1880-1940 (Cambridge, MIT
Press, 1992)
.
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description, noting, "all the Aladdin of the Arabian Nights
had to do,"
was rub his lamp and a formidable genie arrived
I?f • ^ ^''^^^h °^ P^^ss a button andelectricity will perform miracles which make Aladdin'spowerful genie look to his laurels.
These characterizations cut across national boundaries.
Britain's quasi-public Electrical Development Association
churned out numerous promotional pieces during the interwar
period, including the 1919 "Letter of a Householder" that
described "Miss Electricity" as a "Good General Servant
always ready and willing to perform work without bother or
fuss... who never sulked or failed when important occasions
arose." Much of the literature was an awkward mix of
roseate but ill-defined sketches of the impending Electric
Age and detailed instructional vignettes on the latest in
electrical gadgetry.''
Lilienthal invoked this refrain throughout his years
at the Valley Authority. Speaking to a national radio
audience in May 1934, the power chief promised his
listeners "electricity can bring into even the most modest
home tireless servants. It can banish much of the drudgery
of the home and the farms." In TVA; Democracy on the
March, Lilienthal mixed the various metaphors with little
regard for grammatical decorum. Outlining the agency's
Helen McKee, "All the Comforts of Home," Woman ' s Home
Companion 62 (February 1935), p. 16; the EDA pamphlet is quoted
in, Luckin, Questions of Power , p. 28.
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massive expansion of generating capacity, he gave his third
chapter the title, "Twelve Billion Genii," then went on to
describe each of those twelve billion kilowatt hours of
current as "a modern slave, working tirelessly for men."
As others had for England and metropolitan America,
Lilienthal promised bold change for the social landscape in
the Tennessee Valley.^
In a somewhat ironic twist to the portrayal of
electric power as the ever-present slave or servant,
Lilienthal 'and other power proponents often described the
current as an egalitarian technology. Electricity
responded to the demands of individuals, democratically
alleviating burdens across class or region. Arthur E.
Kennelly, for many decades a leader in the electrical
engineering profession and a fervent popularizer of the
medium, explained the current's inherently democratic pulse
in a 1929 Scribner's article; "any electric distribution
system,
"
supplying a large number of dwellings with the power
they require, exists from moment to moment, day and
nite (sic)
, as an organization in obedience to the
wishes of the communities as expressed through their
switches
.
^Lilienthal, Transcript of the Address on NBC Radio Network,
delivered at Washington, D.C., 21 May 1934, Lilienthal Papers,
Box 18; TVA: Democracy on the March , p. 17. Feeding the postwar
boom in domestic and military-industrial consumption, TVA's
investment in increased capacity continued after the war. In the
revised edition published in 1953 for the book's 10th
anniversary, Lilienthal had to increase the number of genii to 18
billion. Unless otherwise noted all references to Democracy on
the March are made to the original 1944 edition.
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Electricity's reputedly democratic response to any demand
was enhanced by the system's ability to reach into any
home. The capacity of alternating current systems to
transmit power over substantial distances, far from the
point of production, was integral to its democratic format.
"Electricity is the most humane and most efficient form of
energy," Lilienthal wrote, "it is mobility itself: It can
be brought to the people."'
When Lilienthal hailed electricity as silent servant
and democratic force he was echoing some very well-worn
themes. But extending this rhetoric to the TVA allowed the
power director to place the agency in a common context.
The TVA was new to the area, with a relatively unique
administrative structure and a controversial agenda, but
its commitment to liberation through technology located the
Authority in familiar terrain. Lilienthal understood the
need for familiarity when he hired a Madison Avenue
advertising firm. Young and Rubicam, as consultants on the
TVA-EHFA promotional campaign. The firm suggested some
fairly standard, and thus familiar, sales techniques, and
also designed the agencies' symbol: a blue fist grasping a
bolt of red lightning, with "TVA and "Electricity For All"
detailed in block red letters. Design historian John
Mendenhall observes that many corporations used lightning
^Arthur E. Kennelly, "Electricity in the Household,"
Scribner's Magazine , 85 (April 1929): p. 452; Lilienthal, TVA:
Democracy on the March , p. 55.
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bolts, noting that in the 1930s, no trademark "was as
popular as the stylized lightning bolt.... A fist grasping
a lightning bolt, a physical impossibility, was the perfect
visualization of man's conquering the elements." The
emblem became ubiquitous across the valley. On the front
of the building that housed the twin agencies' display room
in Chattanooga, the emblem pulsed out its message in
flashing neon-lit colors, with the lightning bolt, "TVA"
and an added "EHFA" flashing on and off in sequence.
At the TVA, the design served two purposes. First,
the familiarity of the lightning bolt located the TVA
within the broad mainstream of American commerce; this
flashing spectacle that beckoned people into sales displays
would have been equally at home along any of the Main
Street commercial districts in the country. Second,
however, the emblem's slogan intimated that TVA's
technological and commercial policies were geared toward a
distinctive goal; "Electricity For All" was not a message
hurled from the lightning bolt logos of corporations such
as Zenith, RCA, and Emerson Electric. The message also
differed from the NRA's Blue Eagle, whose talons clutched
lightning bolts along with gears. The TVA put the power in
the people's hands, rather than leaving it in the grasp of
an eagle— the symbol of the American state. With the TVA
as their tool, the American people could indeed achieve the
impossible; the most humble citizen could control the
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thunderbolts that were once the exclusive property of a
privileged fewJ°
Some familiarity was important, for Lilienthal moved
from the common to the novel when he described the special
mission at the TVA. He believed that much of electricity's
revolutionary potential was undercut by the greed and
short-sighted policies of private utilities. Inflated rate
structures and underfunded rural electrification programs
constricted the flow of power to the people. Power could
not be democratic if it was unaffordable or unavailable.
During speeches that first summer and fall at the new
agency, Lilienthal was constantly heralding "the very
beginning of the power age. In my judgment,"
we have not yet begun to tap the possibilities of the
use of power as a means of increasing the income of
our people and of lightening the burdens which fall so
heavily on them.
Supporters in the press joined in these proto-keynesian
proclamations. "The air is full of talk about the coming
of an ^economy of abundance,'" one reporter speculated.
"But the TVA offers us our first chance to see, in American
terms, what this may actually mean."^^
^°John Mendenhall, Symbols of Power and Progress. American
Trademarks. 1930 to 1950 (New York, Art Direction Book Co.,
1983), no pagination. I am indebted to David Nye's Electrifying
America for the citation to this work.
^^Lilienthal , "A New National Conservation Policy," Address
before the International Congress of Women, Chicago, Illinois, 18
July 1933, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18; Paul Hutchinson,
"Revolution by Electricity. The Significance of the Tennessee
Valley Experiment," Scribner's Magazine 96 (October 1934), p.
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TO usher in this new age, Lilienthal insisted that his
agency must preside over a sharp break with the past
practices of the private firms. For too long, he claimed,
the financial chicanery of prominent utility magnates such
as Samuel Insull, described by Lilienthal as "the leading
citizen of Greece" after fleeing the country to avoid
prosecution for the misdeeds of his holding companies, had
stymied the realization of electricity's full promise, "is
it any wonder," Lilienthal then asked, "that the people are
determined to maintain the most vigilant public control of
this liberating force?" Many TVA supporters launched
similar attacks on Insull and the private utilities,
berating these "financial exploiters... [who] gave little
heed to the real function of the industry in which they had
chosen to carry on their schemes of lurid high finance."
200.
As noted in the introduction to this study, I do not use
keynesianism and proto-keynesianism in any strict doctrinal
sense. Instead, I borrow the formulation from the work of Peter
Friedlander, and subsequently from that of Steve Eraser and
Carlos Pabon. As such, the terms describe an ideological
framework centered upon the use of fiscal policy and regulatory
mechanisms to foster consumption-driven economic growth. I will
at times also employ the term "fordism" in very similar
circumstances, but generally use the latter when I am most
concerned with issues of industrial production typified by high
output and low per-unit profit margins, and the linkage of mass
production to consumption.
See Eraser, Labor Will Rule. Sidney Hillman and the Rise of
American Labor (New York, Eree Press, 1991) and "The 'Labor
Question'" in. Eraser and Gary Gerstle, eds.. The Rise and Fall
of the New Deal Order. 1930-1980 (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1989), pp. 55-84; Friedlander, "The Origins of the Welfare
State;" and, Pabon, "Regulating Capitalism." For more on these
issues, see chapter 5 below, esp. fn. 11.
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For regions of the country that had no Tennessee Valley
Authority, the vigilance necessary to protect the people
from the financiers- primitivism had to be embodied in more
aggressive regulatory oversight. In the valley, the TVA
would implement direct public control. Lilienthal
maintained that the TVA's role was to break down the
various barriers to greater prosperity— making electricity
available, affordable, and thus, democratic . ''^
As Lilienthal continued to sharpen this vision of
TVA's role, he began to shape a special definition for TVA
electricity. As David Nye has suggested, "the public
encountered electrification in many guises. It was a
political issue, an element of spectacle, a means of
transportation, a motive force, and a source of profit."
Through the 1920s, the private sector was the "most
organized and self-conscious group dealing with
electricity," and its portrayal of electricity rested on
the primacy of kilowatt as commodity. In his speeches and
writing, Lilienthal wrested the initiative away from the
utilities. The electrical revolution that they prophesied
was interwoven within the broader myth linking material
progress and individual freedom to the organizational
^^Lilienthal , Untitled Address delivered to the Rotary and
Exchange Clubs, and the Chamber of Commerce, Nashville,
Tennessee, 7 November 193 3, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18; Marquis
Childs, The Farmer Takes a Hand. The Electric Power Revolution in
Rural America (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1952),
p. 43 .
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revolution of corporate capitalism. The Depression had
done much to unravel that tapestry, and Lilienthal sought
to legitimate the TVA's power program by redefining
democratic access to those kilowatts as a public good.
While the marketplace might satisfactorily allocate private
commodities, the vagaries of the invisible hand could not
guarantee a just distribution of public goods. A public
asset required public control; in this case, that control
was the TVA.''^
By the early 1930s, state regulation of the electric
power industry was well-established. Along with gas,
telecommunications, and water companies, electricity was a
"public utility," and a "natural monopoly," which
necessitated regulatory oversight as a substitute for the
self-regulation of the marketplace. However, Lilienthal
moved beyond this notion. He argued that electricity was
more than a public utility— it was a socially vital good
or service. The good produced by a privately-owned utility
was still, in essence, a private commodity; its vital
nature made it particularly subject to regulation, but the
product was ultimately private. Electricity, in his view,
was not a private commodity but a natural resource, owned
by the people as common wealth. The public, through its
administrative instrument, the state, could contract with
the private sector for the development of the country's
13Nye, Electrifying America , pp. 138, 142.
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natural resources; the resource itself remained a public
asset.
Lilienthal did not delve deeply into the philosophical
justifications for his rhetorical turn. As a policy-maker
and administrator, he rarely looked toward the metaphysical
for his rationale. Nor did he rely on his legal training.
Certainly there would be several legal challenges to the
constitutionality of the agency, but those battles were yet
to come, and ultimately rested on matters such as the
courts' interpretation of interstate commerce and the
mundane technicalities of who had the legal standing
necessary to sue TVA. Lilienthal was trying to build a
popular base of support for the agency's power program,
explaining the TVA's low rates as the means toward a
greater end
— democratizing an important public resource.
In "A New National Conservation Policy," an address
delivered in July 1933, Lilienthal first discussed at
length the TVA's plans to control soil erosion, long a
target of resource protection measures, and then moved on
to electricity. "In the President's plan for the
development of the Tennessee Valley," he stated, "there is
another principal natural resource— electric power. The
Valley Authority," he continued
is directed to make experimentations and studies to
develop this national resource of electric power as a
means of taking from the backs of men and women in the
Valley some of their ancient and arduous burdens.
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Lilienthal continued to use this analogy with the soil,
noting the following year that "next to the soil itself,"
electricity is America's greatest heritage. The TVA
and other Federal agencies are under a solemn duty to
see to It that this great natural resource of
electricity shall yield its full measure of benefitsto the people of the country.
The integral bond between conservation and rational
development of natural resources would not have been new to
Lilienthal 's thinking. At the core of the Progressive
tradition out of which he had emerged, from his days as an
adolescent Bull Mooser to his years as a Frankfurter
protege at Harvard, was the belief in the planned use of
the land and other resources.
The natural resource analogy operated on multiple
levels. Lilienthal tapped into many Americans' fundamental
attachment to the land as a symbol of the country's unique
mission, adding electricity to the sources of innate wealth
that blessed the nation. But he also touched on the
widespread unease regarding the misuse and possible
exhaustion of the soil. The fertile topsoil flushed into
the nation's rivers, or blown across the Dust Bowl bespoke
the squandering of that resource, and illustrated the need
for vigorous national stewardship to protect the common
^'^Lilienthal , "A New National Conservation Policy," and,
Address on NBC Radio Network, 21 May 1934, both in Lilienthal
Papers, Box 18. Regarding the idea of conservation and its
relation to development, see, Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and
the Gospel of Efficiencv. The Progressive Conservation Movement.
1890-1920 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959) .
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wealth. During the Depression, this steady erosion of the
soil also seemed to mirror a broader degradation of
America's economic initiative. The TVA would help reverse
this vitiation of both land and economy, Lilienthal
claimed, by carrying on "a resolute, uncompromising and
intelligent war upon insecurity— insecurity of livelihood,
insecurity of resources." For Lilienthal, the Authority's
control of electric power was just one step toward "the
fuller and better balanced development of the resources of
the region," that would lead to the resurgence of a more
vital economic culture.
To democratize its electrical resources, Lilienthal
had to transform the region's power system, but this effort
involved no substantial changes to the power itself. After
all, TVA current alternated along the regional power lines
at the same number of cycles as did private power.
Lilienthal believed that what distinguished his agency's
power from other utilities, what made it democratic, were
the institutional components of the TVA's electrical
network. "The methods of democratic development
represented by the TVA are distinctive," he wrote. "They
are methods that differ from those customarily employed
both by private enterprisers and public agencies."
^^Lilienthal , "A New National Conservation Policy." On the
Dust Bowl phenomenon and the idea of the soil as a cultural
symbol, see, Donald Worster, Dust Bowl; The Southern Plains in
the 1930s (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979)
.
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Lilienthal took care to emphasize that these departures
were profoundly revolutionary but not in any sense
Bolshevik. "Their roots lie deep in the soil of American
tradition.... it [the TVA] required no change in the
Constitution of the United States. Congress has maintained
full control. Property rights and social institutions have
undergone no drastic amendment." still, the Authority's
production and distribution structures stood in stark
contrast to those of the giant holding companies and their
operating subsidiaries. Llewellyn Evans's revolutionary
rate format further altered TVA power. With cheap rates,
electricity would cease to be a luxury item. It was social
rather than technical artifacts that made this public power
unique
.
In TVA: Democracy on the March . Lilienthal outlined
two "essential principles" for the TVA's success. The
first principle was that the TVA recognized that "resource
development must be governed by the unity of nature
herself." Explaining how the agency's production
techniques differed from those of its private rivals,
Lilienthal insisted that the TVA produced its hydroelectric
power as part of a unified program for regional
development. Economic, human, and natural resources were
integrated into what Lilienthal termed "a seamless web."
Power generation must not overshadow the need for
16Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March
, p. 7.
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reforestation in the Valley's hills. Cost-cutting measures
in dam design and construction should not override concerns
for worker safety and the need to train a technical
workforce for the region. Power engineers and public
health staff had to reconcile daily demand for power with
mosquito control that was achieved by a quick and therefore
electrically-wasteful release of reservoir water.
Unfettered by the profit motive, the TVA did not have to
answer to a holding company's bond and stockholders, who
might disregard the social costs of "exhausted land,
butchered forests, polluted streams, and industrial
ugliness." Unlike other federal projects, the TVA
controlled all aspects of development, and did not have
competing bureaucracies undermining its holistic
approach.
The second principle was that the TVA employed
"democratic methods, by the active daily participation of
the people themselves." These democratic methods were held
aloft by two pillars— first, the TVA's practice of
decentralized administration, Lilienthal and H.A. Morgan's
much-vaunted "Democracy at the Grass Roots;" second, the
TVA's reliance upon the incipient rural electric
cooperatives and municipal power systems for its
distribution network. Heralding a new kind of federal
^^Lilienthal , TVA; Democracy on the March , p. 6, and Chapter
7.
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agency, Lilienthal believed that the TVA was more
responsive to the citizenry because its administrative and
policy-making machinery resided in the Valley, not in
Washington. if the strengths of the federal regulatory
apparatus could be linked with the intimacy of local
control, then, Lilienthal claimed, "the experience in this
valley laboratory in democratic methods takes on unusual
meaning." if this notion of grass roots democracy faded in
later years, during its first years this idealized approach
permeated almost all of the agency's rhetoric.
The TVA's close relationship with municipally-owned
utilities and rural co-ops was, for Lilienthal, emblematic
of how a democratic power system nurtured a participatory
citizenry. Lilienthal took great pride in the rural co-
operatives established in conjunction with the TVA, which
set the standard for the national program undertaken by the
Rural Electrification Administration. Among the first
consumers of TVA power were the municipal system in the
town of Tupelo, Mississippi, and that state's Alcorn County
Electric Co-operative. The ties to the "muni's" and co-ops
made TVA power special. Perhaps rehearsing for one of his
many speeches, Lilienthal wrote in his journal,
there is somehow a magic about TVA kilowatts.... To
have the form of organization whereby electricity is
^^Lilienthal , TVA; Democracy on the March , p. 138, see also,
chpts. 9 and 15; See Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots , passim,
for a deeply critical assessment of the dissonance between the
rhetoric and the reality of the grass-roots approach.
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brought to them through the beginning of cooperativeactivity in which they participate is really anaccomplishment. That I feel is what is actuary going
Lilienthal was genuinely inspired by the earnest spirit he
felt whenever he attended co-op business functions. "i
have been at such meetings where throughout a whole day as
many as two thousand farmers and their wives and children
discussed the financial and operating reports made to them
by their superintendent and board of trustees," he later
recalled.
These meetings were social gatherings as well.
Following a break for a barbecue lunch, the co-op sponsored
demonstrations of new appliances and farm equipment, and
cook-offs offering up the tastiest products from electric
kitchens. As Lilienthal described them, "these membership
'town meetings' are not simply business sessions. They
have an emotional overtone, a spiritual meaning to people
who were so long denied the benefits of modern energy and
convenience." In Lilienthal 's estimation, it was the
institutional components of the system, and the people who
forged them, that gave TVA kilowatts their "magic. "^°
^'Lilienthal, Journals, I, pp. 52-53; TVA; Democracy on the
March, p. 21.
Describing the TVA's work in Tupelo, Lilienthal described
the town as, "the remarkable little city of Tupelo. Tupelo will
be known to history as the place where the average man and woman
first made full use of electricity." In fact, Tupelo is
internationally acclaimed, not for its use of TVA power, but
rather as the hometown of the rock-n-roll star Elvis Presley.
^^Lilienthal , TVA; Democracy on the March
, p. 22.
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The Authority's rate-making revolution completed the
creation of democratic kilowatts. The low rates were the
cornerstone of TVA power policy, and the centerpiece of
Lilienthal's promotional efforts. Whenever he discussed
cheap electricity, Lilienthal skillfully integrated popular
symbols of class and gender into a public power narrative
that had Franklin Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the TVA as
the central characters. in a radio speech during early
1934, Lilienthal pulled together all of these elements.
"Some years ago," he told his radio audience,
when Franklin Roosevelt was a candidate for Governor
of New York, he urged strenuously the importance of
lower rates and power development.... His opponents
tried to poke fun at this program, by saying that
Roosevelt wanted to put a waffle iron in every
farmhouse. The women of upstate New York saw nothing
funny about the program at all, and voted
accordingly.... Electric appliances are just as
appropriate in the humble household as in the home of
wealth. A love of home and a pride in that home is,
by no means, a special possession of any group.
In the space of a few sentences, neatly arranged,
Lilienthal laid out the TVA vision of electricity's
domestic potential. Until rates came down, electricity was
a luxury item, the "special possession" of the affluent.
This action required the intervention of the state,
personified by Roosevelt, to make power widely available
and bring it into every "humble household" in upstate New
York— and the Tennessee Valley. "The housewives of this
country use an amazingly small quantity of electricity...
[They are] still barred from the almost limitless
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advantages of this great natural resource.... it is part of
the job of the Tennessee Valley Authority to see that this
condition should not continue." Lilienthal disarmed the
agency's opponents by giving their critique a class bias,
and noting that the voters had gone to the polls and
overwhelmingly endorsed Roosevelt's agenda, first as
governor and later as president. ^1
Lilienthal envisioned his democratic kilowatts
relieving women of myriad difficult tasks. His fervent
belief in electricity's potential is best reflected in the
fact that his private correspondence brims with the same
pronouncements found in his public addresses. "Women who
have stood over hot coal or wood ranges during these
blistering summers," he wrote to Felix Frankfurter, "are
now working on cool kitchens with electric ranges; electric
refrigerators and electric hot water heaters have added
greatly to the decencies of life." However, the TVA power
chief did not intend that electricity would liberate women
from their domestic sphere. Instead, it would perhaps
lighten their burdens and allow women to find their true
potential within the home. With their burdens eased, women
Lilienthal, "The Electrification of the American Home,"
Address on CBS Radio Network from WJSV, Washington, D.C., 20
January 1934, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.
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could transform the home into the idyllic haven it was
meant to be.^^
Nonetheless, Lilienthal shared this vision with many
of his contemporaries, of both sexes. A Women's Hnm^
Companion article promised women that
scientists, manufacturers, engineers and architects
are all conspiring to make the home a more comfortableplace to live and to help women put all the good old
epigrams about their work never being done down thelatest and most efficient model of an incinerator once
and for all.
Eleanor Roosevelt urged Lilienthal forward, telling him
that "if it is possible to make life easier for women in
the home, it will mean much not only for their health, but
also in the leisure time they will be able to devote to
their children." For many women, the material advantages
of electricity did bring welcome relief. In a press
release announcing the TVA's power contracts with Lee and
Alcorn county co-ops in Mississippi, Lilienthal told the
story of a farm women's expectations for electricity. When
it was "facetiously suggested that she would now be able to
use an electric iron to curl her hair," she replied "^No.
The first thing I intend to do is to install an electric
pump to bring running water into my kitchen. That is
something I have wanted all my life." The woman of the
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, 7 August 1934, Lilienthal
Papers, Box 63.
The best overviews of these issues are. Cowan, More Work for
Mother, and Susan Strasser, Never Done: A History of American
Housework (New York, Pantheon Books, 1982)
.
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story may be fictive, especially given the close
resemblance to the above-mentioned narrative of upstate New
York women. The essential truth of the Mississippi woman's
message, however, is undeniable. Electricity lightened
many burdens, and women welcomed power into their homes,
even if it did not necessarily free them from either their
labors or the domestic sphere.
While Lilienthal accepted cultural norms regarding
domesticity and gender with little reflection, he also
encouraged specific efforts by women's groups to carve
space within the public sphere. In part, this meant
affirming women's right to a voice if only to speak as the
guardians of the home. In an April 1934 speech to the
national meeting of the League of Women Voters, he stated,
"as women of America, individually, you are the most
important of all users of electricity— the users of
electricity in the home." But Lilienthal went beyond that
limited construct, and accorded women a legitimate role in
the broader political world as well. During the 1920s, the
League supported George Norris's efforts to keep the Muscle
Shoals plant in the public domain, and into the New Deal it
remained a strong backer of the TVA. Acknowledging this
support, Lilienthal recognized that women's influence
^^Helen McKee, "All the Comforts of Home," Woman's Home
Companion , 62 (February 1935), p. 16; Eleanor Roosevelt to
Lilienthal, 14 July 1934; Lilienthal, "Statement for Chattanooga
News," n.d. (ca. December 1933), Lilienthal Papers, Boxes 63 and
62, respectively.
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reached beyond the traditional scope of home and family.
"As a group of women," Lilienthal told them, "united to
take part in the political life of the city, state, and
nation, you have an immediate and direct interest in the
community control of public utilities." As individuals,
they were women, with all of the domestic implications of
that gender— able to enjoy a better life because of
government action that would bring down power rates and
revolutionize their the homes; as an aggregate, however,
they were an interest group that could help legitimate the
TVA's program. 2^
Ultimately, Lilienthal foresaw the TVA's low rates
transforming the entire region. Farms and factories would
prosper alongside well-kept electric homes. As in the
home, electricity would ease certain tasks, spur
productivity, and usher in the age of plenty. George Fort
Milton, editor of the Chattanooga News and a strident
backer of Lilienthal 's TVA, believed that the agency's
cheap power could help push the entire region out of its
chronic economic dependency. He wrote, "the Tennessee
basin has caught the imagination of the nation's engineers
and statesmen. It is, indeed, the American Ruhr." High-
wage jobs in energy-intensive industries such aluminum and
chemical manufacturing would spur economic growth and pull
'^^Lilienthal , Address to the League of Women Voters, Boston,
Massachusetts, 24 April 1934, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.
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the region out its long, dark age of dependency and
underdevelopment. These industries would not be alien
intrusions into the valley's environment; rather, they
would be the logical and organic culmination of the area's
development, as the human, mineral, and electrical
resources attained rational fulfillment. This fordist
vision promised a future without limits. Economic growth
and the egalitarian implications of material abundance
would usher in a new social order. "Added leisure and
comfort, lighter and briefer tasks," an EHFA-TVA pamphlet
proclaimed, "a merging of all classes of American people
in a common understanding and a common well-being, such are
the benefits of electricity." But Lilienthal constantly
reiterated that none of this could happen unless the TVA
was able to rationally and democratically develop the
region's power resources. To this end, he had to locate
the Authority as one component in the New Deal's
restructuring of the nation's faltering economic system.
Simply linking the TVA to the president and his New
Deal was a relatively easy task. During his campaign,
Roosevelt had placed conservation and utility reform high
on his agenda, proclaiming in an oft-cited speech in
Portland, Oregon, that a judicious mix of federal
regulation and public power projects would "prevent
^^George Fort Milton, "Dawn for the Tennessee Valley,"
Review of Reviews 87 (June 1933), p. 33; EHFA-TVA, Untitled
Pamphlet, n.d. (ca. Fall 1934) RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15.
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extortion against the public and... encourage the wider use
of that servant of the people—electric power." m late
January 1933 the president-elect continued to give this
policy a high profile when he invited George Norris to
accompany him on a tour through the Tennessee Valley.
Passage of the TVA Act as part of the early legislative
flurry that would soon bear the moniker "The First 100
Days," made it clear to contemporary observers that the new
agency was a centerpiece of Roosevelt's New Deal. Given
this prominence, there seemed to be little required of
Lilienthal.26
Despite the apparent ease of his task, Lilienthal
never missed an opportunity to associate the TVA,
Roosevelt's New Deal, and the Democratic party. He was
becoming increasingly acute at sighting the public
relations angles, frequently resorting to the hard-sell
maxim of commercial advertisers: link TVA to Roosevelt, and
Cheap Power to Prosperity often enough and their public
images will be fused. It was this strategy that resulted
in Lilienthal 's canned speeches referring to Roosevelt's
long-standing support for cheap power since his New York
gubernatorial days. As a progressive Republican from the
midwest, Lilienthal also carefully modulated his message
^^Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses ,
complied by S.I. Rosenman (need vol. and pg. cite for Portland
speech) ; on the January 1933 trip, see, Richard Lowitt, George W
Norris. The Persistence of a Progressive, 1913-1933 (Urbana,
University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 576-569.
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for his Southern audience. Although the easternmost
reaches of the TVA's potential territory was hill country
that had a proud tradition of insurgencies against the
Democracy, Lilienthal's political and power markets lay in
a region that was overwhelmingly dominated by the
Democratic party. Thus, when Lilienthal did broaden his
scope beyond Roosevelt, he chose his icons carefully. in
one of his frequent attacks on the "propaganda activities"
of the utilities, Lilienthal charged that, left unchecked,
the private pov/er magnates "would have destroyed the
American system of democracy which Jefferson and Jackson
established." Arriving as an outsider, the power director
quickly familiarized himself with the region's rhetoric.
Yet Lilienthal was not merely tying the Authority to
the coattails of the New Deal. While the TVA drew much of
its initial strength from its close identification with the
popular chief executive, Lilienthal intended to refract the
glow of this reflected glory, using the success of the TVA
as a means to strengthen certain ideological tendencies
within the multifaceted New Deal. In short, Lilienthal saw
the TVA as a wedge opening up the gates to a more rigorous
and inclusive federal regulatory apparatus while also
fostering the growth of an aggregate demand-driven economy.
The TVA would not be the staging point for the "creeping
"^'Lilienthal, Nashville speech, 7 November 1933 , Lilienthal
Papers, Box 18.
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socialism" about which its critics so often warned. Like
his close ally Morris Cooke, Lilienthal did not advocate
universal state ownership of any industry. instead, he
believed that more effective regulation would force the
private sector to be more responsible. The TVA served not
so much as a yardstick, but rather as a "birch rod," with
the threat of further state ownership complementing
enhanced government oversight to compel good behavior from
business.^®
How Lilienthal justified public utility regulation
reveals how he viewed the TVA as a wedge for broader
intervention. Most people understood and accepted some
form of regulation over the utility industry. The
supposedly unique public value and inherently monopolistic
structure of industries such as power and the common
carriers made them exceptions to the popular idiom of
laissez-faire capitalism. But Lilienthal deemphasized the
issue of utilities as natural monopolies; the relative
immunity of these firms from normal market forces played
little role in Lilienthal 's reasoning. Instead, he chose
28One of many examples of Cooke and Lilienthal 's opposition
to universal state ownership was their exclusion of public power
advocates from their regulatory conference of 1932. See, chpt.
2, above. Also, see Leonard DeGraaf's article on the Giant Power
issue during the 1920s, which quotes Cooke to the effect that he
was less concerned with who owned the utilities, but rather with
"how such properties are managed, no matter who does it." Cooke
to Gifford Pinchot, 11 April 1924, as cited in Degraaf,
"Corporate Liberalism and Electric Power Planning in the 1920s,"
Business History Review 64 (Spring 1990), p. 17.
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to stress the public value and necessity of electric power
as the justification for regulation. "By its very nature,"
Lilienthal argued, "the generation and distribution of
power, whether by private or public agencies, is a public
business, for in our present-day community life we are all
utterly dependent upon that service." Electricity had
become an indispensable service, and the state was
obligated to guarantee that private interests did not
contravene the public good.^'
Using this social necessity argument, Lilienthal began
to make claims that in an increasingly complex economy,
wide sectors of the economy had to be considered equally
indispensable, and thus akin to a public utility. The
utilities were no longer unique, not an aberration, and
should be viewed as the model for more inclusive federal
oversight of the economy. Lilienthal had begun to map out
this strategy while still a utility regulator in Wisconsin.
In his March 1933 speech in Sheboygan (cited in Chapter 2
above), Lilienthal had argued that the president-elect's
anticipated bank reform measures were but one example of
"the tendency toward greater and greater community
regulation of essential business enterprises." The
country's lengthy experience with utility regulation
afforded many lessons, positive and negative, for this
imminent extension of state power. "And so," Lilienthal
29Lilienthal, Nashville speech, 7 November 1933.
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went on, both lecturing and exhorting this meeting of
Sheboygan's local business elite,
when we are thinking of how to improve the regulatorymechanism which we have worked out tentativel^for oL
in"min^
^usmess, the public utility, we should bear
r^ni^t "^^^ely learning toegula e the public utilities.... We are devising atechnique of community control of every business whichdirectly and immediately affects the public well-being.
The Depression had exposed broad faults in laissez-faire
ideology, and Lilienthal was using utility regulation to
bring those faults into sharper public view.^°
Lilienthal argued that corporate capitalism was
increasingly insinuated within the daily life of all
Americans. it was not the government's role to hinder that
expansion, but to modulate its social impact through
careful regulation of large-scale firms. Here, Lilienthal
reflected his intellectual links to A. A. Berle's advocacy
of responsible corporate management, and reaching even
further back to Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism.
Lilienthal advocated the creation of a powerful national
regulatory apparatus, very similar to what Martin Sklar
describes as the Republican Roosevelt's vision of "public
service capitalism." This regulatory leviathan would
oversee almost all national enterprise in a manner akin to
the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulation of the
railroads. "Rather than distinguish industry, and the
^•'Lilienthal, Sheboygan speech, 23 March 1933 .
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economy in general, from public service business like
common carriers and public utilities," sklar states, "he
[Roosevelt] argued their similarity and the need to subject
them to similar kinds of comprehensive public
administration." if not in so many words, Lilienthal
likewise envisioned the New Deal's creation of an era of
public service capitalism.
In the Valley, Lilienthal anticipated that low TVA
rates would sell this sweeping expansion of the state's
prerogative. The dramatic surge in consumption of
electricity and the strong support for the agency certainly
indicate that cheap power was a popular policy. It is a
much more difficult proposition, however, to gauge the
3 1 •Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American
Capitalism. 1900-1916 (New York, Cambridge University Press
1988)
, pp. 252, 347-348.
It should be noted that Lilienthal 's acceptance of large-
scale corporate capital as early as 1931-1933 tends to undermine
the longstanding historiographical depiction of him as a "neo-
Brandeisian" who came to accept "big business" more reluctantly
and much later. This portrayal rests largely on the continued
influence of Arthur Schlesinger Jr's. paradigmatic three-volume
work on the New Deal, which (in this matter at least) is deeply-
flawed. As pointed out in Chapters 2 and 3, Lilienthal spanned
that reputedly unbridgeable gap between Felix Frankfurter's cadre
of Harvard Law acolytes and Berle's adherents. See, for
example, Schlesinger' statement, "Lilienthal, a Brandeisian in
1933, ended as the prophet of bigness," in, The Politics of
Upheaval. 1935-1936 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1966)
.
Schlesinger seems to have misinterpreted Lilienthal 's
hostility toward holding company abuses of the late 1920s as a
universal condemnation of the corporate form. This is clearly
not the case. If at some point Frankfurter shed the vestiges of
his support for Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism which he had
backed in 1912, Lilienthal never lost this thread, and in fact
strengthened those ideological ties by working with Berle during
the Wisconsin PSC years.
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public response to the rhetorical meaning Lilienthal
attached to his policy. Although the impact of
Lilienthal 's sales pitch can not be definitively
quantified, it can be explored. From the rolling mountains
of eastern Tennessee to the cotton country south of
Memphis, many people in the Valley believed in the
limitless possibilities of the TVA's democratic kilowatts.
Ultimately, an electric iron or washing machine would not
transform gender or class relations, but such appliances
could be made widely available. Valley folk saw family and
neighbors get jobs with or because of the agency. They
believed that the Authority's electricity brought not only
material progress, but also the promise of a prosperity
they had never known.
Support was not universal. Certainly there was
ambivalence in the valley. Across various cultures,
technology's "Great March of Progress" had normally
elicited concerns ranging from hostility toward the symbols
of change
— machines and factories-- to programmatic
resistance against the agents of the transformations. In
TVA and the Dispossessed
. Michael McDonald and John
Muldowny aptly describe the hostility engendered among the
people of the Norris basin, driven from their homes by the
Authority as it bought up land for reforestation and
reservoirs. Wielding its power of eminent domain
imperiously, the TVA did little to even feign respect for
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the cultural values ol the..-., f^oople, worsening what under
the best ol circumstances would h.wo boon a diff icnt
transformation. The TVA compressed an enormou:; amount ol
economic and social chanqo into a very briol period. it
was perhaps Inevitable that such upheaval war. met with some
hostility. But even as the agency uprooted famiiiQS and
flooded land that held the roots ol poor but very clor-.o-
knit communities, most people in this lar-llun<, km, ion
looked toward the TVA with as much hope a:; appi c-hon: . i (,n .
«
There is scattered, somewhat elusive, evidence that
reveals some of this popular support lor the TVA. David
Nye observes that valley people literally sang the p.,,!;,.:;
of the TVA. "The H.i II ad of the TVA" spread throughout the
region, with people inserting the name ol their own
community into the verses, making it their own sontj .>bouL
the deeply personal impact of this new Authority. Humor,
too, is another folkway that reveals how people felt about
the agency. Using the traditional mission of the
Department of Agriculture as a foil, one common joke asked,
"What are they going to do with all that power when they
get it?" The answer: "Mcjke two bulbs ol (jla:;r. (j I ow whore
only one glee before." The humor demonstrates not only the
cultural reach of the agency, but it also shows that
^'^Michael J. McDonald and John Muldowny, TVA and the
Dispossessed. The Reset tlemen t of Population in t he Norrls Dam
Area (Knoxville, Univeri;ity of Tennessee Press, '\')nA) .
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Lilienthal's productivist gospel was winning many converts.
Cheap power meant greater yields of domestic consumption."
Some of the evidence is more tangible. Speaking on
the floor of the House of Representatives in March 1936,
John Rankin, whose district covered Tupelo and much of
northern and eastern Mississippi, defended the TVA agenda.
Taking a page straight from Lilienthal's texts, he
ridiculed a Republican opponent who had scoffed at the
value of electric appliances. "I should like to see him
bow down over a washtub," Rankin gibed, "and do the family
washing for a few weeks. That would convert him; it would
probably make a Democrat out of him." He read on the House
floor from some of the hundreds of letters that poured into
his office in support of the TVA and cheap power. Again
and again, these letter writers thanked Rankin for his
work; they spoke of new irons, fans, more lights, freedom
from drudgery; finally, they urged him to continue
supporting a cheap power policy. Through the late 1930s,
Rankin was a forceful advocate for the TVA and all of the
New Deal's electrification programs. But he did not cast
his lot with Lilienthal and Morris Cooke out of some deep
and abiding personal loyalty to them, or even due to some
ideological identification with them. He took his stand
because the TVA agenda in these years was indisputably
"Nye, Electrifying America , pp. 313-314; "TVA Sales Plan,"
Business Week
. 23 December 1933, 12.
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popular with his voting (i.e. white) constituents. The
best illustration of this is Rankin's bitter break with the
agency during the 1940s. Running a deeper course through
Rankin and many of his constituents than the philosophy of
cheap power was an unshakable racism. Lilienthal directed
the TVA's modest support for breaking the color barrier in
some of the agency's hiring decisions, which led to vicious
denunciations of the Authority's management by Rankin. As
long as the TVA stood free and clear for low rates,
avoiding even modest challenges to Jim Crow, Rankin was one
of its most enthusiastic backers.
While there are few reliable means for measuring the
public's support of the TVA, it seems clear that the power
program did enjoy some marked popularity. Lilienthal
garnered widespread support for his agenda by tapping into
a popular faith in technology's transformative powers and
identifying TVA current as a unique force. He made low-cost
electricity the rhetorical linchpin of his efforts to
strengthen his hand within the Authority while also
enhancing the profile of the proto-Keynesian elements
within the New Deal. His insistence that the TVA
electricity itself bore some inherently democratic value
reflected Lilienthal 's personal faith in the reformist
^^For one of Rankin's early speeches, see, Congressional
Record . 25 March 1936, pp. 4346-4350; on his later break with
Lilienthal 's management of the TVA, see, Lilienthal, The
Journals
. I, pp. 630, 683.
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political implications of mass consumption. Crafting a
rhetoric of democratic kilowatts, Lilienthal was striving
to forge a vernacular political culture that fostered the
growth of TVA power.
CHAPTER 6
FORGING "A POTENTIAL MASS MARKET:"
THE ELECTRIC HOME AND FARM AUTHORITY,
1932-1935
Lilienthal realized that rhetoric alone would not
protect the Authority from its foes nor sell even a single
kilowatt of electricity. He knew that the agency had to
foster greater demand for power across the region so that
the TVA could justify its hydroelectric production and more
readily acquire territory from the private companies. The
first step toward greater demand was low-cost power and the
agency's fordist reformulation of rate-making methodology.
With rates for electricity maintained at what he described
as a "luxury basis," most people simply could not afford to
increase their power consumption. As Lilienthal
explained in a speech before the American Academy of
Political and Social Science,
the average domestic consumer throughout the
United States uses about 50 KWA of energy a
month, which is a niggardly and parsimonious use
of a great resource... [because] rates have been
too high to permit the general use of
electricity. As a result of these rates, the use
of electricity has been restricted and has
never. .
.
reached the proportions justified by our
sources of electricity, or by the universal need
and demand for this service.
The situation was particularly acute at the TVA, with
industry estimates of the region's excess power capacity
ranging from 30 to 40 percent. Lilienthal accepted these
claims, but pointed to an unacceptably high rate structure
as the chief culprit for the surplus. The burden of proof.
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however, did not rest with the private firms; it lay with
Lilienthal and his power staff.
Lilienthal quickly realized that the high cost of
electricity was only part of the problem. Even if rates
came down to acceptable levels, most people did not have
the load-building appliances needed to consume that
affordable electricity. As with electric rates, appliance
prices rested on a luxury basis, he believed, and such
luxury prices were choking off further growth. With the
sales of high-priced models, Lilienthal claimed,
manufacturers had only "skimmed the cream" off the
appliance market. Without more appliances in more homes,
the TVA would have no market for its power. The result, for
Lilienthal, placed the TVA's power program in a double
bind. The utility and appliance industries would not lower
rates and prices until consumer demand grew. Consumers
could not use more power until both rates and appliance
prices fell. As Lilienthal declared in his American
Academy speech, "here we have a picture of a complete
business stalemate."^
^Lilienthal, Draft Copy of "Philadelphia Speech," December
30, 1933, p. 4, DEL Papers, Box 62; reprinted as "Business and
Government in the Tennessee Valley," in Towards National
Recovery
. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 172(March, 1934): 45-49. For a general survey of
TVA's relations with the power industry, see, McCraw, TVA and the
Power Fight .
^"TVA Appliances," Business Week , March 17, 1934, pp.
10-11; Lilienthal, "Philadelphia Speech," p. 5.
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In the fall of 1933, facing formidable market barriers
to the distribution of TVA power, Lilienthal developed a
proposal for a federal finance agency that would provide
low-interest loans directly to consumers for the purchase
of electric appliances. The agency he envisioned would
work through private as well as publicly-owned utilities,
attracting the cooperation of the private sector with the
promise of greater load offered in exchange for lower
rates. First outlined in a letter to Presidential assistant
Marvin Mclntyre, Lilienthal argued that the proposed agency
would not only provide political relief for the TVA, it
would also serve as a mechanism for national economic
recovery by generating much needed consumer purchasing.
Appliance manufacturers would step up production and put
people back to work. Industrial suppliers would have new
orders to fill. Local commerce would enjoy a renewed vigor
as sales increased. For Lilienthal, the beauty of such a
program was that it could serve the TVA's political goals
while at the same time aiding the New Deal's recovery
effort.^
During the winter of 1933-1934, Lilienthal began
moving forward with his proposal in late 1933. He turned
for advice to two close associates, the social engineer
Morris Llewellyn Cooke and his former boss Donald
^Lilienthal to Marvin Mclntyre, November 21, 1933, DEL
Papers, Box 62; also cited in McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight , p
62 .
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Richberg. Already one of Lilienthal's most steadfast
allies, Cooke expressed immediate support for the proposal,
noting in a letter that the plan seemed "generally
workable." Cooke did add that the agency might have
problems persuading most private utilities to lower their
rates. "m the Tennessee Valley of course you have them
[the utilities] backed up against the wall. But take
Minnesota and the Dakotas," he wrote,
you will probably only get a pitying look from
the service company when you begin to talk thekind of rates you have in mind.^
Cooke continued to wield great influence; as head of the
Rural Electrification Administration (RA)
, Cooke would
become a director of the new finance agency in 1935-1936.
As the general counsel for the NRA and a close advisor
to the president, Richberg was well-situated and able to
ensure that the proposal of his former junior associate got
a fair hearing within the administration. Lilienthal wanted
the President to establish the finance agency by executive
order and fund it through the $3.3 billion appropriated
under Title II of the NIRA. Lilienthal hoped that this
maneuver was possible, in part so that he could capture
some of that $3.3 billion before it was exhausted, but also
because he wished to circumvent Congress, where his program
Morris L. Cooke to Lilienthal, December 11, 1933, Cooke
Papers, FDRPL, Box 53, Folder 23.
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"would be sterilized by extensive legislative hearings.
Having helped draft the NIRA and then steer it through
Congress, Richberg thought that the maneuver was possible,
but he knew that Lilienthal would need to cultivate a base
of political support in order for Roosevelt to authorize
the agency's creation.
Richberg quickly arranged a meeting between Lilienthal
and Gerard Swope, the influential head of General Electric
and a member of the NRA's Industrial Advisory Board. In
early December, 1933, Lilienthal met with Swope and
explained his plan. A well-known advocate of cooperative
ties between business and government, and a wily
entrepreneur who recognized the possibility of opening up
previously untapped markets, Swope expressed immediate
interest in the project. Having supported industrial
rationalization through an expansion of trade association
activities during the 1920s, Swope put Lilienthal in touch
with his industry's trade association, The National
Electrical Manufacturers' Association (NEMA) , but Swope
also secured an autonomous link for General Electric by
placing Lilienthal in personal contact with T.K. Quinn,
Vice President of G.E.'s manufacturing division, and
^Lilienthal to Donald Richberg, November 30, 1933, DEL
Papers, Box 62.
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Chairman of the corporation's new credit arm, the General
Electric Contracts Corporation/
Many other manufacturers were initially less
cooperative. They harbored doubts about the profitability
of increased low-end sales, fearing that customers might
turn away from higher-priced models, and they were also
reluctant to enter into such an intimate relationship with
a federal agency the powers of which were not yet clearly
defined. But when Westinghouse joined G.E. in support of
the sales program, the others had to follow, for they could
not risk being cut out of what Business Week described as a
"potential mass market."^ with T.K. Quinn providing
technical advice and examples of private sector finance
plans, Lilienthal drew up a proposal which he presented to
the President in mid-December.
Lilienthal 's proposal reflected both the
characteristic strengths and the flaws of its author.
Diligently constructed with a careful attention to the
possible political ramifications of the program, and
well-stocked with data, the document was also grand in its
vision and extremely optimistic in its assessment of the
new agency's potential economic impact. Along lines
suggested by Quinn, Lilienthal proposed a cooperative
•^Lilienthal to Richberg, November 30, 1933 ; and T.K. Quinn
to Lilienthal, December 4, 1933, DEL Papers, Box 62.
''"TVA Demonstrator," Business Week
.
May 19, 1934, p. 11.
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arrangement among utilities, manufacturers, local appliance
dealers, and the new agency. The manufacturers would
provide dealers and utilities (for most utilities sold
electric appliances at this time) with low-priced,
agency-approved refrigerators, ranges, and hot water
heaters. Participating dealers and utilities would
encourage moderate-income customers to use the EHFA plan,
enticing people to buy with both low prices and the
program's below-market finance rates. The EHFA would
finance the purchase, with a monthly payment added on to
the customer's electric bill. To provide a clear example
of how the agency would work, Lilienthal offered the
President a hypothetical case. "Mrs. John Jones of the
little town of Sparta, Wisconsin, will get the benefit of
this plan," Lilienthal wrote. After hearing of the plan
through news releases and other publicity, Mrs. Jones will
go to her local dealer, and find models produced by "a
well-known manufacturer— [such] as General Electric" and
approved by the new agency. Instead of $100 for
base-priced models, she will find refrigerators for "may be
as low as $35," and easy credit terms. After discovering
that the local utility's rates are also coming down, Mrs.
Jones will inform her husband, who will then go down to the
dealer, order the equipment, and sign the note. The
Joneses will have a new refrigerator, and their monthly
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payment will become part of a revolving fund used to
advance credit to more families.^
The major innovation which the EHFA offered in the
field of installment finance was a liberalization of credit
terms. Automobile financing had fueled a major expansion
of consumer credit during the 1920s, breaking down
long-standing moral canons which previously had left most
people reluctant to go into debt to purchase household
goods. Institutional barriers began to recede as the
utilities and local finance companies began to offer terms
on everything from radios to refrigerators. Through the
1920s, however, these finance plans still included a series
of restrictions that stymied broader use of installment
plans. Contracts were limited on average to only twelve
months, with the most generous provisions rarely going
beyond twenty-four months. Lilienthal's proposal would
lower downpayments to between five and ten percent, and
^T.K. Quinn to Lilienthal, December 4, 1933, DEL Papers, Box
62; Lilienthal correspondence with Quinn, November and December,
1933, in. Records of the Electric Home and Farm Authority,
National Archives, Records Group 234, Reconstruction Finance
Corporation/Electric Home And Farm Authority, Manufacturers
Files, Box 85 (hereafter cited as RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box No.);
Lilienthal memorandum to Franklin D. Roosevelt, "National Home
and Farm Electrification Program Proposed by Tennessee Valley
Authority," n.d. (circa early December, 1933), DEL Papers, Box
60.
In a technical sense, the EHFA's rates were not "below
market," for the agency's rates actually became part of the
market. I use the phrase "below market" to denote rates which
were lower than those offered by sales finance companies at that
time. I thank Martha Olney of the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Economics Department, who pointed out the need for this
clarification.
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extend contracts to a range of thirty-six to forty-eight
months.'
Operating on a nation-wide basis, Lilienthal estimated
that the program would generate sales of over 2 million
refrigerators, 1.2 million ranges, and 1 million hot water
heaters. He went on to request $200 million in credit from
the NIRA appropriation, but added that the funds would be
replenished by loan payments, and that increased business
activity resulting from the sales would approximate $600
million for the year 1934. Finally, as he hoped to
convince Roosevelt that the program was politically
expedient as well as economically sound, Lilienthal noted
that appliance manufacturers "have indicated a keen desire
to participate.
Lilienthal 's grand strategy for consumption-driven
economic recovery was one of the first attempts to
implement a growth-oriented economic program during the
1930s. His intentions for the EHFA and the power program
at the TVA highlight the emergence of an alternative policy
track within the New Deal, dominated as it was in those
'a useful overview of the development of installment
financing is, Martha L. Olney, Buy Now. Pav Later; Advertising.
Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s (Chapel Hill,
University of North Carolina Press, 1991)
.
For a study of credit and appliance purchasing in England,
see. Sue Bowden, "Credit Facilities and the Growth of Consumer
Demand for Electric Appliances in England in the 1930s," Business
History 32 (January, 1990)
.
^^Lilienthal memo, to Roosevelt, circa December, 1933, DEL
Papers, Box 60.
first years of Roosevelt's presidency by the stagnationist
econoinics of the NRA and the first Agricultural Adjustment
Administration. Although Lilienthal's programs constituted
a minority tendency, the ideas underlying his policies were
not new. The pro-growth agenda was the product of a long
gestation period— shaped over more than a decade by a
network of businessmen, economists and planners, and labor
leaders that had coalesced around the twin goals of mass
consumption and economic expansion.''^
Morris Cooke, in particular, was one of the central
figures in the forging of the expansionist constituency.
Cooke and other planners in organizations such as the
Taylor Society, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the
Twentieth Century Fund had come together with businessmen
As noted in chapter 4 above, the work of Steven Fraser and
Peter Friedlander address the development and strategies of this
growth-oriented network. See, Fraser, "The M.abor Question"' in,
Fraser and Gerstle, eds.. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal
Order, and Friedlander, "The Origins of the Wei fare State : The
Keynesian Elite and the Second New Deal, 1910-1936."
In "The New Deal and the Idea of the State," Alan Brinkloy
argues that pro-growth forces did not coalesce until the 1940s,
after the conservative resurgence of the late 1930s stymied the
regulatory-interventionist wing of the New Deal, and the Second
World War demonstrated that fiscal policy could in effect
subsidize private profit, high employment, and economic growth--
in short, the conservative keynesian program. However, 1 would
argue that the war only brought this agenda to the political
forefront, and merely brought some more reluctant element s of
labor and capital into what was already a fairly consistent
ideological and social movement. See Brinkley in, Fraser and
Gerstle, eds. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order , pp.
85-121.
For an important discussion of the emergence of conservative
or "commercial" keynesian in the United States, see Robert
Collins, The Business Resoonse to Kevnes fl981).
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from commercial sectors such as the garment industry and
urban mass retailing, who accepted the logic of demand-
driven policies and some form of national economic
coordination because of their firms' shared interest in
mass consumption and due to the internecine chaos of their
industries.
Cooke had been moving toward an ideology of growth
since the early 1920s. Expressing his belief in the
efficacy of growth to labor leader Sidney Hillman, Cooke
stated in 1920 that, "in itself any increase in the
production of essential commodities is a desirable social
end. "^2 By ^j^^ decade, these planners had a
clear vision, entailing, in the words of one historian,
"planned, expanded production and state-sanctioned
redistribution of income in the interests of security and
consumption."^^ Until the New Deal, however, this
coalition had lacked the political power necessary to
implement its agenda.
Lilienthal's new agency provided a rural counterpart
to the more urban-oriented measures supported by the growth
coalition, such as state support for industrial unionism
and federal income guarantees like Social Security. The
countryside was a vast and untapped market which would do
^^Cooke to Hillman, April 15, 1920, as cited in Fraser, "The
^ Labor Question'" p. 60, fn. 9.
^^Fraser, p. 62.
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much more than absorb the industrial capacity which lay
idle due to the Depression. Integrating these
underdeveloped regions into the national economy would
create new sources of consumption-driven growth.
Lilienthal continually referred to Henry Ford's marketing
strategies as the keys to growth. "What had proved to be a
good business principle for Henry Ford in the pricing of
his first automobiles," Lilienthal wrote, "what was good
business in the mass production field generally, would be
good business in electricity supply." Lilienthal 's
articulation of the fordist order thus grew out of his
close ties to Cooke, but much like the businessmen who had
embraced the agenda, the logic of his own interests drove
him to identify so closely with Cooke and adopt Cooke's
formulations for his own. Since his tenure at Wisconsin,
his success, and the security of his agencies, was tied to
broadening the regulatory prerogatives of experts and to
greater domestic consumption that would justify the
experts' implementation of low rate structures.''^
Despite Lilienthal 's ambitious predictions, the
program was not without its critics. Arthur Krock of the
New York Times launched biting attacks on the EHFA, just as
he had continually dogged the TVA from its inception.
Krock compared the promise of the EHFA to the malarial Eden
Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March (New York, Harper
and Row, 1953, orig. ed. 1944), p. 23.
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promoted by the Charles Dickens character, Martin
Chuzzlewit. Krock warned that people would be drawn in by
the allure of material prosperity, only to be greatly
disappointed by the empty reality behind the New Deal's
promises
.
While Roosevelt paid close attention to his political
opposition, Arthur Krock 's criticism would not dissuade the
President from taking action. As a result of the efforts
of Lilienthal, Richberg, and the appliance manufacturers,
Roosevelt signed an executive order establishing the
Electric Home and Farm Authority on December 19, 1933, and
the EHFA was chartered as a Delaware corporation in
January. However, the President was not prepared to
authorize $200 million for a national program. Instead,
Roosevelt ordered the EHFA capitalized with $1 million from
the NIRA funds, with an additional $10 million in credit
for the agency from the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. The President also limited the program to a
trial run within the confines of the Tennessee Valley. The
EHFA became a de facto subsidiary of the TVA, with the TVA
Board of Directors serving as the new corporation's
Trustees and Executive Officers.''*
^^New York Times . December 20, 19 33, p. 33, col. 1.
Leuchtenberg notes that the Times eventually became a strong
supporter of the TVA. See, Leuchtenberg, FDR and the New Deal ,
p. 55, fn. 39.
^•^Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order No. 6514, December
19, 1933, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 5; "Certificate of Incorporation
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With a charter secured, Lilienthal then turned to
putting the program into operation. To ensure the agency's
success, Lilienthal needed to convince the manufacturers to
produce affordable appliances, while also securing lower
electric rates from the utilities. With this in mind,
Lilienthal carried on extensive negotiations with both
groups. Meetings with a special NEMA committee began in
December, 1933, and continued through the following
spring. With advice from Quinn and G.E. production
specialists as well as government engineers and home
economists, Lilienthal provided the NEMA with sets of
technical specifications which the models had to match to
be acceptable for EHFA financing. Further, while
Lilienthal did not set definitive price levels for the
appliances, he made it clear that the program would not
succeed without "drastic price revisions," and that retail
prices would be as important as technical reliability in
determining acceptability for EHFA financing.^''
The NEMA distributed the criteria, and the
manufacturers sent prospective models to the EHFA for
review. Home economists from the Department of Agriculture
of Electric Home and Farm Authority, Inc.," January 17, 1934,
copy in RG 2 34, RFC/EHFA, Box 4.
^^Lilienthal-Quinn correspondence, December 1, and 4, 1933,
RG 2 34, RFC/EHFA, Box 85; V.D.L. Robinson, TVA Administrative
Assistant, to W.J. Browne, Gibson Corporation, February 2, 1934;
H.W. Newell, Frigidaire Corporation, to Lilienthal, March 5,
1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 84 and 80, respectively.
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tested the performance of the various models, and with only
minor reservations, the USDA personnel approved almost all
of the appliances as technically sound and within EHFA
specifications. 18 Final acceptance of all models, however,
depended upon Lilienthal's approval of retail prices. m
this matter, Lilienthal adeptly used manufacturer
competition to the EHFA's advantage. Hoping to avoid
collusion and confident that none of the companies wanted
to be excluded from the program, the TVA-EHFA Director
ordered the manufacturers to submit prices in sealed bids.
Lilienthal would announce the EHFA's findings at a March
meeting and press conference at the NEMA's New York
offices.
Scheduled to publicize the EHFA program and highlight
the agency's cooperation with the business community,
Lilienthal used the media exposure at the New York meeting
to pressure the manufacturers into further price
reductions. All of the prices were "higher than expected,"
he told the press. Still, all of the ranges and heaters
were accepted for financing. However, none of the
refrigerators were acceptable. The EHFA was disappointed.
^^EHFA correspondence with Manufacturers, February-March,
1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 80-85. The EHFA denied approval
based on technical considerations for only one company, the
Rutenber Electric Company of Marion, Indiana. The wiring in its
stoves was deemed inadequate; the first refrigerator it sent for
testing leaked coolant, and the second failed to maintain a
satisfactory internal temperature under extreme external
conditions (external temperatures over 100 degrees Fahrenheit)
.
See, correspondence with Rutenber Co., Box 83.
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Lilienthal explained, by the lack of innovative new designs
and by prices that ranged from $80 to $120, certainly a far
cry from the $35 price Lilienthal had quoted to Roosevelt
in December. What people needed, and what the EHFA
expected, he insisted, were not just no-frills versions of
existing models. what was needed was "a new base price for
industry," and perhaps "another [Henry] Ford" to achieve
that breakthrough.''^
Lilienthal was convinced that refrigerators offered
the greatest sales potential of the three appliances, and
he was adamant that prices had to come down further. To
effect further reductions, Lilienthal continued to play the
manufacturers off each other, but he also held a trump
card. In the EHFA's articles of incorporation, the agency
was authorized "to manufacture, buy, sell, deal in, and to
engage in, conduct and carry on the business of
manufacturing, buying, selling, and dealing in electrical
appliances and equipment... of every class and description
necessary or useful for the operations of the
Corporation." If Lilienthal failed to get satisfactory
prices from the manufacturers, he could have brought the
EHFA into the appliance business. Given that the
government was then entering the power business through the
TVA, and with unused industrial capacity still at
^'"TVA Appliances," Business Week
.
March 17, 1934, pp.
10-11.
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Depression levels, the possibility of such a move did not
seem remote in 1934. Indeed, the threat seemed real enough
New York Timns to publish a headline story,
announcing, "Federal Corporations Are Enabled To Engage In
Any Form Of Business," reporting that, "through six
government-controlled corporations, the Roosevelt
administration is enabled to engage in virtually any form
of business enterprise
.
Lilienthal never had to move forward with this threat
to private enterprise. By May, each side came to a
compromise whereby the EHFA approved the proposed models on
a temporary basis at slightly reduced prices, around $75,
and the manufacturers agreed to submit newly designed
refrigerators by August. Lilienthal realized that his
anticipated "drastic price revisions" would fall far short
of his $35 goal. Independent sets of estimated production
costs provided by T.K. Quinn and by economic consultants
from the TVA corroborated the manufacturers' claims that
they could not afford to go any lower. What the struggle
over refrigerator prices reveals is that the precise nature
2°"Certif icate of Incorporation of Electric Home and Farm
Authority, Inc.," January 17, 1934, copy in RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box
4. New York Times . March 25, 1934, p. 1, col. 4 & 5. The other
five corporations were: Commodity Credit Corporation, Public
Works Emergency Housing Corporation, Federal Surplus Relief
Corporation, Subsistence Homesteads, and Tennessee Valley
Associated Cooperatives. The report characterized Delaware
Incorporation laws as "easy" and also reported that the charters
were drawn up "by officials now assisting in the administration
of their [the corporations'] activities.
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of the business-government relationship was as yet unclear,
and each side was attempting to lay out more sharply
defined rules and limits which were to their own
advantage
.
Lilienthal also moved to lower power rates.
Convincing the utilities to cooperate with the EHFA would
not be easy. The power corporations were already engaged
in a war with the TVA, and they would not be won over
readily to a venture run by David Lilienthal as an adjunct
to the TVA. Because the utilities held monopolistic
franchises, these companies would not be drawn into the
EHFA program by a fear of losing market share to
competitors, as were the appliance manufacturers. But with
very little territory as yet receiving TVA power,
Lilienthal realized that he had to sell the EHFA program to
the private companies. If he did gain their cooperation,
Lilienthal knew that increased power consumption across the
region would make TVA ' s acquisition of further territory a
much simpler task, for the utilities would have greater
sales despite smaller markets. As Lilienthal had noted in
his first letter to Marvin Mclntyre, the success of the
EHFA would provide, "some means of increasing the demand
EHFA Correspondence with Refrigerator Manufacturers,
March-July, 1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 80-85.
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for electricity so as to make room for the existing systems
as well as the system which we are creating. "22
By either enticement or coercion, however, Lilienthal
intended to bring rates down and draw the utilities into
the EHFA plan. The shiny lure he cast out was the
load-building promise of the EHFA. Lower your rates and
join our program, and your bottom-line will improve,
Lilienthal promised. Resist, he warned, and the yardstick
of lower rates and increased appliance sales in TVA
territory will win over the public to an increasingly
aggressive expansion of public power throughout the
Southeast and ultimately, across the nation.
Power companies had always been interested in building
their domestic load. As early as 1909, the power magnate
Samuel Insull employed salesman to sell electric
appliances. Most utilities had showrooms which extolled
the virtues of electric living, and promotional campaigns
were commonplace. The companies also devised rate
structures which they believed encouraged greater domestic
consumption, offering substantially reduced rates to heavy
users of current. 2^ However, many industry executives
continued to resist any attempt to lower rates for more
22Lilienthal to Mclntyre, November 21, 1933.
2^Hughes, American Genesis
, pp. 231-238; Glenn Weaver, The
Hartford Electric Light Company (Hartford, Connecticut, Hartford
Electric Light, 1969), pp. 98-99; "Appliance Bargain," Business
Week, September 17, 1938, p. 27.
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moderate consumers, especially to the EHFA's recommended
levels of 3 to 4 cents per kilowatt hour— 50 to 200% lower
than existing rates. As one executive stated in the
utility industry's trade journal, Electrical wnr-iH,
privately owned and operated utilities can lower
residence rates materially only as load isbuilt.... We cannot, like the government
establish highly unprofitable, low residential
rates that it is hoped some day will be
profitable when adequate consumption has been
obtained.
While some utility officers continued their
resistance, Wendell Willkie fully appreciated the
implications of Lilienthal's message. As chief executive
of Commonwealth and Southern, the giant holding company
which owned the four major utilities in the Valley, Willkie
hoped to profit from this joint venture, and he quickly
came to terms with the EHFA, even while continuing his
legal and political struggles against the parent TVA. C&S
agreed to bring down rates to EHFA-specif ied levels and
"use their utmost endeavors" to promote appliance sales.
While the C&S chief drew harsh criticism from some
executives, the more pragmatic utility leaders supported
him, noting that lower rates might initially cut profits,
but also admitting that there was the possibility that
their load factors would increase enough to at least offset
the lower rates. Given the political situation, moreover,
'^^George E. Whitwell, "Only Industry Selling Will Beat
Yardsticks and Taxes," Electrical World . March 24, 1934, p. 427.
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few alternatives existed. As an editorial in the trade
Electrical World stated, "the lower rates are
coming, it is written on the wall."25
With the participation of the utility and appliance
industries tentatively in hand, Lilienthal planned a
promotional campaign to coincide with an anticipated
mid-May starting date for the program. The Madison Avenue
advertising firm Young and Rubicam handled the campaign as
part of its work for the TVA. The advertising executives
approached this government account with a great deal of
skepticism. Y&R was one of advertising newer firms, and was
widely regarded as a renegade agency— primarily for its
early adoption of hard-sell tactics, and not for any great
concern with radical social issues. In a June 1934 meeting,
Samuel Cherr of Y&R told Forrest Allen that "in any
approach to this market. Young & Rubicam would begin with
the idea that the public buys things because they are sold,
not because they are good for the public." And in the case
of the Tennessee Valley, Cherr warned Allen, even a hard-
sell may not work. Mixing equal parts disdain for regions
beyond the Hudson river and dispassionate economic
analysis, Cherr offered little hope for the agency's
"^^"T.V.A. Effects A Deal with Southern Utilities,"
Electrical World (January, 1934), p. 120; "Federal-Spending
Compels Utility-Selling," Electrical World (February, 1934), p.
209 .
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success. As Allen reported of the meeting, Cherr stated
that his firm
was forced to take a realistic view of our market
area, that wide ranges of its population have lowincomes; that there was a high degree of illiteracy,
and that there was an attitude throughout the entirearea which was marked by an indifference to anyimprovement or progress.
Notwithstanding his skepticism, Cherr -s firm accepted the
campaign and the Authority's $10,000 fee. The proposal
called for heightening EHFA's visibility through permanent
and mobile display showrooms, direct mail efforts using the
government frank, and sending out door-to-door canvassers
in selected areas. The campaign also involved many joint
promotional efforts between the TVA and the EHFA. The
authorities shared a main showroom in Chattanooga, where
the TVA's fist and lightning bolt emblem was lit in bright
neon. "EHFA" was added above the fist, and flashed on and
off in sequence with the lightning bolt and the block
letters "TVA" below it.^^
The EHFA began operating in May, 1934, in the small
town of Tupelo, Mississippi. As one of the first
municipalities to receive TVA power, the EHFA selected
Tupelo more for its symbolic value rather than for its
particular market strength. For a few short weeks Tupelo
was besieged by the agency's canvassers, the media, and
^°Forrest Allen to George D. Munger, EHFA Commercial
Manager, June 26, 19 34, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15; "TVA
Demonstrator," Business Week
,
May 19, 1934, p. 12.
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hundreds of curious onlookers. The EHFA set up a permanent
showroom in the town, with the various approved appliances
arranged in mock kitchens. EHFA and TVA literature,
slogans, and pictures were a constant and vivid reminder
that these public agencies were ushering in the modern age
of comfort and convenience. The common themes running
through both agencies' literature emphasized the
administrative and ideological bonds between them, and the
content of the message bore evidence of Lilienthal's
distinctive idiom. One brochure stated,
the EHFA is interested in a constantly greater use of
electricity in all American homes. A fully
electrified nation is the goal. Added leisure and
comfort, lighter and briefer tasks..., a merging of
all classes of American people in a common
understanding and a common well-being, such are the
benefits of electricity.^''
Agency personnel continued their intense promotional
efforts as the EHFA program slowly expanded across the
Tennessee Valley during that first summer of operation. But
despite these promotional efforts, EHFA sales lagged. By
July, the agency had financed only 142 contracts worth just
over $14,000.^® Searching for a sales breakthrough, the
EHFA renewed its efforts to convince manufacturers to
design new refrigerators. Once again, G.E. led the way.
27„rpY^ Demonstrator," p. 12; "Budget for Promotional
Division for Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1934," and
"Chattanooga Exhibit," RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 15.
^^EHFA Statement of Operations, Installment Contracts
Purchased through August 31, 19 37, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 4.
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submitting a model which met the agency's criteria for the
lowest possible price combined with technical reliability.
The new design was a 4 cubic foot chest-type refrigerator,
opening from the top rather than the front. Compared to a
cabinet model refrigerator, the chest model was distinctly
inferior in user convenience and made less efficient use of
space, but the EHFA believed that the chest's low cost
outweighed its disadvantages. Citing the G.E. design, the
EHFA stated in July that, "we [the EHFA] are of the opinion
that the other manufacturers would be distinctly benefited
by developing new models at this particular time."^^ The
others did follow suit, and EHFA-approved chest models went
on sale during the fall of 1934.
However, the chest models did not generate a sales
boom. Most people who could afford refrigerators wanted
larger models; the three and four cubic feet of space in
the chests was too small. Since the EHFA only financed
each manufacturer's base-priced model, customers had to
turn to private financing, or forego their purchase.
Manufacturers and dealers pressured the agency to change
its policy. A dealer from Mississippi plainly stated the
sentiments expressed by many others when he wrote to inform
the EHFA,
we have several people today that would buy larger
boxes than the T.V.A. models if they could get E.H. &
^^George D. Munger, to H.W. Newell, Frigidaire Corporation,
July 2, 1934, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 80.
234
F. A terms We can't see why you are limiting us to
""^^l
""^"'^ this business andour customers want refrigeration, but the T.V.Amodels are too small. Won't you please grant u^authority to sell these larger appliances?
It seems that most dealers never considered the chest
models, with their narrow profit margins, worthy of any
serious sales push. As an editorial in Electric
Refrigeration Npws stated, dealers "intend to use the chest
model as a ^nailed-to-the-floor
' refrigerator, employing
its low price as a bait to draw in store traffic.
While Lilienthal had maintained that the chest model
would become the Model T of refrigerators, establishing "a
new base price" for the industry, he was able to recognize
a sales flop. In November, 1934, he sought authorization
from the President to change EHFA policy. Lilienthal
recommended extending EHFA financing to include all models
from manufacturers that produced EHFA-approved base-priced
models. The new policy went into effect the following
spring.
At same time that the EHFA was working through its
sales problems, organized opposition to the program began
to grow. Since the agency's formation, local dealers had
been dissatisfied with its intimate ties to the utilities.
^°D.K. Galtney, Galtney Motor Company, to EHFA, no date
(circa Fall, 1934), RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 34; Electric
Refrigeration News
,
8 August 1934, p. 8.
^^Lilienthal Memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt, November 21,
1934; Lilienthal to G.D. Munger, January 29, 1935, both in RG
234, RFC/EHFA, Box 34.
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as power companies competed with the dealers for consumer
appliance purchases. Coinciding with the EHFA's start-up
in Tupelo, ten dealers in Georgia filed suit in Federal
court against the agency, charging that by coercing the
appliance manufacturers and utilities into joining the
program, the government was creating a monopoly which would
destroy the dealers' businesses. They sought an injunction
preventing the Georgia Power Company (one of the four
Commonwealth and Southern subsidiaries) from selling EHFA
appliances. ^2 The dealers failed to secure an injunction,
and their suit was ultimately unsuccessful, but over the
next year dealer resistance stiffened and new allies joined
their struggle against the EHFA.
During 1935, the merchants' trade association, the
National Retail Dry Goods Association, joined with two
associations from the credit industry. The National
Association of Sales Finance Companies and the National
Retail Credit Association, to lobby against the agency.
Believing that the EHFA-utility relationship "deprived
local dealers of the opportunity of making a sale," and
that "the invasion of the field of instalment credit by the
Federal Government... was operating to demoralize sound
credit practices," these associations used legal action,
^^New York Times . May 9, 1934, p. 35, col
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political pressure, and public relations to weaken or
destroy the program."
Lilienthal exhibited little fear of these efforts.
When he was developing his EHFA proposal the previous
December, Lilienthal had not even considered it necessary
to consult these groups, as he had the NEMA and utility
interests. The appliance and utility industries were
oligopolies, composed of large-scale corporations wielding
enormous political and economic power. The larger firms
were central to Lilienthal 's vision for integrating the
Tennessee Valley into the national economy and for
sustaining consumption-driven economic growth. The retail
credit and dry goods business sectors possessed neither the
national scale nor the accompanying political clout held by
corporations such as General Electric and Commonwealth and
Southern. The smaller trade associations did have allies
in Congress, but as long as the EHFA remained insulated
from the legislature by an Executive Order, their
opposition was ineffectual.
As was the case with most New Deal programs,
opposition also emerged to the agency's left. Advocates of
"For a report on the coordinated efforts of the three
associations, see, R.E. Baylis, "Liberalized Credit— Its
Disadvantages and Its Effects on Buying Power," Proceedings of
the Silver Anniversary Convention of the National Retail Credit
Association
, 1937, p. 94; for the quotes, see, NASFC News , June,
1935, p. 1, and November, 1935, p. 1. The NRCA Proceedings and
the NASFC materials are located in the Baker Library of Harvard
Business School. I am again indebted to Martha Olney for
informing me of the existence of these records.
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more radical solutions to the nation's economic woes viewed
the EHFA as yet another ill-conceived attempt to prop up a
discredited capitalist system. In a critique that was only
partly tongue-in-cheek, J.B. Matthews and R.E. Shallcross
noted
there is, in fact, arising a school of recovery
preaching the gospel of economic salvation by
gadgetry. According to the editor of Electric
Refrigeration News, the nation is now faced with a
choice between (1) Fascism, (2) Communism, (3) the New
Deal, and (4) Air Conditioning: and he, of course,
favors the adoption of the last-named road.
Lumping the EHFA together with this private-sector panacea,
Matthews and Shallcross insisted that appliance sales and
installment financing would resolve none of the systemic
contradictions plaguing the country. "It should be manifest
to everyone," they continued, "that a gadgetry boom is a
spurious prosperity from which the bottom must inevitably
fall out with a bang."^"*
The split between Arthur Morgan and Lilienthal also
surfaced in regard to the EHFA. Morgan expressed what was
a traditional antipathy toward installment sales, calling
such credit "a very questionable process at best." He
feared that the TVA was abusing its "unique prestige" among
Valley residents to sell appliances which people could not
afford. Morgan's critique never went beyond an exchange of
memos with Lilienthal, and the program continued to operate
^^J.B. Matthews and R.E. Shallcross, Partners in Plunder.
The Cost of Business Dictatorship (New York, Covici, Friede
Publishers, 1935), pp. 83, 87.
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under Lilienthal's direction. Whereas Morgan saw
consumer debt as a burden and a morally questionable
activity, Lilienthal believed that credit expansion and
price reductions would create economic development,
generating jobs, income, and wealth across the country as
well as within the Valley.
The EHFA's trial run in the Tennessee Valley lasted
fifteen months. Lilienthal had always intended the EHFA to
be a national program, with its operations initially
restricted to the Tennessee Valley serving only as a
temporary measure aimed at resolving any operational
flaws. But when the agency finally did expand in August
1935, the national EHFA bore only a superficial resemblance
to Lilienthal's creation.
As envisioned by Lilienthal, the EHFA's expansion
would not have significantly altered the agency in purpose
or structure. The EHFA would retain its liberally-drawn
Delaware charter. The Board of Directors would change to
reflect a more national scope, including one Director from
the TVA (presumably Lilienthal)
,
along with one
representative each from the Treasury, Interior, and
Agriculture Departments, and one member from the Federal
^^A.E. Morgan to Lilienthal, September 7, 1934, and G.D.
Munger for Lilienthal to Morgan, October 20, 1934, RG 234,
RFC/EHFA, Box 5.
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Power Commission. As planned, the expansion meant business
as usual, but on a larger scale.
Before the national program went into effect, the
Supreme Court decision striking down the NIRA undermined
Lilienthal's plan. Without the NIRA, Roosevelt's Executive
Order that authorized the EHFA was invalid, and Lilienthal
could no longer avoid going to Congress for enabling
legislation. The "extensive legislative hearings"
Lilienthal feared were imminent, and despite the steadfast
support of public power advocates in Congress, the
legislature did indeed sterilize the EHFA. Compromise
followed on top of compromise. The EHFA received a new
corporate charter in the District of Columbia which removed
all of the broad discretionary powers of the Delaware
corporation. More importantly. Congress removed the agency
from Lilienthal's control, establishing the new EHFA as a
subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with
a seven member Board of Directors drawn exclusively from
the RFC with the exception of one representative from the
recently formed Rural Electrification Administration.^''
^''Lilienthal to Roosevelt, December 3, 1934. DEL Papers, Box
63 .
^''Material on this shift can be found in several different
EHFA files. See, Executive Order No. 7139, August 12, 1935,
ending the Delaware corporation; Lilienthal to Roosevelt, July
26, 1935; and. Congressional File, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Boxes 4,5,
and 31, respectively.
2Under the RFC, the EHFA greatly expanded its
territory, eventually including areas such as Los Angeles
County, California; Austin, Texas; and Hartford,
Connecticut; but its organizational character was
distinctively different. The RFC completely abandoned
promotional activities. The showrooms closed. The neon
signs were turned off and taken down. Business Week , the
journal which had kept the closest watch over the EHFA
since its inception noticed the transformation. "The
difference was largely one of attitude," the business
weekly reported.
Back in the Valley, the movement had been a
crusade. Moved to Washington, it became just
another of RFC's many activities... and fell hei
to the conservatism normally associated with the
banker, rather than the promoter.
The conservatism of the RFC exerted an increasingly
powerful influence over the EHFA. Morris Cooke served as
the first Chairman of the newly reconstituted agency, but
as the sole representative on the board of directors from
outside of the RFC, he was unable to control EHFA policy;
he resigned his post in 1936. A dispute in 1938 reveals
how conservative the agency had become. The REA field
representative for the Puget Sound area was repeatedly
stymied by regional EHFA officials in his attempts to get
local RA co-operatives signed onto the EHFA program. The
^''"EHFA Pussyfoots Successfully," Business Week , August 15,
1936, p. 37.
24
regional EHFA office operated out of space freely provided
by the Portland Gas and Electric Company in Portland, and
EHFA men used vehicles owned by the private utilities to
travel through the area. Reluctant to anger their local
patrons who were also the source for most of their
contracts, the EHFA representatives showed little interest
in working with the RA co-operatives. The private
utilities had many more customers than the co-ops, and
since the new EHFA was much more interested in contracts
than it was in social goals, the EHFA ignored the co-ops
until Washington, D.C., RA officials raised enough
objections to force the EHFA to accommodate them. As R.C.
Brummer, the EHFA representative explained the incident in
a report to Washington,
I told him [the RA official] that we were not
interested in any of the political affairs, that
we had kept out of the squabbles, [and] that we
had to operate in a business way.
The EHFA continued to operate until 1942, when war-time
restrictions on credit and appliance production led to its
dissolution.^'
Judged solely on the number of sales financed by the
program, the EHFA was never more than a minor-league
operation. During its 15 months in the Tennessee Valley,
the agency purchased just under 5,000 contracts, amounting
^^EHFA-RA Relations, Correspondence, October, 1938, RG 234,
RFC/EHFA, Box 32; Executive Order No. 9256, October 13, 1942,
liquidating the EHFA, RG 234 RFC/EHFA, Box 4.
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to almost $760,000. At the end of 1940, its last year of
significant activity, the EHFA's cumulative total was
254,000 contracts worth $36.1 million, which was less than
2% of electrical appliance installment paper and less than
0.1% of all consumer credit in that period.^''
Joseph Coppock, an economist who studied the EHFA for
the National Bureau of Economic Research in the late 1930s
and wrote a retrospective assessment of the program in
1964, attributed its marginal impact to the bureaucratic
conservatism of the RFC, and to the bewildering series of
contractual arrangements among utilities, manufacturers,
dealers, consumers, and the EHFA. In order to minimize the
opposition of private lenders and Congressional opposition,
Coppock claims, the RFC administrators were unwilling to
aggressively publicize the program and maintained real
annual percentage rates at 9 to 10%, only one or two points
below private sector rates, rather than the 3 to 4% which
would have induced significantly greater consumption. The
utility agreements, rate reviews, approved appliance lists,
and dealer participation requirements further inhibited
expansion.
^°"Memorandum. Re: Operations of Electric Home and Farm
Authority," no date, circa 1938, RG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 5. Joseph
D. Coppock, "Government As Enterpriser-Competitor: The Case of
the Electric Home and Farm Authority," Explorations in
Entrepreneurial History 1(1964), pp. 190-192.
Joseph D. Coppock, Government Agencies of Consumer
Instalment Credit (New York, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1940); Coppock, "Government As Enterpriser-Competitor,"
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Certainly, lower real interest rates would have
created greater demand for EHFA financing, but the lack of
publicity and the administrative obstacles which Coppock
cites as sources for the agency
-s marginal impact do not
explain the dismal sales performance during the
fifteen-month trial run in the Tennessee Valley. Under
Lilienthal's guidance, the EHFA conducted a major
advertising campaign, and also had the cooperation of the
four major private utility companies in the region, yet the
agency financed very few sales. Even expanding the number
of models eligible for financing following the chest
model's low sales only generated a modest increase in
contracts
.
The EHFA's greatest limitation while linked to the TVA
was the regional underdevelopment that would continue to
block the full realization of Lilienthal's goals for
economic reconstruction. The Tennessee Valley was one of
the poorest and most rural regions in the United States.
In 1932, per capita retail sales in the region were
one-half the national average. Only 3% of the farms had
electricity, compared to a national average of 11%, and
rural electrification programs took years (and for some
areas, decades) to string wire across America's rural
landscape. Despite lower electric rates and slightly
moderated finance charges and appliance prices, many people
pp. 188-198.
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Of the Tennessee Valley still could not afford
refrigerators or electric ranges
As a national program, the agency faced insurmountable
structural economic barriers which prevented it from
becoming the engine of national recovery that Lilienthal
had intended it to be. Lilienthal believed that price
reductions and credit expansion would be enough to fuel
mass consumption. However, cheap prices for consumer
durables were not the primary obstacle blocking economic
recovery. Job and income insecurity due to wage cuts,
unemployment, short work weeks, and the absence of social
insurance legislation stifled popular consumption by
limiting the amount of debt which families were willing to
incur. Lilienthal could not control these matters, and the
EHFA could not realize his goal of sparking a broad-based
economic recovery.
As a measure for national recovery, and as a finance
agency, the EHFA met with little success. However, as one
component in the TVA's efforts to increase electric
^^"Expenditures for Electrical Appliances by Workers in 42
Cities," Monthly Labor Review
.
46(February 1938): 447-454; Ted
Leitzell, "Uncle Sam, Peddler of Electric Gadgets," New Outlook
164 (August, 1934), pp. 51-52.
^^For studies of the emergence of this mass production-mass
consumption synthesis, see, Michel Aglietta, A Theory of
Capitalist Regulation. The US Experience , trans, by David
Fernbach (London, New Left Books, 1979, orig. ed. 197 6) ; Mike
Davis, "^Fordism" in Crisis: A Review of Michel Aglietta's
Regulation et crises: L'experience des Etats-Unis . " Review
2 (Fall, 1978): 207-269; and, Mike Davis, Prisoners of the
American Dream (New York, Verso Books, 1986), pp. 52-117.
consumption through lower rates, the EHFA was successful i
easing the Valley Authority's political situation. As
rates declined, people who could not buy items such as
refrigerators or electric ranges still used more
electricity, by turning on lights for longer periods and
buying less expensive items such as fans, radios, and
irons. The results of lower rates were clear and
unmistakable. in both TVA territory and in regions
supplied by private companies which had lowered rates to
EHFA-specified levels, consumption increased dramatically.
Even without heavy appliance buying, consumption was up 83
after six months of low TVA rates. More illustrative of
the role that the EHFA played in generating power
consumption, is the increased load among the Commonwealth
and Southern subsidiaries. In 1935, for all utility
companies east of the Rocky Mountains, the top three
utilities for average customer consumption were the three
C&S companies in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. These
companies' rates were slightly higher than the national
average in 1933, but when they topped the consumption
rankings in 1935, their rates of 3.63 cents per
kilowatthour were more than 2 5% lower than the national
average. By 1939, utilities using the EHFA plan and thus
meeting the agency's low rate requirements averaged over
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60% greater per customer consumption than did companies not
on the EHFA plan/^
Ultimately, the EHFA's minimal impact on appliance
sales and its greater influence on electric load were
secondary to its role in the process of experimentation
during the 1930s and 1940s, which resulted in a
reconstituted political economy in which the state helped
mediate the formal juncture of mass production and mass
consumption. Needing to create a market for TVA power, and
believing the Depression to be a crisis of
A recent study of the RFC during the New Deal by JamesOlson asserts that the EHFA was "an instant success," financingthe sale of over 70,000 refrigerators during 1934. This estimate
appears greatly inflated, as agency records in the National
Archives indicate a total of 4,886 contracts financed from the
EHFA's start in 1933 through the end of June, 1935. Given this
small number of contracts, Olson's figure of 70,000 refrigerators
seems quite impossible. For Olson's appraisal, see, James S.
Olson, Saving Capitalism. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation
and the New Deal. 1933-1940 (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1988), p. 142. My appraisal is based on reports made by
the EHFA. See, Untitled Statement of Operations, through August
31, 1937, KG 234, RFC/EHFA, Box 4.
Fiscal Year # of Contracts Amount of Contracts
1933- 34 142 $ 14,290.75
1934- 35 4,744 745,421.02
During House debates on power policy, Mississippi
Congressman John Rankin, whose district included Tupelo and other
TVA and EHFA territory, read excerpts from letters written to him
by his constituents which described how they made use of more
power due to reduced rates. He read fifty or more of the
accounts, noting that he had many more back in his office. While
some letters listed a wide array of appliances and electric
tools, all of them listed at least three basic items— lights,
fans, and radios. For examples, see. Speech of John Rankin,
March 25, 1936, Congressional Record , pp. 4346-4350.
McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight , pp. 75-76; and, EHFA
Statement of Operations, 1939, pp. 5-6, and chart 1, RG 234,
RFC/EHFA, Box 31.
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underconsumption, Lilienthal designed a program aimed at
expanding, not simply maintaining, the economy.
Influencing the appliance trade through product
design, retail prices, electric rates, and credit terms,
Lilienthal envisioned the EHFA as a catalyst for business,
opening up new markets to private enterprise, while also
enlarging the state's responsibilities as the broker among
the various interest groups within the marketplace. The
TVA-EHFA director forged alliances with manufacturers such
as Gerard Swope, who recognized the benefits of closer
business-government cooperation and stood to gain from
revitalized consumer purchasing.
The Electric Home and Farm Authority reflected the
vision of a political network which supported an activist
state and expansionary economic policies. Even as the EHFA
was proving to be less successful than planned, Lilienthal
and his allies remained convinced that the New Deal must
turn to other expansionary measures, and they understood
that there were different means of achieving this goal. In
mid-summer 1934, Lilienthal wrote to Felix Frankfurter,
stating,
one angle of the New Deal which I wish could be made
clear to the public mind and carried out in action, is
the necessity of reestablishing and maintaining a
stable purchasing power among the masses of the
people. NRA may have stopped the downward course, but
it is obvious that it has not, and certainly if NRA is
to be selfgovernment , will not reestablish an adequate
purchasing power. ... I wonder if it would be sound to
frankly face the issue of reestablishing purchasing
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su^t^inoH^ ^^^dit expansion but through as a ed, ambitious program of public works.
While agencies such as the NRA, shaped by the vision of
economic stagnation and industrial maturity, proved
unworkable and increasingly unsatisfactory, the EHFA was
one of the first, halting steps toward a keynesian
pol it ical economy
.
^^Lilienthal to Frankfurter, August 7, 1934, DEL Papers, Box
63 .
For studies of the growth-oriented coalition which shaped
America's post-War economy, see, Robert Collins, The Business
Response to Keynes (1981); Kim McQuaid, Big Business and
Presidential Power (New York, 1980) ; and, Alan Wolfe, America '
s
Impasse, The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth (New York,
Pantheon Books, 1981) . For a provocative study of which
industrial sectors joined the New Deal coal it ion , see , Thomas
Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party
Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,
"
International Organization 38(Winter, 1984) : 41-94.
CHAPTER 7
THE ••FEUD" REVISITED:
ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND THE LILIENTHAL-MORGAN CONTROVERSY
Despite facing an array of obstacles during the
agency's first five years, the TVA-s original directorate
oversaw considerable progress in their dam-building and
hydroelectricity programs. By 1938 the TVA had four of an
anticipated ten dams in operation; three (Norris, Pickwick
Landing, and Wheeler) were constructed by the agency, and
the fourth was the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals—inherited
from the Army Corps of Engineers. The fifth dam,
Guntersville, would go on line the following year. The
Authority had 13,000 employees, the great majority of them
at work on dam construction crews. Other TVA crews had
stretched out 4,600 miles of transmission lines across the
Valley. In those five years, forty-three municipal power
companies and nineteen rural cooperatives had contracted
for TVA power, along with several direct industrial
consumers. Total annual power production had just exceeded
2 billion kilowatt hours (kwh) . TVA's low rates drove up
consumption throughout the Valley; residents consistently
drew over twenty percent more power than their counterparts
in other regions. At the same time, the Authority had also
successfully rebuffed a series of legal challenges that
effectively settled the issue of the agency's
constitutionality. Its statutory legitimacy secured, TVA
gained added leverage in its negotiations for more
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territory, as the private utilities were slowly reconciled
to its existence.^
The economies exacted by the agency in its
construction program and the gradual easing of legal
pressures proved to be a great boon for Lilienthal. Cheap
power was the cornerstone of his efforts to induce economic
recovery through effective demand management. Lower rates
spurred dramatic surges in consumption and protected the
agency against attack from private utility interests. The
fordist gambit played out by Lilienthal since his arrival
in 1933 looked like a smashing success. The success of his
power program was fortuitous, for as the threat of attack
from without receded, Lilienthal became entangled in
renewed hostilities within the agency.
By the winter of 1935-1936, the tensions evident among
the directors prior to the Lilienthal-H. A. Morgan coup of
August 1933 had resurfaced. For three years, the situation
grew progressively worse, from an internal power struggle
of little note outside the agency to a notorious public
^Marguerite Owen, The Tennessee Valley Authority (New York,
Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 38-39; testimony of Julius Krug, 7
December 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA
. pp 5227-5228.
A succinct, account of the legal issues can be found in
McCraw, TVA and the Power Fight , pp. 118-119. Neither of the
Supreme Court's decisions on the TVA (in the Ashwander and TEPCO
cases) provided a sweeping affirmation of the Authority's
constitutionality. However, the Court's general shift by the late
1930s toward granting broader discretionary powers to the federal
government, coupled with the utilities' gradual recognition of
the TVA's business-like demeanor, settled the constitutional
issue
.
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scandal, complete with bitter charges of personal
malfeasance and political treachery, with Harcourt Morgan
remaining largely in the background, but still decisively
with Lilienthal, the dispute pitted Lilienthal against
Arthur Morgan. Lilienthal emerged as the victor.
Reflecting his fondness for boxing, it is safe to say that
he won by a knockout in the late rounds. The president
removed Arthur Morgan from the board, Lilienthal helped
name Morgan's successor, and, ultimately, Lilienthal even
succeeded his ally H. A. Morgan as chair of the TVA board.
This chapter examines the Lilienthal-Morgan conflict.
However, this will not be a descriptive study of the
struggle, and only a brief recapitulation of the events
will follow. On a personal level, both men certainly
disliked, and even despised, each other. In addition, their
policy differences were quite real, and triggered the
conflagration that engulfed the directorate. But the axis
around which the particulars of the conflict spun was an
unbridgeable ideological gulf between these two men. This
gulf shaped the contours of their specific policy disputes,
and to an extent was echoed in the personality traits that
created such a bitter and lasting enmity.^
^ Thomas McCraw ' s 1970 monograph, Morgan vs. Lilienthal: The
Feud within the TVA
.
remains the definitive chronicle of the
bitter power struggle. Still, McCraw 's work, along with most
other analyses of the conflict, tend to emphasize the directors'
disputes regarding specific policy initiatives at the Authority
as well as the personal enmity between Lilienthal and A. E.
Morgan. McCraw 's title best illustrates this tendency,
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The intellectual divide between Morgan and Lilienthal
is reflected in their economic philosophy and the
understanding of the TVA as an experiment in
decentralization. In his promotional efforts, Lilienthal
quickly appropriated Harcourt Morgan's rhetoric describing
the TVA as an experiment in "grassroots democracy." For
Lilienthal, however, grassroots democracy was purely an
administrative measure, a technigue designed to locate the
federal bureaucracy close to the place of its
implementation and not in Washington. "What I have been
describing," he wrote in TVA: Democracy on the March
,
"is
the way by which the people of one region have been working
out a decentralized administration of the functions of the
central government." Lilienthal never intended grassroots
democracy as a means for dispersing the country's economic
characterizing the struggle as a "feud"— with all its
implications of a blood-level vendetta.
Also, McCraw's account is somewhat sympathetic toward
Morgan. For an alternative perspective, see Richard Lowitt,
George W. Norris. The Triumph of a Progressive. 1933-1944
(Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1978), chapter 17:
"Trouble in Paradise." Another portrayal of the conflict can be
found in Roy Talbert, Jr., FDR's Utopian. Arthur Morgan of the
TVA (Jackson, University Press of Mississippi, 1987) . Most
studies of the New Deal written since 1970 tend to rely very
heavily upon McCraw.
Morgan's own account of the story can be found in the memoir
he composed shortly before his death. The Making of the TVA
(Buffalo, NY, Prometheus Books, 1974); Lilienthal's published
journals offer his edited version. At over 6,000 pages, the
records of the 1938 congressional investigation of the TVA ( Joint
Investigation of the TVA ) are the voluminous, but indispensable,
primary guide to the conflict and, in fact, to the entire scope
of TVA operations during the 1930s.
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development, because he was never enamored of the regional
approach. He advocated using the lure of cheap and
plentiful power to attract energy-intensive, large-scale
industries to the Valley. These national firms would be
subject to federal industrial relations regulation, and
would thus create the demand for a high-wage, unionized
labor force. In turn, these high-wage jobs would spur
greater domestic consumption and generate enough demand to
integrate the Tennessee Valley into a dynamic national
economy. Lilienthal wanted to knit the region into the
nation's modern industrial economy, not isolate it. He
wanted to revive and expand the nation's industrial base,
not turn away from it.
For his part, Arthur Morgan was deeply distressed by
the mass consumption policies pursued by Lilienthal, and
the two offered divergent routes for the TVA's role in
remapping the Valley's economic pathways. The ultimate
success of Lilienthal capped the triumph of one path toward
economic development with an impact far beyond the confines
of the Tennessee Valley. The triumph of Lilienthal 's vision
at the TVA was accompanied at the national level by the
political ascendance of a keynesian strategy. By the late
1930s, the disparate forces supporting this agenda began to
coalesce, gaining increased influence among organized
labor, sectors of industrial capital, and within the state.
Lilienthal 's was thus a shared vision, and as it emerged in
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Sharper relief, it cut an economic pattern and a set of
policy initiatives that would dominate the nation's
economic order through the midcentury.^
There were many reasons for the escalation of the
Lilienthal-Morgan conflict, but it is clear that their
temperamnets exacerbated the ideological tension on the
board. Headstrong and very ambitious, often to the point of
being brash, Lilienthal enjoyed maneuvering within the
political arena and cultivated attention from the media. As
was clear from the earliest days of his appointment,
associates and advisors of the youngest TVA director, from
George Norris to Morris L. Cooke and Felix Frankfurter, fed
this ambition and urged him forward at every point in his
struggles against Morgan as well as the private utilities.
Morgan was austere and judgmental— contemptuous of
politics and reluctant to compromise. An autocrat by nature
and an engineer by training, Arthur Morgan craved
regimentation; his version of a Utopian social order was
reflected in his life-long devotion to the writings of
^Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March , p. 138.
To further complicate matters, it is clear that H. A.
Morgan's call for "grassroots democracy" carried a distinctly
regionalist message, albeit of a different strain than that of
Arthur Morgan. As suggested by Philip Selznick, Harcourt Morgan's
vision entailed cooperating "at the grassroots" with the South 's
conservative (and quite powerful) agricultural oligarchy. This
implied acquiescence to the low-wage, segregated labor market of
the South that would have been undermined by the full
articulation of Lilienthal 's agenda. As will be noted below,
these contradictions between the philosophies of the two allies
on the TVA board crippled the full realization of the keynesian
agenda
.
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Utopian novelist Edward Bellamy, of whom Morgan wrote a
biography/
The lack of any definitive administrative format
heightened the tensions, and the 1933 truce that balkanized
the directorate and created, in essence, three functionally
autonomous agencies within the TVA reflected and reinforced
the ideological split. Lilienthal felt that each member of
the board was coequal. Morgan believed that while each
board member had one vote, his appointment as chair made
him primus inter pares. The tripartite division of power
forced on to A. E. Morgan had given each director certain
managerial prerogatives within their administrative sphere.
However, the demarcation between the divisions was
imprecise, and Lilienthal 's power engineers were often
engaged in jurisdictional disputes with Morgan's dam
engineers. Even if the lines of responsibility had been
completely clear, these two divisions had to work together,
and the breach at the top of the agency ran as a fault
through the respective divisions.
For over two years, the factions circled one another,
then came to blows during the winter of 1935-1936. Arthur
Morgan intended to resolve the troubles that plagued the
^In his sympathetic (but not hagiographic) study, Roy
Talbert, Jr. describes Morgan as a puritan-utopian , or as a
puritanical progressive. See, "The certainty with which he knew
what was best for people sprang from a streak in him that was
probably puritan and that at time seemed genuinely
authoritarian." FDR's Utopian
, p. 41.
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board. The TVA chair went to Roosevelt and requested that
Lilienthal not be reappointed to the board. The term of TVA
directors was to be nine years, but the first set of
appointments were staggered at nine, six, and three years;
Lilienthal came up for renewal in 1936. Roosevelt
characteristically did all he could to avoid any
resolution. He told Morgan that he sympathized with his
position, but Lilienthal had backers, including Robert M.
La Follette Jr., that made it impossible to cut the junior
director loose
— especially in an election year. The
President left Morgan with the impression that he would
take some appropriate action after the campaign was over.
Shortly after the election, the rancorous Democratic
congressman, Maury Maverick, wrote, in his own inimitable
style, of the impending struggle. "King Arthur Morgan of
the Round Table," Maverick noted
wants all the Utility Knights, good and bad, public
and private, to sit around and make goo-goo eyes at
each other. Little David Lilienthal wants to slay the
Power Goliath, and possibly to kick the whole table
over. In the following months, it became increasingly
difficult to get King Arthur and Little David to even
come together at the same table.
^
^Maury Maverick, "T.V.A. Faces the Future," The New
Republic . 18 November 1936, p. 64.
21
The election passed and Roosevelt took no action.
Morgan's brittle commitment to quiet diplomacy shattered.
In 1937, the chair issued a series of public statements
criticizing his fellow board members. Morgan's tone
gradually became bitter and the critiques became ever more
personal. Morgan described Lilienthal as implacably hostil
to the even the conciliatory elements of the private power
sector, and intimated in an Atlantic Monthly article that
he was either blinded by fanaticism or hiding his true
ambitions. "The abuses of the private power industry,"
Morgan claimed,
have bred in some men an attitude of bitter hatred...
This attitude may be exploited by other men who have
no such convictions, but who will endeavor to ride to
political power on the issue.
Morgan went on to accuse Lilienthal of buying off
politically influential landowners through the land
condemnation process for the agency's dams. By the end of
1937, Arthur Morgan's charges had cast a long shadow over
Lilienthal, and over the TVA as well.*^
Answering Morgan's charges that he was a public power
zealot bent on destroying the private sector, Lilienthal
countered with his own innuendo. The more skillful
tactician, however, Lilienthal covered his trail as he
"Arthur E. Morgan, "Public Ownership of Power," Atlantic
Monthly 160 (September 1937)
,
p. 340.
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moved against Morgan. Rarely did Lilienthal attack his
senior colleague in public. Instead, he relied on the press
contacts he had cultivated to air his views. George Fort
Milton, editor of the Chattanooga Npw^ and a strong backer
of Lilienthal, wrote caustic editorials against Arthur
Morgan's policies. National correspondents and columnists
sympathetic to the Lilienthal faction frequently reported
information available only from internal and confidential
agency memoranda. Morgan, the press claimed, was hopelessly
naive concerning the private power interests and their
supposedly conciliatory policies which actually endangered
the TVA and the administration's entire power program.
Morgan claimed that, in particular, Drew Pearson's column,
"Washington Merry-Go-Round, " seemed to have specific access
to material distributed only at the highest levels within
the Authority— in effect charging Lilienthal at least
indirectly with the leaks. The allegations lack definitive
proof, but were probably justified. Excerpts from Morgan
memoranda on the subject published by various reporters
seem to justify this characterization; but their
publication also implicates Lilienthal or one of his aides
in some shrewd media practices.^
Tor Lilienthal 's relations with Milton, see their indexed
correspondence in the Lilienthal Papers. On the specific claim
regarding Pearson, see testimony of A. E. Morgan, 20 July 1938,
Joint Investigation of the TVA . pp. 460-461.
259
In early 1938 the situation became increasingly
untenable, and a serious liability for the Roosevelt
administration. Already weakened by the battles surrounding
his court reform and executive reorganization plans, the
president had little choice but to finally pick sides and
stop offering equivocal support to both factions. Bothered
by Arthur Morgan's public airing of the dispute, Roosevelt
convened a meeting with Lilienthal and his TVA chair. Never
the diplomat, Morgan refused to substantiate his charges,
or even discuss them with the president. After meetings at
the White House on the llth, 18th, and s of March,
Roosevelt fired Morgan for his "contumacious" conduct, but
the struggle dragged on for another year. Morgan refused to
acknowledge Roosevelt' dismissal, then requested and
received a full Congressional hearing in which he could
defend himself. For six months, the joint committee heard
testimony in both Washington and in the Valley. For all the
thousands of pages of testimony, the committee's findings
profited little from the experience. The Democratic
majority used the hearings to support the Administration's
sacking of Morgan, and more broadly of the TVA's power
program— easily the most visible and popular aspect of the
agency. The Republicans used the investigation as a
platform for tirades against the TVA. In the end, although
questions were raised regarding certain practices of
Lilienthal 's legal and power divisions, the committee found
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little evidence to support Morgan's most grievous charges
of malfeasance. Media attention had already waned, and
Morgan moved quietly back into private life. More than
ever, the TVA was Lilienthal
• s.
In his memoirs, Arthur Morgan outlined the
philosophical chasm that would always separate the two men.
"There is one issue on which we were most centrally in
disagreement," he wrote.
David Lilienthal assumed that the motives of people in
general tended to be sound and that their primary need
was for information and the opportunity, through the
resources of communication, technology, and science,
to give expression to their motives. In contrast, I
believed that information and resources were not
sufficient for human well-being because the mass of
people, with selfish motives and purposes, are likely
to put information and power to poor use.
Lilienthal 's development strategy, based on materialist
assumptions and geared toward unfettered mass consumption,
stood in sharp contrast to the human engineering that
Morgan believed would effectively redesign the moral and
economic landscapes of the Tennessee Valley.®
In all of his work, Lilienthal stressed that the
foundation of progress was material growth. He distanced
himself from the social planners, at one point stating that
8Morgan, Making of the TVA
. pp. 181-182.
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"I Wish to call this a discussion of regional development.
I prefer the word development to the word planning because
the word planning has so often been misused and
misinterpreted." In another coded attack on Morgan,
Lilienthal offered that "the Government's function is not
to devise forms and molds in which to pour the average man,
but rather to give the average man his chance to show what
is in him." No elite, he charged, "should prescribe for the
people a set of standards and institutions... and then
impose those, willy-nilly, upon the men and women of the
community." After a meeting at the White House where he
spent some time talking with Eleanor Roosevelt,
Lilienthal 's notes in his journal laid out his deep
mistrust of social planning. "Mrs. Roosevelt said a few
things about the TVA story that pleased me a lot," he
wrote
.
I have long felt that she was a beautiful spirit, but
that she had the social worker angle on a world that
is tough and bitter and hardly amenable to such
tampering with symptoms. Her efforts at Arthurdale and
Crossville [two of the early resettlement programs]
always pained me.
The causes of social ills were economic, he believed.
Healing these ills was the government's responsibility.'
^Lilienthal, Address to Seminar on Planning, Harvard
Graduate School of Public Administration, 22 November 1941;
Address to Knoxville Rotary Club, 1 August 1933, Lilienthal
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By contrast, Arthur Morgan hoped to make the Tennessee
Valley the site of a bold and massive experiment in social
planning and regional development. His ideas were part of a
strong current in American social thought among critics of
large-scale industrialization. This critique, voiced most
prominently by Lewis Mumford and sociologist Howard Odum •
s
southern regionalists
, decried the unchecked growth of
industrialism that choked the life out of the cities and
overwhelmed the rural periphery. The Depression confirmed
their worst fears. The lines of unemployed factory workers
and the drawn faces of the rural poor served as graphic
evidence of the failures of unplanned development. The
regionalists envisioned diversified and decentralized
industry in the countryside. Electricity was an integral
component of most decentralist programs; electric power was
clean power. The scattered towns in which homes were heated
and factories powered by the silent servant were not
poisoned by the coal-burning furnaces that cast a pall over
so much of the modern industrial landscape. Because the
power could be strung out to villages blessed with neither
coal nor waterpower sites, the dispersal of industry would
be both technologically and economically viable. In their
landmark work, American Regionalism , Odum and co-author
Papers, Boxes 60 and 18, respectively; Lilienthal, Journals , I,
p. 236.
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Harry Moore claim that regionalism "offers a medium and
technique of decentralization and redistribution.
To Morgan, the TVA seemed to be the perfect vehicle
for effecting this transformation. Not only would the
agency's commitment to hydropower fuel regionalism, but its
legislative charter afforded the type of discretionary
powers that Morgan's planners would need. In charge of a
federal agency with a mandate to coordinate previously
disparate activities within the Tennessee River's basin,
Morgan implicitly understood that the agency's
administrative autonomy gave planners more actual power
than they enjoyed in any other government niche. As board
chair, he devoted the first meetings of the three directors
in 1933 to lengthy monologues on policies that ranged from
plans for confiscation and reforestation of exhausted
farmland to studies of "the proper functions of the real
estate man in an organized society." It was precisely this
commitment to "human engineering" that precipitated the
administrative coup of that first August. Lilienthal and
Harccurt Morgan had no desire to see the Tennessee Valley
turned into a laboratory for the social planners from what
^°Howard W. Odum and Harry E. Moore, Southern Regionalism
(New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1938), p. 9.
Thomas Hughes's recent synthesis, American Genesis , explores
Morgan's intellectual ties to Mumford and the other regional ists
.
As I will argue below, however, Hughes perpetuates the notion
that regionalism was the philosophy underlying development
strategies at the TVA. See Hughes, chapter 8, "Tennessee Valley
and Manhattan Engineer District."
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Lilienthal once derisively labeled "the Survey Graph in
group," for the journal through which many of the planners
circulated their ideas."
Through the early years at the agency, it became
increasingly clear that Lilienthal and Arthur Morgan
differed over economic as well as social philosophy. The
chair's uneasiness with Lilienthal 's credit expansion
policies at the EHFA reflected Morgan's fundamental
opposition to the entire consumptionist program. Morgan's
hostility was probably deepened and made much more rigid by
his personal affinity for austere and simple living— a
remnant, his biographer suggests, of the puritanical
influences of his youth. As he had stated in discussions of
the EHFA, Morgan opposed drawing people into debt for goods
that in his considered opinion they did not really need.
His regionalist sensibilities also led him to oppose
attracting large-scale industry to the Valley. He did not
want his agency to turn the region into another stark
industrial landscape, similar to so much of the Northeast
and Midwest; he did not want the Tennessee Valley to
become, as one writer had proposed, "the American Ruhr."
What Morgan did want was the TVA to foster the
development of mixed industrial-agricultural communities,
^Arthur Morgan memorandum to H. A. Morgan and Lilienthal,
30 July 1933, reprinted in Joint Investigation ; testimony of
Harcourt A. Morgan, 2 6 May 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA ,
pp. 100-102 and 98-99, respectively; Lilienthal, Journals . I, p.
62 .
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Similar to those in the Interior Department's Subsistence
Homesteads program and Agriculture's Resettlement
Administration (later the Farm Security Administration), in
a memo prepared for the introductory meetings of the TVA
board, Morgan suggested studying the possibilities of
developing small industries in "industrial and agricultural
communities." The economic assumptions underlying these
ideas were linked to the overproductionist theories
associated with the first Agricultural Adjustment Act and
the National Recovery Administration. Designed to stem the
tide of urbanization, advocates of such projects maintained
that the small plots of land worked by the community
residents would provide food crops for home use, taking
pressure off the glutted markets for staple crops. The
light industries in the towns, producing smaller domestic
and farm items such as shoes, clothes, simple furniture,
and hand tools for local consumption, would offer
employment that was insulated somewhat from the cyclical
vagaries of market forces. During the occasional slack
periods in these factories, families could turn to more
intensive cultivation of their small plots for subsistence
and perhaps even some truck produce if wages fell short.
^^Morgan memo to Lilienthal and H. A. Morgan, 30 July 1933.
For more on the various resettlement programs, see Conkin
Tomorrow a New World ; for studies of the overproductionist theme
in the AAA and NRA, see Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the
Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press,
1954) ; Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind In American
Civilization. Volume 5. 1918-1933 (New York, Augustus M. Kelly,
In a speech at the University of Tennessee, Morgan
elaborated on his regionalist vision. What if, he
suggested, one town set up a small shoe factory, and
another town set up a furniture plant. Morgan admitted that
these firms "may be relatively inefficient," lacking the
supposed benefits of economies of scale, "but those people
[Valley inhabitants] are sitting there doing nothing." with
complementary light industries scattered through the
Valley, the TVA could assist in the formation of
distribution cooperatives that would allow people to help
themselves instead of "doing nothing." Morgan maintained
that this came at no cost to the national economy. "This is
not taking away business from the rest of the country," he
claimed, "because they don't have any money to spend."
From Morgan's perspective, the greatest obstacle to
this program's success was the dominant sway of mass
production industries. "In the furniture town," he noted in
his University speech
,
the people buy their shoes not from this little shoe
factory, but from St. Louis; they have got their
credit and advertising lines, they have got their
1969) ; and, Ellis W. Hawley, New Deal and the Problem of
Monopoly. A Study in Economic Ambivalence ( Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1966)
.
Regionalists never made clear why these small-scale shoe and
garment shops would not be subj ect to the grave cycl ical swings
that had traditionally hit that sector as hard as producer goods
firms
•
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traveling men out, the channels of trade all run to
those big mass production centers.
It would take new institutions and some modest economic
compulsion to break away from the region's unhealthy
dependence on the industrial core. The cooperatives would
be the institutional innovation; the compulsion would come
in the form of regional scrip. The TVA chair suggested that
the cooperatives would buy the local products using a local
currency, good only within the Valley. The small factories
would pay wages in the scrip and, "in that way, home shoes
would, in some degree, outlaw St. Louis shoes." Compelling
the Valley's workers to buy from each other in this manner
was necessary, Morgan argued, "to break across the deep-
worn channels of trade which all lead into and out of the
great commercial centers." His speeches were often laced
with an air of millenarianism. Led to the new world by the
TVA's social planners, Morgan envisioned that the Valley's
inhabitants "can be the individualist [s] of American
industrial life. With artistic and scientific guidance, he
can make the goods which America needs to take the curse
off its mass-production civilization." Morgan insisted that
a regionalist solution was the only cure for the ills that
plagued the Valley.
^^Material from the speech can be found in Morgan's
testimony, 19 July 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA . pp. 331-
333, and in Talbert, FDR's Utopian , pp. 124-125; individualist of
American industrial life quote as cited in Jonathan Mitchell,
"Utopia— Tennessee Valley Style," The New Republic . 18 October
268
The core of Morgan's message was lost as critics
focused their scorn on what they considered the more naive
aspects of his remarks. Morgan's nemeses in the press
jumped on the call for a local currency; in a biting
parody, George Fort Milton made Morgan the target for some
editorial barbs, portraying the scrip issue and Morgan's
support for reviving regional crafts and culture as a silly
proposal for folk dancing and a currency based on
coonskins. After a visit to the Valley, Maury Maverick
explained to readers of The New Republic
^
the atmosphere is— I cannot express myself exactly,
since I am only a congressman, and therefore lack the
cultural and scientific knowledge possessed by some of
the TVAers. But the air somewhat rarified, and I am
sure I heard the swishing of long wings and saw Green
Pastures and De Lawd (Morgan)."
Other critics were equally harsh, if less sarcastic. In The
New Republic
. Jonathan Mitchell advised that "Dr. Morgan
1933, p. 272.
In a 1984 article, social critic Jane Jacobs claimed that
the TVA "failed" to develop a prosperous and balanced regional
economy because it never implemented this agenda. Using the work
of theorists such as Charles Sabel, she pointed to the emergence
of localized industrial sectors that have embraced "flexible
specialization" as a contemporary example of the economic mode
promoted by Morgan. Laying aside the issue of flexible
specialization's relative merit as a system and as a tool of
analysis, Jacobs seems to have overdrawn the comparison.
Advocates of flexible specialization see it as an alternative or
a complement to mass production, but they situate their model
within a global economy. Morgan's regionalism was autarchic and
anti-modern— with little resemblance to either the theory or
practice of flexible specialization.
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and his associates ought to drop, at once, their fantasy of
an independent, sovereign Tennessee Valley." Mitchell
declared the idea that the Valley could turn inward for its
economic and moral sustenance to be "so much romantic
mush." Throughout his years at the TVA, and indeed well
beyond, Morgan found himself constantly explaining his
comments regarding real estate brokers and a coonskin
currency. The more germane points of his developmental
agenda were lost.^^
Morgan certainly had a Utopian vision that featured
some of the more ambitious elements of social planners.
However, Arthur Morgan was no lone eccentric. For many
years, the back-to-the-land ideas underlying the drive for
decentralized agricultural-industrial villages had been
percolating through various networks of intellectuals and
policy-makers. The massive unemployment that hit especially
hard in the industrial core lent credence to these
analysts, and the New Deal created the institutional
possibilities for such experimentation. If Morgan's critics
in the press found much to ridicule in his proposals, the
TVA chair did find supporters as well. Chester Crowell
portrayed the dream of regional Utopias in much more
sympathetic terms. Echoing Morgan, Crowell noted that mass
production industry was not suited to the Tennessee Valley,
^^Milton editorial, Chattanooga News . November 1933;
Mitchell, "Utopia— TVA style," p. 272.
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but the rich resources of the region are "usable in a self-
contained community of small industries living to serve the
surrounding agriculturalists." Crowell also defended the
"native handicrafts and arts" that George Milton skewered.
For some, the decentralist path to Utopia was considerably
more than "romantic mush."^^
Support was not limited to ivory tower thinkers who
invaded the federal bureaucracy during the 1930s. As
Governor of New York, Franklin Roosevelt had supported
small-scale resettlement ventures; as president, Roosevelt
continued to encourage these programs, appointing
decentralists such as M. L. Wilson and Morgan to
administrative posts in several agencies. As late as 1939,
by which time Morgan was gone and the New Deal's community
programs marginalized, Roosevelt was still making speeches
that resonated with the timber of his original TVA
chairman. On a trip to his Warm Springs home, the President
stated, "I went to buy a pair of shoes, and the only shoes
I could buy had been made in Boston, or Binghamton, New
York, or St. Louis." To be sure, by 1939 decentralism was
little more than a vestigial remnant within the Roosevelt
administration. The President's sentiment nonetheless
illustrates his lingering affinity for a philosophy that
figured prominently in the early New Deal's commitment to
^^Chester T. Crowell, "Tennessee Valley, A Prevision of
Utopia," The Literary Digest , 17 March 1934, p. 6.
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"bold, persistent experimentation." Rather than the
ramblings of an eccentric Utopian, Arthur Morgan's policies
were squarely situated within one of the currents in the
New Deal mainstream J*^
Yet Arthur Morgan was less concerned with being in any
mainstream than he was with being on what he saw as the
"right" side of any issue. This became clear as he turned
his critique of the mass production system against the
TVA's own cheap power policy— easily the most visible and
popular of the agency's programs. Morgan was more than
hostile to the philosophy driving the program; he disputed
Lilienthal's claim that the low rates had spurred the great
increases in domestic consumption. The massive promotional
efforts of the TVA and the agricultural extension service,
speeches by the President in Corinth and Tupelo, and
canvassers for the EHFA had made the Valley "intensely
power conscious," Morgan claimed. In essence, he believed
^"^On M. L. Wilson and the Subsistence Homesteads program,
see Conkin, Tomorrow A New World ; on the Resettlement
Administration, see Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics; The
Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration (Chapel
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Roosevelt
speech, 30 March 1939, as cited in Schulman, Cotton Belt to
Sunbelt
. p. 7. Reflecting the influence of Conkin and a personal
affinity for the Morgan faction at the Authority, Thomas McCraw
described Morgan's ideas as "sound and desirable" if "frankly
experimental and tentative." McCraw, The Feud , p. 35.
The notion that Morgan's ideas were eccentric persists in
the contemporary historiography. Even in his sympathetic
biography, Roy Talbert Jr. describes Morgan's plans as
"fascinating simply because of the unconventional activities that
he considered proper in the social and economic development of a
region." Talbert, FDR's Utopian , esp. chapter 6, "TVA Utopia."
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that the promotional efforts were appealing to the most
base material desires. These practices ran across the
entire grain of Morgan's personality. Not only did they
encourage what to his mind was excessive consumption, but
they also hid the true cost of TVA power, thereby
undermining the validity of the yardstick. For Morgan this
was sheer pretense; Lilienthal was disingenuously hiding
subsidies that never made it into the account books of the
power division. He also charged that the TVA coerced
farmers seeking the extension of power lines into buying
appliances that would guarantee a set load before the
agency agreed to string a line into the potential
customers' area. At the congressional hearings, Morgan
explained that in these cases "it was not so much a case of
having the establishment of low rates followed by a
spectacular and immediate increase in use as it was a
matter of compelling prospective customers to commit
themselves in advance to use amounts far in excess of the
national or local average." Morgan balked at the use of
compulsion to spur the takeoff of a Fordist economy,
willing, as he was, to use compulsion to nurture small-
scale industry, or to confiscate lands exhausted by the
region's hardscrabble farmers. "For some of these
consumers," Morgan concluded, "smaller use [of electricity]
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at higher rates, with less money invested in appliances,
would have been better personal economy. "^^
By the time he testified before Congress in 1938,
Morgan had little political influence. He and his core
supporters remained convinced that he was morally right,
but an ethical vocabulary did not translate well in
Washington, nor did it in the households of Americans (in
and outside of the Tennessee Valley) who were receiving
lower utility bills in their mail. The mass consumptionist
solution that Lilienthal had pressed since his years at the
Wisconsin PSC was clearly ascendant.''^
Lilienthal 's ideas stood as the antithesis to
virtually every component of Morgan's regionalism. The
younger director favored large-scale industry, mass
production, and unabashed materialism. In a 1934 speech to
the region's policy-makers at the University of
^'^Morgan testimony, 25 May 1938, Joint Committee
Investigation , pp. 44-48. Requiring rural districts to contract
for a predetermined floor on kwh consumption was common practice.
Ontario Hydro, the model for so much of the TVA's power program,
had set this precedent in order to justify the cost of rural line
extensions. See Fleming, Power At Cost , pp. 136-143.
^^In August 1939, Morgan sent a letter to the approximately
350 people that contributed over $28,000 to a "defense fund" for
him. Not deterred by the committee's findings, Morgan charged
that the investigation was "inadequate as to the manner of its
conduct, as well as to the report." Morgan circular, 7 August
1939, copy in William Leiserson Papers, Box 27, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin.
As will be noted below, the labor economist Leiserson had a
strong personal loyalty to Morgan dating to their years together
at Antioch College, although Leiserson also had strong
reservations regarding Morgan's position on organized labor.
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Chattanooga, Lilienthal delivered an obvious rejoinder to
Morgan. Adherents of regionalism, he stated,
suggest that it might be better to go back to an ideal
of a self-contained economy-- an economy in which
handicraft and small industry takes the place of
large-scale manufacturing.... I do not share this
foreboding, nor do I see an avenue of escape from our
problems in the economic order they propose. It seems
to me plain that our first duty must be in some way to
increase the flow of goods, for it is only in terms of
goods that we are hungry or well fed, are able to
enjoy life's riches or have them denied.... It is not
the abundance of goods that makes men starve in the
presence of plenty. A return to scarcity would better
the lot of all.
Lilienthal continued, "the income of our people in terms of
goods must be increased, or all our hopes must die. And
large-scale industry, controlled in the interest of the
community, can provide us that increased flow of goods."
The Fordist solution was the only alternative, he
insisted . ^'
While Lilienthal hoped to attract a variety of
manufacturers to the Valley, he concentrated on the energy-
intensive sector commonly found clustered around sources
of
19
Chattanoog
Lilienthal, Address to the Tennessee Valley Institute,
a, 21 April 1934, Lilienthal Papers, Box 18.
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Cheap power, for which, he noted, "power is a dominant cost
factor." Many could use the mineral resources of the
region. Electroprocessing industries, including aluminum
and chemical plants were a key. The aluminum giant Alcoa
already had a presence in the Valley, and Reynolds came as
well. Lilienthal enjoyed maneuvering on the national scene,
and the plants he helped draw to the region read like a
list of the country's mining and chemical giants. Electro-
Metallurgical, a division of Union Carbide and Carbon,
Wolverine Tube, a Calumet and Hecla subsidiary, and
Chemstrand, one of Monsanto 's artificial fiber groups, all
came to the Valley. The TVA's power section found the
larger firms particularly suited to the agency's load
forecasts. The big corporations had the capital sufficient
to build their own stand-by power plants, and could buy
large blocks of secondary power in addition to contracting
for primary, or uninterruptible, kilowatts. This provided a
stable market for all TVA power, enabling the Authority to
sell this secondary power when the dams had to release
water for flood control purposes. Lilienthal personally
oversaw much of the negotiations with the national firms.
The smaller plants, often textile and garment mills already
common to the South, did not become direct customers of the
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TVA, buying their power from the municipalities and rural
cooperatives that purchased wholesale power.
It comes as no surprise that the missing piece in
Lilienthal's Fordist solution was high wages. Low labor
costs, after all, had been the traditional calling card
when southern boosters had gone knocking on industrialists'
doors. Geographically uneven development and the
distortions of the Jim Crow labor market had left factory
wages in the entire South far below the national average.
By any measure, the Tennessee Valley lagged behind the rest
of the country; it was a drag on national recovery. Looking
at the numbers, Lilienthal admitted to being daunted. "No
one need point out to you the tragedy behind those
figures," he told an audience at the University of Georgia.
Nonetheless, "our job was not to wring our hands but to
face these facts, and to set about to do something to
change them. ... We cannot have a sound national prosperity
if any region of the country suffers under a low income."
^°Lilienthal , Address of 21 April 1934; James Dahir, Region
Building. Communitv Development Lessons from the Tennessee Valley
(New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 82-93; Testimony of
Julius Krug, 7-8 December 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA ,
pp. 5228-5233, and 5293-5305.
On the development of industry in the Niagara region and
around the Bonneville Power Administration, see Robert Belfield,
"The Niagara Frontier: The Evolution of Electric Power Systems in
New York and Ontario, 1880-1935 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1981), and Paul J. Raver, "Government
Action and Private Enterprise in River Valley Development: A
Public Administrator's View," American Economic Review 41 (1951),
p. 292.
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Development in the Valley and recovery for the country
depended on the expansion of high-wage employment
.
For Lilienthal, part of the solution lay in his large-
scale industry strategy. The lumber and textile industries
already in place thrived in a low-wage environment, and
Morgan's regionalist approach would bring no capital for
development or for wages. The national firms, however,
would create the kind of jobs that Lilienthal sought. Their
wage scales were relatively high, and likely to go higher
because of unionization. Beginning with section 7A of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, and later with the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act, the federal
government had created a more favorable environment for
organized labor. This was particularly true among larger
firms engaged in interstate commerce. James Dahir, an
economist who studied the TVA's development program in the
1950s, explained the approach. "Big companies not only
bring big payrolls, but often good labor-management
relations." The (need name), affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations, represented workers at
Electro-Metallurgical beginning in 1939, and the company
went through its first fifteen years without a strike. An
^^On the debilitating effects of the segregated labor
market, see Gavin Wright, Old South. New South. Revolutions in
the Southern Economv since the Civil War (New York, Basic Books,
1986), esp. pp. 196-217; also see the introduction to Schulman,
From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt ; Lilienthal, Address to the Institute
of Public Affairs, University of Georgia, 29 October 1936, as
cited in Schulman, p. 37.
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American Federation of Labor union (again, need name) was
the collective bargaining agent for Reynolds Aluminum
workers, and the company's labor relations were a model of
job and wage security— the prerequisites for establishing
a consumption-driven economy. By the 1950s, over two-thirds
of the workforce were long-term employees with benefits
that included paid vacations and health insurance. In the
event that management proved uncooperative, coercion was an
option. The regulatory force of an activist state could
compel recalcitrant firms to deal with organized labor, as
Lilienthal had implied when he stated in Chattanooga that
"large-scale industry" could be "controlled in the interest
of the community . "^^
^^For an overview of the New Deal's labor legislation, see
Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions. Labor
Relations^ Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America,
1880-1960 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985) ; Dahir,
Region Building
, p. 105.
Lilienthal delivered the Chattanooga speech in 1934, well
before the passage of the NLRA. However, many pro-labor elements
inside and outside the administration were using the NRA's
section 7A as a wedge for organizing, and were pressing for
further legislation. See J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator Robert F.
Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism (New York, Atheneum,
1968) .
French political theorist Michel Aglietta explained the
importance of factors such as job security and insurance in
maintaining a consumptionist economy. Purchases of houses, cars,
and various consumer durables, the so-called big-ticket items,
"presupposed a vast socialization of finance.... It still
remained essential to limit the consequences of capitalist
insecurity on employment and on the formation of individual
wages, so as not to break the continuity of the consumpticpn
process, and in order to enable the workers to meet the financial
commitments contracted with the acquisition of their consumer
goods." Aglietta, trans, by David Fernbach, A Theory of
Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London, Verso, 1979) p.
159.
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The Authority itself was one of the largest employers
in the Valley. One of Arthur Morgan's first decisions at
the TVA was to break with the standard government practice
of contracting out construction projects. Morgan had
considerable experience in flood control, and he was
dissatisfied with the inefficiencies and delays he believed
were inherent to the public contracting procedures.
Alienated as well by the harsh labor practices of the
private contractors that he had seen building various dams,
Morgan got the board's approval to build TVA dams by "force
account." The TVA hired its own people and supervised its
own construction. At its height in the late 1930s, the
agency employed over 13,000 people, most of them in work
crews at the dam sites.
Morgan and Lilienthal became involved in shaping a
labor relations policy for the agency. Both shared a
commitment to creating a positive environment for labor-
management relations, and shared the progressive faith in
using administrative machinery to avoid such supposedly
irrational practices as strikes and work slowdowns. They
had more pragmatic reasons for this commitment as well.
Morgan's reputation as an expert hydraulic engineer would
be severely tested by the massive building program and the
intricacies of water control on such a grand scale.
"owen. The TVA . pp. 21-23; Testimony of Gordon Clapp, 5
August 1938, Joint Investigation of the TVA. pp. 1550-1551.
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Lilienthal understood that building the dams quickly and
efficiently would put more power on line faster,
facilitating lower electric rates. Even with their
different visions for the agency, both poured their hearts
into the Authority, fully aware that efficient execution
of their program would provide political security against
critics in the private sector and in Congress.
In formulating an employee policy for the Authority,
Arthur Morgan called upon William Leiserson, an old friend
from his years at Antioch College. A student of the
patriarch of labor economics, John R. Commons, Leiserson
had taught at the Yellow Springs school during Morgan's
presidency. Described by one historian as "one of the most
important figures in the development of labor relations
policy during the New Deal," Leiserson relished the chance
to draw up from scratch an employee policy for the new
agency. He brought with him another significant figure in
the field— Otto Beyer, the architect of a well-known
cooperative plan on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. They
designed a program that closely resembled the B & O Plan,
setting up joint cooperative committees to discuss work
practices, safety, and morale.
^^Tomlins, The State and the Unions , p. 79; on Leiserson's
involvement with the TVA, see the Leiserson Papers, Boxes 5, 27,
and 40, "Beyer," "Arthur Morgan," and "TVA" folders, SHSW; two
surveys of the TVA's Employee Relations Policy are Robert S.
Avery, Experiment in Management. Personnel Decentralization in
the Tennessee Valley Authority (Knoxville, University of
Tennessee Press, 1954), and Avery, "The TVA and Labor Relations:
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But despite Morgan and Lilienthal's shared commitment
to labor-management cooperation, the two directors once
again split. In this instance, the conflict centered upon
the proper role of organized labor in the cooperative
program and more generally in the collective bargaining
process. Morgan was deeply ambivalent about the labor
movement. Although he was highly critical of company unions
such as that on the Pennsylvania Railroad, serving only as
a tool of management, Morgan believed that a truly
cooperative environment would eliminate the need for
independent unions. National unions, industrial or trade-
based, were the institutional response to hostile
management and perpetuated the outmoded system of class
conflict, which Morgan maintained would wither away upon
the birth of a new cooperative era. These ideas troubled
even Leiserson, who remained loyal to Morgan throughout the
conflict with Lilienthal, but who privately described some
of the chairman's writings on the subject as "Morgan's
effusion on Company Unions. "^^
The early drafts of the Employee Relations Policy
(ERP) reflected Morgan's ambivalence. Initially, the ERP
skirted the issue of labor's right to choose its own
representatives, and would have established the TVA as an
A Review," Journal of Politics 16 (1954): 413-440.
^^Morgan testimony, 29 August 1938, Joint Investigation of
the TVA
. pp. 3126-3127; Leiserson to Beyer, 23 July 1935,
Leiserson Papers, Box 5.
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open shop employer. By the time the ERP became policy in
August 1935, there was, according to the agency's personnel
chief, Gordon Clapp, "considerable change in fundamental
principles from the policy which was tentatively
suggested The essential change," Clapp explained,
was to remove any equivocation with respect to whether
or not the rights of labor to organize would be
recognized without qualification, and whether their
rights to designate representatives of their own
choosing would be recognized without qualification.
With these amendments, the ERP guaranteed TVA employees the
right to bargain collectively. It did equivocate slightly
in regard to the closed shop, which the TVA was politically
unable to authorize; with some bureaucratic sleight of
hand, however, the ERP effectively granted the closed shop
by making union membership a "positive factor" in the
annual merit evaluations for employees. As Gordon Clapp
explained this circuitous route toward the closed shop to a
Civil Service assembly in 1937,
in general employee organizations include those
employees who are most concerned about the problems of
the service and consequently should be the ones with
whom management should deal.... Individual employees
and non-union employees if they become sufficiently
concerned, will then seek an opportunity to align
themselves with those organizations that are
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recognized and attempting to assure some
responsibility.
Even the president, who on several occasions had dismissed
the notion of collective bargaining for government workers,
supported the TVA program, hailing it as "the most
significant, if not the only, instance of genuine
collective bargaining in the public service anywhere in the
United States." The final draft of the ERP also highlighted
the Authority's "prevailing rates" payscale which mandated
the TVA to "show due regard for those rates in private
industry that are arrived at through collective
bargaining." Pegging the prevailing wage to union rates
skewed upward the wage cohort against which the TVA's rates
would be set. Reviewing labor policies with the agency's
salaried supervisors, often the least cooperative
participants in the efficiency committee meetings,
Lilienthal cajoled his audience, telling them, "we are not
simply not anti-labor, we are a pro-labor policy
organization. "^^
^^Avery, "The TVA and Labor," pp. 413-419 (Clapp 1937 and
Lilienthal speeches as cited on p. 413, and Roosevelt speech as
cited on p. 419) ; Gordon Clapp testimony, 29 August 1938, Joint
Investigation of the TVA . pp. 3139-3145.
Avery noted that the cooperative program had been moderately
successful, "but they have fallen short of their goal of
developing a fully effective spirit of teamwork. . . caused
primarily by the fact that there are still segments of management
who have never been completely sold on the value of the program."
"TVA and Labor," p. 423.
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Clapp noted that these changes in the ERP emerged as
the direct result of "negotiations with organized labor."
M. H. Hedges of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers testified at the Congressional hearings that it was
David Lilienthal who brought the unions into the process.
As early as September 1933, Lilienthal was holding
conferences up and down the Valley with union
representatives. He brought together thirteen building
trade unions affiliated with the AFofL and sought their
counsel. These unions comprised the crafts that were needed
to construct the TVA's dams and install its massive
hydroelectric generators. With Lilienthal 's support, the
local officers of the thirteen building trades formed the
Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council, which oversaw
the cooperative committees at all dam sites and coordinated
the bargaining activities of its constituent
organizations
.
Unlike Morgan, Lilienthal believed that unions were
integral to his development program. Collective bargaining
would maintain a high-wage economy, but it would also
ensure industrial peace and elevate the productivity of a
disciplined workforce. He spoke about the ERP to labor
audiences across the country promoting the program, and not
incidentally, promoting as well his own role in its
^''Testimony of Gordon Clapp and M. H. Hedges, Joint
Investigation of the TVA , p. 3145 and pp. 3361-3364,
respectively.
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formation. In fact, after the board members endorsed the
policy in August 1935, they postponed announcing its
implementation until Labor Day, at Lilienthal's suggestion,
as "a sort of Labor Day gift." He went to Detroit to
present the "gift" and in his speech made only passing
references to Arthur Morgan's pivotal role as the architect
of the Authority's force account construction program and
the initiator of the ERP process. This bothered Morgan, who
quite correctly saw it as brazen self-aggrandizement on the
part of the agency's most junior director. Irrespective of
this self-promotion, it is clear that without Lilienthal,
the ERP would not have provided any protection for
organized labor; he factored unions into the TVA equation.
By 1938, over 90 percent of the Authority's wage-scale
employees were members of the thirteen craft unions
comprising the Trades and Labor Council.
Lilienthal went to Detroit not simply as a ploy for
greater self-exposure, but because he understood the
national implications of his plans for regional
development. He spoke outside the Valley because he
believed that the Authority's programs must economically
integrate the region into the nation. The Fordism embraced
by Lilienthal had no use for isolated pockets of economic
growth. In this scheme, the Tennessee Valley could be
^^Morgan to Leiserson, 23 April 1938, Leiserson Papers, Box
40; Clapp testimony, Joint Investigation of the TVA , p. 3147.
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neither an economy unto itself, regenerated but unable to
mesh within a broader economic tapestry, nor could it
remain a backwater of unproductive agriculture and
sweatshop industries. Spurred by his high-wage, cheap power
policies, Lilienthal envisioned the Valley as
the scene of an expansion of industry which in the
course of the coming decade will change the economic
life of the South.... Fitted into a national program,
it will stimulate and regenerate the industrial life
of all America. We in the Tennessee Valley area, in a
very real sense, face a new frontier— an industrial
frontier.
Lilienthal did not limit his vision to increased power
consumption, or to a more prominent role for himself.
Rather, he linked the Authority's success to national
recovery and economic growth.^'
It was fairly common for advocates of a growth-
oriented economy to frame their positions in terms of the
frontier. The notion that the closing of the western
frontier foreclosed certain avenues of economic opportunity
persisted into the 1930s, reinforced by the deep
retrenchment of the Depression. Growth proponents
maintained that the mass consumption program opened a new
frontier. Gardiner C. Means thus stated that "the closing
of the geographical frontier and the declining rate of
29Lilienthal, Chattanooga Speech, 21 April 1934.
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population growth" did not have to lead inevitably to "a
decline in markets and a contracting economy. If increased
buying power were to become available to the mass of
consumers, some of the increase would be saved but the bulk
would be spent on consumption." Underdeveloped and its
potential for mass consumption untapped, the Tennessee
Valley was part of this new industrial frontier. ^°
If the Valley's prosperity depended upon national
recovery, then the region's growth could not come at the
expense of the ailing industrial core. Lilienthal was not
interested in attracting old firms in flight from the
industrially mature Northeast and Midwest. No revival could
be sustained in the South if it was built upon the
misfortune of workers and communities in other parts of the
country. "It will be a sad day for Southern industry,"
lectured Lilienthal,
if the presence of a new factory here means merely the
creation of an industrial graveyard in New England, or
some other section. What I see for this area is an
economically sound growth of commerce and
manufacturing, which will fit itself into a national
economy
.
^°Gardiner C. Means, "Basic Structural Characteristics and
the Problem of Full Employment," in, National Resource Planning
Board, The Structure of the American Economy. II. Toward Full Use
of Resources (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 7.
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Lilienthal understood that the various regions were
mutually dependent. Regional growth derived from an
economic equation that needed to be balanced on both sides.
Lilienthal had asserted that subsidized appliance purchases
in the South meant manufacturing jobs in the Northeast and
Midwest. Similarly, a vibrant industrial core would create
demand for the Valley's products. Mutually balanced growth
would move the country beyond a zero-sum scramble over a
shrinking or stagnant economic pie.''^
To a degree, Lilienthal succeeded. From 1940-1948, the
Tennessee Valley region added over 1,400 new manufacturing
and processing plants to its industrial base; only nine of
these were "transplants" drawn away from another region. In
1929, the size of the Valley's industrial workforce had
stood at only 49 industrial workers per 1,000 inhabitants
—
less than one-half the national average. Twenty years
later, the Valley had over 80 industrial workers per 1,000,
still less than the national figure of 107, but a
proportional improvement. Over the same period, the
region's wages and salaries had increased by 255 percent,
whereas the national increase had been 127 percent.
Undoubtedly, the Tennessee Valley was still poorer and less
developed than the country taken as a whole, but after two
Lilienthal, Chattanooga speech.
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decades of cheap power and TVA-induced growth, the region's
second-class status was considerably less pronounced.
But despite advances, the region remained the nation's
poor country cousin, and the limits to Lilienthal's
expansionary policies mimic the strategic flaws in the
later New Deal's entire economic program. During 1936-1938,
Roosevelt had attempted to break the power of the
conservative Congressional Democrats, and had tied these
efforts to a total reconstruction of the Southern economy
through legislation such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which, in its initial form, would have established a
national minimum wage, broad in its reach, with no regional
differentiations. Despite briefly grasping victory in
Claude Pepper's successful 1938 senatorial campaign, this
strategy fell short. The southern Bourbon Democrats
retained considerable political power and were able to
prolong the death rattle of the region's dual labor market.
The administration curtailed the reformist implications of
the later New Deal, including any cautious steps toward
social democratic fiscal and labor policies that would have
initiated a modest redistribution in the national income.
^^William E. Cole, "The Impact of the TVA upon the
Southeast," Social Forces 28 (1950), p. 438.
^^For an overview of the southern Democrats, see James T.
Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal. The
Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939
(Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1967) ; on the "Southern
Strategy" and the implications its failure had upon national
policies, see, Fraser, "The Labor Question," and Brinkley, "The
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But the collapse of Lilienthal's vision for a new
social order in the Tennessee Valley resulted as much from
inherent flaws in its design as from external political
forces. In fact, choices made by Lilienthal in his
formulation of TVA policy that provided short-term benefits
to the agency ultimately undermined Lilienthal's
realization of the most radical implications of his
keynesian agenda. Three issues in particular highlight
this
—
his decision to join forces with H.A. Morgan, the
close ties forged between the agency and the AFofL building
trades, and the political alliance with the so-called
"power roughnecks" such as Lister Hill, John Sparkman, and
John Rankin. All of these steps worked at cross-purposes.
They strengthened Lilienthal's position and secured the
Authority's existence, but they also effectively narrowed
the range of political possibilities. In the late 1930s,
the language of redistributive keynesianism was an
insurgent ideological discourse, spoken in the North by
industrial unionists and their political allies. In the
South, there was no institutional counterpart to the
northern insurgency. Still, there were social forces,
however malnourished, that represented oppositional
politics in the South. Lilienthal would have had to forge
alliances with these groups, but they lacked the political
New Deal and the Idea of the State," both in Fraser and Gerstle,
eds.. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order .
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capital that he sought in the short-terra. As a result of
the ties he made with conservative political forces,
Lilienthal ensured the ultimate collapse of his own
agenda
.
To create a democracy of mass consumption in the
valley, Lilienthal would have had to challenge the
segregated labor market that debased the wage structure for
blacks and whites in the South. Not only did the low wage
levels limit in a very practical way people's ability to
consume, but the rhetoric of the Jim Crow system undermined
any challenges to the political and economic status quo.
Lilienthal 's carefully measured tactical steps made such a
strategic leap impossible. Whenever the Authority was under
fire, Lilienthal turned to the "power roughnecks" in
Congress. Working closely with Rankin and Lister Hill, one
of the original co-sponsors of TVA's enabling legislation,
Lilienthal found allies who fought hard for cheap power and
for bringing modern conveniences such as electric irons
into their region's homes. However, when the logic of
Lilienthal 's agenda led to reforms that might disrupt the
segregated labor market, these men balked. They resisted
efforts to integrate the TVA workforce, and fought a
successful rearguard battle against the FLSA that greatly
weakened the law and helped perpetuate, for a time, the
^^On the nature of this movement in the North and its
weakness in the South, see Fraser, Labor Will Rule , pp. 289-406.
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segregated southern labor market. The roughnecks also
struggled with the industrial unionists for control of the
Democratic party, battling to weaken the influence of the
union's policy arm, CIO-PAC.
As in the national struggles, their efforts at the
Authority had a profound impact. For example, the agency
was proud of a stated policy of hiring blacks in direct
proportion to their percentages within the region's
population, approximately eleven percent. However, almost
every black person employed by the TVA worked in unskilled
laborer positions. Even the most modest, painfully cautious
steps toward an integrated labor force brought down these
roughnecks' ire, and further narrowed the TVA's ideological
range. When John Rankin berated the agency for
administering its clerical staff aptitude tests to several
black women, Lilienthal wrote in his journals, "felt it
[administering the exam] was right, but untimely as hell."
He never did say when the time would be right. Lilienthal 's
ties to the AFofL building trades also contributed to the
Authority's caution. These craft unions had virtually no
apprentice program in the South for blacks, and by agreeing
to draw on the local labor pool, the TVA could not move
beyond the South 's traditional labor practices.
^^On the race issue at the TVA, see Grant, TVA and Black
Americans
;
Lilienthal, Journals, I, p. 630;
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Working so closely with the AFofL's building trades,
noted for their staunchly racist membership practices, and
unwilling to move too far beyond the racial sensibilities
of its Congressional backers, the TVA crippled its own
efforts to forge regional prosperity through mass
consumption. A Monthly Labor Review article in 1938
outlined the implications of these policies for the TVA.
Studying the amount spent on electrical appliances by
"working-class" families across the country, the article
noted that white families in the South had annual average
expenditures almost identical to the other regions. Black
families in the South, however, fell far behind. Incapable
of challenging the dual labor market, the TVA could not
break that system's grip on the region's economy. Despite
some gains wage levels for both black and white workers
would remain depressed, and a significant portion of the
region's population would continue to be excluded from the
economic mainstream— and thus from the mass consumption
equation.
By 194 0, when the New Deal's retreat from reform was
nearly complete, Lilienthal still maintained that multi-
purpose development and water control projects could
transform both the economic and social relations of the
country. After meeting with Culbert Olson, Governor of
^^"Expenditures for Electrical Appliances by Workers in 42
Cities. Monthly Labor Review , 46 (1938), p. 448.
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California, Lilienthal noted that they had discussed Carey
McWilliams's Factories in the Field
,
which details the
emergence of agribusiness in California's irrigated desert
valleys. "I suggested," he wrote,
the proposition that public control and ownership of
essential water supply might serve as a fulcrum for
the effecting of great land reforms in California,
whereas developing the water supply and then turning
it over to large landowners without any thought of the
consequences to average people and smaller farmers
might simply be fastening the chains that already
chafe
.
Such pronouncements, already a familiar theme for
Lilienthal, remained his most common refrain for decades,
as he sold the TVA development model across the world. From
Colombia's Cauca Valley to the Khuzestan region of Iran,
Lilienthal promoted the TVA as a model for bringing
economic growth and social progress to the less-developed
nations.
It seems clear that Lilienthal believed that the TVA
was an engine for both social and economic change. It seems
equally clear, however, that the Authority achieved no
^''Lilienthal, Journals, I, p. 242 ; there is no literature on
Lilienthal 's years as head of Development and Resources
Corporation, which served as a consultant on numerous river
valley projects. A very brief review of this work can be found in
Lilienthal 's obituary in the New York Times , 16 January 1981, p.
Al:4.
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great social transformation. The agency did little to
challenge the region's racial status quo, and the increased
use of electricity and consumption of consumer goods did
little to redistribute wealth or power. Indeed, what
economic growth the TVA did bring to the region came at a
high price. Blurring the line between irony and tragedy,
the long-term implications of the TVA's cheap power
policies were environmental degradation and the
entrenchment of an unresponsive and unaccountable
bureaucracy that does not have to answer to even the
"shareholder democracy" so touted by private corporations.
By the 19 50s, consumption of TVA power had far outpaced the
capacity of its hydroelectric generators, and the agency
had embarked on an ambitious coal plant program. The power
remained cheap because the agency's demand revived the
ailing Eastern coal industry, and supported the expansion
of strip mining across the mountain valleys of Appalachia.
It embraced pollution controls only reluctantly, even
purchasing in 1993 options to pollute from other utilities
under the market-driven reforms of the Clean Air Act. The
Authority developed one of the nation's most extensive
nuclear power programs, hoping to fill the continued growth
in demand that was paced mainly by industry and the
government's atomic research and processing facilities at
Paducah, Kentucky, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. As rates rose,
for neither coal nor nuclear power were as cheap as
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hydroelectricity, and pollution worsened, Valley residents
who tried to alter the TVA's course met with little
success. These people discovered that the agency that had
inscribed on its dams "Built for the People of the United
States" was itself constructed such that it was
inadequately answerable to the citizens it supposedly
served.
Of course the TVA alone could never achieve some
startling social transformation, and the agency's options
were constrained by the political environment. By the late
1930s, the Roosevelt administration had been defeated on
several fronts by a rejuvenated conservative opposition.
Even the institutional centers of social keynesianism in
the country's industrial core had suffered a series of
setbacks. In conjunction with a growing concern with
international events, the once-rising tide for reform had
turned, and was now at an ebb. But it was not simply the
case that external forces served as the Authority's
undoing. At most these forces accelerated the articulation
of tendencies inherent to the TVA and to David Lilienthal's
ideology. Lilienthal was convinced that managerial
technique and material prosperity were the answers to
social progress. He forged an agency molded by that faith.
Unfettered by virtue of its incorporation as a public
authority, the TVA was never a democratically responsible
institution. Driven by a political agenda, Lilienthal never
questioned the technological imperative that lay at the
base of his entire program. He never questioned the
necessity of the bond between production and progress. He
never lost faith in the assumptions of the fordist logic,
and never losing it, he never pushed his political agenda
beyond that faith.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION.
THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION AND THE POLITICS OP
ACCOMMODATION: THE NEW DEAL ORDER IN THE POSTWAR ERA
The Second World War accelerated the conservative
drift at the TVA. The power demands of the defense
industries located in the valley spurred what was
ostensibly a dramatic redefinition of Lilienthal's TVA
power policies. During the war, the Authority sold an
increasing proportion of its power to industrial consumers,
particularly to the energy-intensive plants of the Aluminum
Company of America (Alcoa) . But the ties between the TVA
and such firms went much deeper than simply buying and
selling electric power. For example, TVA worked closely
with Alcoa in the planning of the Valley's power supply.
TVA bought several hydroelectric power plants from Alcoa,
thus securing unified control of the regional water-control
and power system, and in return provided the company with a
guaranteed power load that exceeded the total output from
the dams ceded to the agency. This coordination served the
interests of both public and private-sector bureaucrats.
Along with the wartime supply of power to the
government's atomic research and processing facilities at
Paducah and Oak Ridge, Kentucky, military-industrial
consumption supplanted the TVA's mandated commitment to
provide cheap power to domestic customers. In fact the TVA
sought to discourage greater domestic use during the war
that might siphon off current needed for military purposes;
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Lilienthal proscribed rate cuts by the rural cooperatives
and municipal systems. The shift in priorities was not
simply a function of the war, however, as industrial and
defense-related consumption continued to increase, so that
by the 1950s residential usage accounted for less than half
of the TVA's sales. In the war mobilization the agency had
abandoned its commitment to rural and residential use, and
it never found its way back.
The conservative resurgence of the late 1930s and the
need to meet the demands of the war emergency certainly
contributed to the agency's transformation, but the new
direction of the 1940s also reflected the accommodationist
tendency with Lilienthal 's keynesianism. Since his early
work with appliance executives crafting the EHFA program,
Lilienthal had found common ground with business interests
that supported the TVA's existence. Coordinating the power
needs of the defense industries, Lilienthal discovered the
opportunity to fortify his Authority by pursuing closer
ties to cooperative sectors within corporate America.
Lilienthal 's proprietary interest in the TVA meshed well
with the more conservative political climate. His
commitment to an economic reconstruction of the Valley and
to a redistribution of wealth and power faded.
It is clear that Lilienthal 's unrelenting efforts to
strengthen the TVA's hand had a corrosive effect upon the
agency itself and ultimately exacted a heavy toll on the
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agency's self-expressed ideals of a more equitable social
order. In the process of securing the TVA's future,
Lilienthal and the power staff began to sublimate the
agency's ultimate goal of a grand reconstruction of the
Tennessee Valley that would alter the existing power
structure as fundamentally as it altered domestic
consumption patterns. They began to equate the
legitimation of the agency as an end in itself, rather than
as a means to bolder socio-economic reform.
As Philip Selznick observed, the TVA's rather unique
administrative genesis left it open to overtures by
interest groups that could offer long-term political
support. Selznick shows that this process resulted in the
"co-optation" of the agricultural programs by the most
conservative forces within the Southern farm establishment-
-the Extension Service and Farm Bureau bloc.^ In the case
Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots , see esp. pp.
259-262, "The Cooptative Mechanism."
While Selznick deftly pierces the agency's protective
facade, his study is almost completely focused upon the
agricultural programs. I believe that this poses two
problems. First, because the TVA's activities and its
social identification became increasingly dominated by the
power program, the agency's commitment to a democratic
agenda must be tested by the words and deeds of its power
section. Second, Selznick helped perpetuate the common
assumption that the power section did in fact embrace and
pursue economic reformist policies that are ultimately
tainted only because Lilienthal gave free rein in the farm
realm to H.A. Morgan and the conservatives in order to
isolate A.E. Morgan. Thus Selznick does for the power
program what he would not do for the agricultural section;
he accepts the public identity that the power group created
for itself, without examining the implications of its
actual deeds.
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of the power program, the agency was not co-opted by
outside forces but instead imploded, collapsing into the
most conservative implications of its own agenda. From
within, the power branch began replacing the goal of reform
with the goal of institutional preservation; and although
the two goals may have at first seemed indistinguishable,
they were not. What began to emerge was an institutional
conservatism that slowly moved the TVA away from using
cheap power to foster democratic initiative in the valley.
Lilienthal's insistence that the TVA kilowatts themselves
bore some kind of inherently democratic power pushed the
agency closer toward identifying mass consumption as a goal
rather than as a means of redressing the maldistribution of
wealth and social power that would remain intact long after
domestic power use reached then-unimagined levels.^
Even if Lilienthal had come closer to appreciating the
broader limits of his strategy, he could not possibly have
reconciled those limits within his bureaucratic agenda. The
^The TVA's Canadian progenitor, Ontario Hydro, followed
a remarkably similar trajectory. H. Vivian Nelles observed
that Hydro's controversial origins fostered within the
commission "a heightened instinct for self-preservation."
Nelles, The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines, and
Hvdro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Hamden, CT,
Archon Books, 1974), p. 465.
What this suggests, I believe, is that certain kinds
of political imperatives are embedded within the design of
these quasi-autonomous agencies. The artifacts do indeed
have politics. I am not proposing a rigid institutional
determinism here, but instead argue for the contingent
relationship between the agencies and the ideological
interests of their administrators.
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reorganization of America's economy was not simply a
product of technocratic tinkering. The consumer revolution
of the post-war era emerged out of a long process in which
contending social forces struggled to assert their
interests. The rise of industrial unionism, the war-induced
economic resurgence, and the ideological discipline imposed
on the New Deal state during the 1940s provided the
foundation for a new set of institutional groundrules where
the state mediated an uneasy truce between industry and
organized labor. Labor received higher wages and relative
job security; business received higher profits through
increased productivity, reduced labor militance, and
carefully prescribed state intervention directed toward
smooth operation of foreign and domestic
markets. Lilienthal could not impose from above such
conditions upon the people of the Tennessee Valley.
Leaving the TVA at the war's end, Lilienthal went on
to become the first chair of the Atomic Energy Commission.
His leadership of the new agency and political challenges
he faced there suggest the ideological consolidation of
conservative keynesianism, and the extent of the state's
accommodation with capital. Most politicians and the press
viewed Lilienthal as a progressive voice on atomic energy
matters; in a sense he was, but his positions at the AEC
stand in marked contrast to those he held during the TVA's
first years. One of the central concerns at the AEC was who
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would control atomic energy. The military had directed all
research and development during the war. if electricity
generated by atomic fission remained linked to the weapons
program, then the armed services would retain control.
Lilienthal opposed this, but the alternative he favored
reflected the permanence of the ideological transformation
that had occurred since the late 1930s. Lilienthal urged
the privatization of atomic energy, with significant state
subsidies for the fledgling industry, and with minimal
regulatory guidelines enforced by the AEC. The political
range had shifted rightward. Once an advocate of extensive
public regulation, and once the overseer of the federal
government's largest experiment in public enterprise,
Lilienthal became a spokesman for private power.
In the 1950s Lilienthal himself turned to a career
that reflected this altered ideological spectrum. With
assistance from the investment house of Lazard, Freres, he
formed the Development and Resources Corporation to market
TVA-style development to less-developed countries. This
enterprise demanded his skills as a bureaucratic
entrepreneur. He tied the firm to the burgeoning American
foreign aid apparatus, and forged close ties to political
leaders in nations that accepted the dual imperatives of
open markets and anticommunism that shaped American foreign
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policy in the emerging Cold War world. ^ D&R Corporation,
then, reflected the very essence of the new accommodation
between corporate capital and the state.
Lilienthal also continued to exercise his promotional
skills, turning his pen in the 1950s toward the cultural
legitimation of the new order. Lilienthal was one of many
New Dealers who began to proclaim the beginning of a truly
New Era, unlike the false prophecy of the 1920s, and
heralded the onset of unparalleled material prosperity.
These rhetoricians were assured by the modest regulatory
that remained from the New Deal and by personal bonds
forged in wartime associations between state managers and
corporate executives that business and government were both
committed to a new partnership. The tracts literally poured
off the presses. Lilienthal 's Big Business: A New Era
(1953) , was one of a series of works that announced the new
economic order, accompanied by A. A. Berle's The Twentieth
Century Capitalist Revolution (1954) , and John Kenneth
Galbraith's American Capitalism (1952), among others. Other
studies, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s The Vital Center ,
were testaments to the political durability of the system.
^The Iranian regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi was one of
D&R's long-standing clients. In fact, the overthrow of the
Shah forced the firm into bankruptcy after it suffered huge
losses on an unfinished dam and power development project
in the Khuzestan valley. D&R had never been a hugely
profitable endeavor, and instead had existed as an
appendage to the Cold War policies of the United States.
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David Lilienthal was one of the architects of a
politics of consumption that emerged out of the ideological
struggles of the 1930s and 1940s as the conservative
keynesianism that defined the political economy of the
United States during the short-lived "American century."
This postwar system was not monolithic, nor was it as
immutable as its heralds proclaimed. Instead, this order
provided a set of rules for behavior to be followed by the
country's dominant economic and political forces. The rules
were subject to constant revision, as power ebbed and
flowed among the contending forces. Jarred by the domestic
and international turmoil of the early 1970s, the postwar
order frayed and then split apart.
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